United States v. Harvey
Decision Date | 04 February 1966 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 3323. |
Citation | 250 F. Supp. 219 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Fletcher HARVEY et al. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Hugh Fleischer, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.
Stephen P. Dart, St. Francisville, La., for R. Harry Daniel, Sr., R. Harry Daniel, Jr., Edward I. Daniel, Jordan Truitt and Daniel and Truitt, Inc., defendants.
Leon A. Picou, St. Francisville, La., for Fletcher Harvey and Bertrand Haralson Barrow, defendants.
Fred Jackson, St. Francisville, La., for John Davis Spillman, defendant.
This suit is brought by the United States of America under the provisions of Title 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1971(b) and (c), and Public Law No. 89-110, 89th Congress, Section 11(b), commonly known as the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The United States seeks an injunction enjoining the defendants individually and all persons acting in concert with them from engaging in any acts, and specifically those herein complained of, designed to deprive Negro citizens of West Feliciana Parish, Louisiana, of the voting rights secured by the above mentioned laws. More specifically, the United States alleges that the defendants, for the purpose of interfering with the rights of Negroes to vote, have "subjected and threatened to subject Negro citizens to coercive and intimidatory economic penalties, which have included:
Defendants, while admitting that some of their tenant farmers and day laborers have been discharged, deny that the termination of employment is in any way connected with any voting activities engaged in by those affected. They deny any violation on their part of the provisions of either Title 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1971, or of Public Law No. 89-110, 89th Congress, Section 11(b). All of the defendants further urge the unconstitutionality of the laws in question on the ground that their enforcement, in this instance, would violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by depriving them of their property and of the free use and exercise thereof without due process of law.
This suit was filed on December 17, 1965, at which time plaintiff's motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order was denied and the case set for hearing on its motion for a preliminary injunction on December 23, 1965. In view of the fact that, when the hearing was held on December 23, all parties stated that they had introduced all of the evidence available to them, it was agreed that the Court would consider this hearing as a trial on the merits, and decide on this record whether or not plaintiff is entitled to the injunctive relief sought. Now, after carefully considering the record, including the exhaustive briefs filed by counsel for both sides, this Court concludes that, under the law, and for the following reasons, plaintiff cannot prevail herein.
The issues presented are several. First, does the Voting Rights Act of 1965 apply to individual action, or must it, constitutionally speaking, be limited in its application to state action; second, can the Voting Rights Act of 1965, without running afoul of the United States Constitution, be so construed and applied as to prevent a private individual from evicting tenants from his privately owned property for whatever reason he may wish to do so; and third, if it be held that the Voting Rights Act can be so construed and applied, does the evidence in this case justify a holding that these particular defendants are in violation of Section 11(b) of that Act.
The United States seeks injunctive relief on the ground that the action of the defendants, in evicting certain tenants from their properties, constitutes a violation of Title 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1971(b), and Section 11(b) of Public Law 89-110, 89th Congress, commonly known as the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
Section 42 U.S.C.A. § 1971(b) provides:
"(b) No person, whether acting under color of law or otherwise, shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any other person for the purpose of interfering with the right of such other person to vote or to vote as he may choose, or of causing such other person to vote for, or not to vote for, any candidate for the office of President, Vice President, presidential elector, Member of the Senate, or Member of the House of Representatives, Delegates or Commissioners from the Territories or possessions, at any general, special, or primary election held solely or in part for the purpose of selecting or electing any such candidate."
Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 provides:
"No person, whether acting under color of law or otherwise, shall intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for voting or attempting to vote, or intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for urging or aiding any person to vote or attempt to vote, or intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for exercising any powers or duties under Section 3(a), 6, 8, 9, 10, or 12(e)."
The first question to be decided is whether or not these quoted provisions of federal law can be so construed as to prohibit purely individual acts of discrimination as distinguished from state action amounting to discrimination. If they purport to prohibit individual discriminatory acts, we must decide whether or not the prohibition contained in the Voting Rights Act is directed to the right to vote in state and local elections as well as in federal elections, and, if so, whether or not such a prohibition is within the power of Congress to decree. Since the specific provisions of 42 U.S. C.A. Section 1971(b), relied on herein by plaintiff are so similar in effect to the provisions of the Voting Rights Act relied upon, a determination of the validity of petitioner's contentions under the latter will suffice in determining the issues presented in this case.
The very title of the Voting Rights Act itself leaves no doubt but that this Act was passed by Congress under its assumption that its authority to do so was contained in the Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Act is entitled "To Enforce the fifteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other purposes." In addition thereto, reference to the Act itself clearly shows by its repeated reference to the Fifteenth Amendment that that Amendment is considered to be the source of congressional power to enact this legislation. It is repeatedly stated throughout the Act that its purpose is "to enforce the guarantees of the Fifteenth Amendment."
The Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
It has been repeatedly, consistently, and unequivocally held that the prohibition contained in the Fifteenth Amendment is directed solely at action "by the United States or by any State" and not at action by the individual. James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 23 S.Ct. 678, 47 L.Ed. 979 (1903); Brawner v. Irvin, 169 F. 964 (N.D.Ga.1909); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 73 S.Ct. 809, 97 L.Ed. 1152, rehearing denied, 345 U.S. 1003, 73 S. Ct. 1128, 97 L.Ed. 1408 (1953); United States v. Amsden, 6 F. 819 (D.C.Ind. 1881); United States v. Morris, 125 F. 322 (E.D.Ark.1903); Karem v. United States, 121 F. 250, 61 L.R.A. 437, (C.A. 6, 1903); Hawkins v. North Carolina Dental Society, 230 F.Supp. 805 (W.D. N.C.1964); and Paynes v. Lee, 239 F. Supp. 1019 (E.D.La.1965).
In James v. Bowman, supra, the United States Supreme Court was considering the constitutionality of an act of Congress, U.S.Rev.Stat. § 5507 (U.S.Comp. Stat.1901, p. 3712), which provided:
In the course of its opinion, the United States Supreme Court said:
Then, after analogizing the Fifteenth Amendment to the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court said:
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Nipper v. Smith
...conduct of private individuals in all elections; however, the constitutionality of this section is questionable. See United States v. Harvey, 250 F.Supp. 219 (D.C.La.1966) (holding that the section is unconstitutional as applied to private individuals in nonfederal elections in light of Sup......
-
United States v. Simms
...power. See: Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 14 U.S. 304, 4 L.Ed. 97 (1816). Defendant cites this Court to United States v. Harvey, 250 F.Supp. 219 (E.D. La. 1965), for authority that Congress is powerless to punish individual action as it relates to state elections. In that case, t......
-
Jordon T. Stringer, Criminalizing Voter Suppression: the Necessity of Restoring Legitimacy in Federal Elections and Reversing Disillusionment in Minority Communities
...UNION, supra note 76. 80 Id. 81 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 41. 82 Swirsky, supra note 12, at 371. 83 United States v. Harvey, 250 F. Supp. 219, 226 (E.D. La. 1966). 84 United States v. Edwards, 333 F.2d 575, 579 (5th Cir. 1964). 85 Id. 86 Id. 87 Swirsky, supra note 12, at 372 (citing......
-
THE ANTI-TENANCY DOCTRINE.
...eviction by their white landlords "for the purpose of interfering with their rights of registering and voting"), with U.S. v. Harvey, 250 F. Supp. 219, 228-29 (E.D. La. 1966) (rejecting Black sharecroppers' claims that they were evicted for registering to vote in part because "[t]he right o......