United States v. Harris

• Docket Number: 3:22-CR-00018-FDW-SCR
• Decision Date: 15 September 2023
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. DARRELL ALAN HARRIS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. DARRELL ALAN HARRIS, Defendant.

No. 3:22-CR-00018-FDW-SCR

United States District Court, W.D. North Carolina, Charlotte Division

September 15, 2023

ORDER

Frank D. Whitney United States District Judge

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant's Objections, (Doc. No. 38), to the Magistrate Judge's Memorandum and Recommendation (“M&R”), (Doc No. 34). Defendant seeks review of the M&R's recommendation that this Court deny Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence, (Doc. No. 29). This matter is now ripe for review.

For the reasons set forth below, the M&R is AFFIRMED and ADOPTED IN PART and AMENDED IN PART; Defendant's Objections are SUSTAINED IN PART and OVERRULED IN PART; and Defendant's Motion to Suppress is DENIED.

I. Background

Defendant was indicted on January 20, 2022, on the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C §§ 922(g)(1). On January 20, 2023, Defendant filed the instant motion to suppress. The suppression motion seeks to suppress all evidence taken during and derivative from a stop and search of a vehicle that occurred on March 15, 2021.

The magistrate judge conducted an evidentiary hearing on February 24, 2023. At hearing, the Government presented the testimony of three police officers with the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department who were involved in the events in question: Officer Charles Famulari, Officer Jabari Barrett, and Officer Joseph Muha. During the hearing, the court admitted and viewed portions of the photos and videos captured during the traffic stop by the officers' body worn cameras. On March 6, 2023, the magistrate judge issued the M&R to deny the motion to suppress. (Doc. No. 34). Defendant timely filed its Objections to the M&R on April 3, 2023, (Doc. No. 38). The Government did not file a response to the Objections; however, this Court has reviewed the initial pleadings, as well as the evidence and argument presented by both parties during the hearing.

II. Standard of Review

A district court may refer a motion to suppress to a magistrate judge for a recommendation pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 59(b)(1). See Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(1). A party may file written objections to a magistrate judge's memorandum and recommendation within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the memorandum and recommendation. 28 U.S.C § 636(b)(1). ‘“Any written objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections.”' Morgan v. N.C. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 421 F.Supp.2d 890, 893 (W.D. N.C. 2006) (emphasis in original) (quoting Thomas v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 21 F.Supp.2d 551, 560 (D.S.C. 1997)); see also Battle v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987) (“Parties filing objections must specifically identify those findings objected to.”) (cleaned up). “Frivolous, conclusive or general objections need not be considered by the district court.” Battle, 834 F.2d at 421 (quotation omitted). “A general objection, or one that merely restates the arguments previously presented is not sufficient to alert the court to alleged errors on the part of the magistrate judge.” Aldrich v. Bock, 327 F.Supp.2d 743, 747 (E.D. Mich. 2004).

Thus, “[a]n ‘objection' that does nothing more than state a disagreement with a magistrate's suggested resolution, or simply summarizes what has been presented before, is not an ‘objection' as that term is used in this context.” Id.; see also Jones v. Hamidullah, No. 2:05-2736-PMD-RSC, 2005 WL 3298966 at *3 (D.S.C. Dec. 5, 2005) (noting objections to an M&R “on the whole are without merit in that they merely rehash [the] general arguments and do not direct the court's attention to any specific portion of the [report]”). General or conclusory objections result not only in the loss of de novo review by the district court but also in waiver of appellate review. Tyler v. Beinor, 81 Fed.Appx. 445, 446 (4th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); United States v. Woods, 64 Fed.Appx. 398, 399 (4th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). If proper objections are made, a district court will review the objections under a de novo standard. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Absent a specific, proper, and timely filed objection, the Court reviews only for “clear error,” and need not give any explanation for adopting the M&R. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005); Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 200 (4th Cir. 1983).

Upon careful review of the record, “The court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c).

Additionally, a reviewing court must take a deferential standard regarding the credibility of witnesses where the magistrate judge sits as a trier of fact. See McNairn v. Sullivan, 929 F.2d 974, 977 n. 3 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. MacConnell, 2010 WL 3399166, *2 (W.D. N.C. 2010); United States v. Brooks, 2006 WL 695079 at *1 (W.D. N.C. 2006). Some courts have explicitly adopted a deferential standard of review for credibility determinations when the magistrate judge heard the live testimony and observed the demeanor of the witnesses. See, e.g., United States v. Gibbs, 421 F.3d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 2005) (“In [making a de novo determination], the district court need not re-hear testimony from the suppression hearing; its deference to the magistrate's credibility determinations is appropriate when they are supported by the record.”).

III. Findings of Fact

The magistrate judge entered findings of fact based on the testimony and evidence received during the hearing. (See Doc. No. 34, pp. 1-3). Defendant lodges specific factual objections to the facts as laid out in the M&R, with specific citations to the hearing transcript. In short, Defendant argues the evidence contradicts eleven facts found in the M&R. (Doc. No. 38, pp. 4-8).

With benefit of the transcript of the evidentiary hearing, the Court has closely reviewed each of the factual objections and finds only one objection to be supported by the testimony in the record. The M&R indicates the traffic stop occurred on “March 15, 2023,” (Doc. No. 34, p. 2); however, the evidence clearly indicates the stop occurred on March 15, 2021. It appears the M&R's reference to 2023 instead of 2021 is a typographical error, and the Court sustains the objection and finds as fact that the traffic stop at issue occurred on March 15, 2021.

Otherwise, objections (1) and (3) through (11) as outlined in Defendant's filing are overruled. In short, the premise underlying these objections is that the magistrate judge incorrectly assessed the witnesses' credibility or failed to account for explanations made during crossexamination. These objections suggest the M&R ignored factual discrepancies, or failed to consider the full factual record, because the magistrate judge determined the officers' testimony to be credible. In overruling these objections, the Court notes that a reviewing court must take a deferential standard regarding the credibility of witnesses where the Magistrate Judge sits as a trier of fact. See United States v. Brooks, No. 1:05CR248-1, [2006 BL 36801], 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25626, at *3-4, 2006 WL 695079, at *1-2 (W.D. N.C. March 15, 2006); United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 232 (4th Cir. 2008); McNairn v. Sullivan, 929 F.2d 974, 977 n. 3 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Stoots, No. 97-4038, , 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 32787, at *2, 1997 WL 724503, at *1 (4th Cir. Nov. 20, 1997) (unpublished table decision). The Court agrees with the magistrate judge's findings of witness credibility with regard to the officers' testimony. The magistrate judge presided over the evidentiary hearing and was in the best position to make determinations regarding credibility. Furthermore, the undersigned has reviewed the record, particularly witness testimony, and finds the magistrate judge's findings of credibility to be consistent with the evidence in the record.

Upon de novo review, the Court finds the magistrate judge's recitation of the facts in the M&R as amended herein to be supported by the evidence and record, and since they are adopted with modification, they are restated to provide context for this Order:

On or around March 8, 2021, Officer Famulari initiated a voluntary contact with Defendant Darrell Harris in the vicinity of Catherine Simmons Drive and August Street in Charlotte. Famulari was part of an increased police presence in this high crime area. Defendant was operating a white Dodge Ram truck. A tag reading “TAG APPLIED FOR” was displayed on the truck. Famulari advised Defendant that his tag was improper. During the course of their contact Defendant gave the officer a fictitious name. Famulari did not document the contact and Defendant was not detained.

On March 15, 202[1], Famulari spotted Defendant operating the same truck back in the area of Catherine Simmons Drive. The truck was still displaying the improper tag. The officer was going to initiate a stop for the improper tag. As Famulari approached in his cruiser, Defendant drove away and entered I-77 from La Salle Street. Defendant accelerated and Famulari reached a speed of ninety miles per hour attempting to stop the truck. Defendant pulled onto the shoulder of I-77 near Morehead Street. Famulari approached the passenger side of the truck. An eight year old child in the back seat was the only passenger. The officer detected a strong odor of marijuana coming from inside the truck. He advised Defendant that he was being stopped for the improper tag and for driving “way too fast.” Defendant could not produce an operator's license or registration for the truck. He told Famulari

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