United States v. Harper
Decision Date | 01 February 1956 |
Docket Number | Cr. No. 725-55. |
Citation | 137 F. Supp. 4 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Alva B. HARPER, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
William S. Thompson and Joseph P. McCormick, Washington, D. C., for defendant, for the motion.
Victor Caputy, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., opposed.
The defendant, Alva B. Harper, a physician, was convicted on a charge of performing an abortion, and moves for a new trial. The principal question that deserves discussion, relates to the admissibility of evidence. It is claimed that the court erred in admitting evidence that on two prior occasions the defendant had performed abortions on women other than the complaining witness.
The Government, in its case in chief, introduced evidence to the effect that the victim of the abortion called at the defendant's office; that she explained that she wanted him to bring about a miscarriage; and that at a later date, by prearrangement, she returned to his office when he inserted some medicine into her body through an instrument known as a speculum. She testified that she immediately became sick and that a few days later she was taken to the District of Columbia General Hospital, where she had a miscarriage. The fact that she had a miscarriage was corroborated by the hospital records. The defendant took the witness stand in his own behalf. He admitted that he had examined and treated the complaining witness, but claimed that she was bleeding, that he was afraid that she might lose the baby, and that the medicine he gave her was intended to prevent a miscarriage.
In rebuttal the Government called two other women, each of whom testified that on a prior occasion within a few weeks of the date involved in this case, the defendant, at her request, performed an abortion on her. The court admitted this evidence over objection solely on the issue of the defendant's intent to perform an abortion on the complaining witness. When the evidence was introduced, the court apprized the jury of the specific purpose for which it was admitted, and further explained this limitation in detail in its charge to the jury. In its instructions to the jury the court enumerated intent as one of the elements of the offense that the Government had the burden of proving.
It is, of course, an elementary principle that at the trial of a criminal case, evidence that the defendant has committed crimes other than the one with which he is charged, is not admissible. The basic reason for this rule is that the prejudice that may be caused to the defendant if such a fact were admitted in evidence, might outweigh its probative value. On the other hand, it is equally well settled that evidence of other similar acts of the defendant may be admitted to show motive, knowledge, intent, or a common design, whenever any of these elements is relevant. That such acts may also constitute crimes, does not bar their admission and does not affect their competency. While the bare fact that a defendant has committed other crimes is not in and of itself admissible against him, the fact that evidence otherwise competent and relevant would also show that the defendant committed other crimes, is no reason for its exclusion. A familiar example is a case involving the passing of counterfeit money. If the defendant claims that he did not know that the money was spurious and that he did not intend to pass any counterfeit money, it is admissible to show that he had passed counterfeit money on other occasions, in order to prove that it was no mere accident that at the time in question he had uttered a counterfeit bill, or a counterfeit coin.
This exception to the general rule was adopted at an early date in Massachusetts in an opinion written by Chief Justice Shaw. In Commonwealth v. Stone, 4 Metc., Mass., 43, 47, which involved a charge of fraudulently passing bills of exchange of a defunct bank, this great jurist wrote as follows:
A scholarly and exhaustive discussion of this general problem is found in the leading case of People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286, 62 L.R.A. 193. The court discusses the point involved here as follows 168 N.Y. at page 293, 61 N.E. at page 313:
"`Generally speaking, evidence of other crimes is competent to prove the specific crime charged when it tends to establish: (1) Motive; (2) intent; (3) the absence of mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the others; (5) the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial.'"
On the question of intent the opinion contains the following explanation 168 N.Y. at pages 297-298, 61 N.E. at page 296:
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Mayes v. Madigan, Civ. No. 35004.
...137 F. Supp. 1 ... Henry MAYES, Petitioner, ... Paul J. MADIGAN, Warden, United States Penitentiary, Alcatraz, California, Respondent ... Civ. No. 35004 ... United States ... ...