United States v. Harrelson, 72-3630 Summary Calendar.
Citation | 477 F.2d 383 |
Decision Date | 04 May 1973 |
Docket Number | No. 72-3630 Summary Calendar.,72-3630 Summary Calendar. |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Paul Louis HARRELSON, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit) |
David C. McCord, Dallas, Tex., Selwyn S. Webber, Odessa, Tex., court appointed, for defendant-appellant.
Frank D. McCown, U. S. Atty., Fort Worth, Tex., Charles D. Cabaniss, Asst. U. S. Atty., Dallas, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before THORNBERRY, GOLDBERG and RONEY, Circuit Judges.
Appellant, Paul Louis Harrelson, brings this appeal from his conviction on two counts of conspiring in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 to violate 18 U.S.C. § 2314 by causing stolen goods and forged securities to be transported in interstate commerce.1 Although the briefs filed on appellant's behalf purport to raise at least eight separate points of error, when the repetitive, redundant, and rephrased points are combined, we have before us only four distinct issues. We find each of these to be without legal merit, and we affirm.
First, appellant argues that the trial judge committed reversible error when she denied his motion for continuance, which was filed only three days before the trial was set to begin. We cannot agree. Although we are mindful that continuances must, in the interests of justice and fair play, be granted in many circumstances the general test on appellate review is whether the trial judge committed an abuse of discretion in granting or denying the motion for continuance. See, e. g., United States v. Vicars, 5 Cir. 1972, 467 F.2d 452, 455; United States v. Gower, 5 Cir. 1971, 447 F.2d 187, 190, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 850, 92 S.Ct. 84, 30 L.Ed.2d 88. We find that no such abuse occurred here. Appellant alleged as grounds to support his motion the hospitalization of his "lead counsel," the refusal of the prosecution to cooperate in discovery, and the general unpreparedness of his other retained attorneys. The District Judge conducted a lengthy hearing on these matters, specifically found that "most of the statements made in this Motion are completely untrue," and concluded that (1) the hospitalized attorney had in fact never accepted employment by appellant, (2) appellant's "other" retained attorneys provided adequate counsel, and (3) the prosecution was not obstructing discovery. We have studied the transcript of that hearing and we find plenteous evidence from which the trial judge could permissibly have made these findings. We note, for example, that one of appellant's attorneys had been retained eight weeks before trial and had filed various motions on his behalf and that another attorney had been on the case for at least one week. In the Vicars case, supra, we found no abuse of discretion in denying an eleventh hour request for continuance filed six days before trial. Under the circumstances outlined above, we are unable to perceive any abuse in the denial of this motion for continuance.
Second, appellant insists that the trial judge committed prejudicial error when she "forced" him to proceed to trial with counsel not of his own choosing. When the case was called for trial on the scheduled day, appellant appeared in the company of the two attorneys discussed above. Appellant again requested a continuance and claimed that he had no trial counsel. The able District Judge thereupon appointed both of the previously-retained counsel to represent appellant and proceeded to trial.2 We have only recently had before us a case presenting remarkably similar facts. In United States v. Sexton, 5 Cir. 1973, 473 F.2d 512, the operative facts were as follows:
The instant appeal is governed by the quoted portion of the Sexton...
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