United States v. Hartley
| Decision Date | 17 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | 22-3010, No. 22-3044 |
| Citation | 34 F.4th 919 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Dalton R. HARTLEY, Defendant - Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Corey R. Detter, Defendant - Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Kayla Gassmann, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Melody Brannon, Federal Public Defender; with her on the briefs), Kansas City, Kansas, for Defendants-Appellants.
James A. Brown, Assistant United States Attorney (Duston J. Slinkard, United States Attorney, with him on the briefs), Topeka, Kansas, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Before MATHESON, BRISCOE, and EID, Circuit Judges.
Defendants-Appellants Dalton R. Hartley and Corey R. Detter, in separate criminal cases, each moved for early termination of probation under 18 U.S.C. § 3564(c). The same district judge denied their motions for the exact same reason. On appeal, they filed unopposed motions for expedited consideration, which we granted. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 in these related appeals, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Mr. Hartley pled guilty to aiding and abetting the acquiring of a controlled substance by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception, or subterfuge, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(3) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. His plea agreement included an appeal waiver. The district court sentenced him to probation for three years, set to expire on August 1, 2022.
On January 12, 2022, Mr. Hartley moved for early termination of his probation under 18 U.S.C. § 3564(c), which provides:
(c) Early termination. —The court, after considering the factors set forth in [ 18 U.S.C.] section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, may, pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure relating to the modification of probation, terminate a term of probation previously ordered and discharge the defendant at any time in the case of a misdemeanor or an infraction or at any time after the expiration of one year of probation in the case of a felony, if it is satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct of the defendant and the interest of justice.1
His motion said that (1) he had successfully completed over 29 months of his 36-month term of probation, (2) his reintegration into society was complete, and (3) further supervision was unnecessary. He further stated that the United States Probation Office and the Government did not oppose the motion.
In the motion, Mr. Hartley identified several factors to support early termination. He was "in good standing with the Probation Office ... [, had] reported as directed, [had] complied with all conditions of probation, completed the [Moral Recognition Therapy] program, completed his 200 hours community service within 13 months, [had] passed all of his drug tests, and [had] adjusted successfully to probation." 22-3010, ROA, Vol. 1 at 49. He continued "to perform community service by speaking to nursing students at Salina Area Technical College and UMKC Pharmacy Students about the risk of addiction and codependency, and by role playing with the Masters of Social Work Program through Kansas State University in Salina." Id. Mr. Hartley also led "the 12-step program at his church and serve[d] on the church's leadership counsel." Id. Finally, he had "successfully reintegrated into the community" and had "been working as a materials handler at [a Kansas company] since April 2018." Id. Mr. Hartley's motion also discussed the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) that warranted early termination of his probationary term.
The district court denied the motion on the day it was filed. After setting forth the facts of Mr. Hartley's case and noting his "satisfactory performance on probation," the court's order stated:
The Court frequently grants early termination of terms of supervised release which are imposed following a term of incarceration. Here as noted, Defendant did not receive a sentence of incarceration; instead, probation was his sentence. The Court views that differently than early termination of supervised release where a defendant has already served his full incarceration sentence. Where the principal sentence imposed on a defendant was of probation, the Court does not find that a subsequent truncation of that sentence is in the interest of justice, even if (as here) the conduct of the defendant is meritorious. Therefore, the motion is denied.
Mr. Detter pled guilty without a plea agreement to one count of manufacturing counterfeit currency, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 471, and to two counts of possessing counterfeit currency, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 472. The district court sentenced him to probation for three years, set to end on July 30, 2022.
Like Mr. Hartley, Mr. Detter moved for early termination of his probation under 18 U.S.C. § 3564(c). His motion, filed March 1, 2022, said that (1) he had successfully completed 31 months of his 36-month probationary term, (2) his reintegration into society was complete, and (3) further supervision was unnecessary. He further stated that the United States Probation Office did not oppose the motion, but noted the Government objected to it.
Mr. Detter's motion presented the following facts:
Mr. Detter is in good standing with the Probation Office and is eligible for early termination under the terms of the USPO procedure manual. Mr. Detter had one positive [urinalysis test] on November 19, 2020, and a diluted [urinalysis test] on March 15, 2021, but has been compliant with all drug testing since then and has a record of successful rehabilitation while on probation. As his post-sentencing conduct demonstrates, Mr. Detter has maintained employment and a stable residence, has learned from his mistakes, and has demonstrated a willingness and capability to remain a valuable, law-abiding member of the community.
22-3044, ROA, Vol. 1 at 29-30.
The motion further detailed that he had worked for the same company since May 2021, had earned a Class A Colorado Driver's License in January 2022, and continued to be "involved with Oxford House as an alumnus by assisting new residents and helping with fundraising efforts." Id. at 31. At age 30, he had "converted himself into a law-abiding community member." Id. The motion also discussed the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) that warranted early termination of his probationary term.
The same district judge who denied Mr. Hartley's motion also denied Mr. Detter's. The district court recited the facts of his case, including his "good standing with the Probation Office." Id. at 34. It then repeated the identical language that it used to deny Mr. Hartley's motion, including its view that when "a defendant[’s]" sentence "was of probation," "truncation" is not "in the interest of justice." Id.
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The Defendants provided evidence that the district judge in their cases used the same language to deny § 3564(c) motions for other defendants. See 22-3010, Aplt. Br. Attachs. D-G. At oral argument, the Government conceded that the district judge had ruled similarly in other cases and that it could not identify a case in which the judge had taken a different approach. Oral Arg. at 21:17-22:10.
Mr. Hartley and Mr. Detter argue the district court abused its discretion by adopting a blanket policy to deny them relief under § 3564(c) and refusing to consider § 3564(c) ’s statutory criteria. 22-3010, Aplt. Br. at 11-19; 22-3044, Aplt. Br. at 11-19. Before addressing these arguments, we first determine whether Mr. Hartley waived his right to bring this appeal.
Mr. Hartley's plea agreement included the following waiver paragraph:
10. Waiver of Appeal and Collateral Attack. The defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives any right to appeal or collaterally attack any matter in connection with this prosecution, his conviction, or the components of the sentence to be imposed herein, including the length and conditions of supervised release, as well as any sentence imposed upon a revocation of supervised release. The defendant is aware that 18 U.S.C. § 3742 affords him the right to appeal the conviction and sentence imposed. The defendant also waives any right to challenge his sentence, or the manner in which it was determined, or otherwise attempt to modify or change his sentence, in any collateral attack, including, but not limited to, a motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (), or a motion brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). In other words, the defendant waives the right to appeal the sentence imposed in this case, except to the extent, if any, the Court departs upwards from the sentencing Guideline range that the Court determines to be applicable. However, if the United States exercises its right to appeal the sentence imposed, as authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b), the defendant is released from this waiver and may appeal the sentence received, as authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). Notwithstanding the forgoing waivers, the parties understand that the defendant in no way waives any subsequent claims with regards to ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct.
22-3010, ROA, Vol. 1 at 36-37.
During Mr. Hartley's colloquy with the court under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, the following exchange took place:
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