United States v. Harvick

Decision Date12 August 1957
Docket NumberCrim. No. 8640.
Citation153 F. Supp. 696
CourtU.S. District Court — District of South Dakota
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Bennie HARVICK and J. C. Beattie, Defendants.

Robert L. Vogel, U. S. Atty., Fargo, N. D., for plaintiff.

M. J. Clayburgh, Albuquerque, N. M., and William T. DePuy, Grafton, N. D., for defendants.

DAVIES, District Judge.

These proceedings stem from a pending criminal prosecution for income tax evasion involving the defendants, Harvick and Beattie. A Grand Jury returned a four count indictment against the two defendants under 26 U.S.C.A. § 145(b) of the Internal Revenue Code.

Count One charges Harvick with attempting to evade 1952 income taxes by filing false returns, and Count Two charges Harvick with attempting to evade 1953 income tax in the same manner.

Count Three charges Beattie with attempting to evade 1952 income tax by filing false returns, and Count Four charges Beattie with attempting to evade 1953 income tax in like fashion.

The defendants have moved to dismiss the indictment upon these grounds:

1. The indictment does not state facts sufficient to constitute an offense against the United States.

2. It charges two or more offenses but does not allege that they are of the same or similar character or part of a common scheme or plan as required by Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A.

3. It does not allege that the defendants participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses as required by Rule 8(b).

With respect to the first ground, there has been judicial determination that an indictment charging the filing of an income tax return deliberately understating net income and the tax thereon adequately states an offense against the United States. Cave v. U. S., 8 Cir., 1947, 159 F.2d 464; United States v. American Stevedores, D.C.N.Y.1954, 16 F.R.D. 164.

With respect to the second ground both sets of counts, one with two and three with four, separately charging the offense of income tax evasion but for different years, as to each defendant, are certainly of the same or similar character and may be joined in a single indictment. United States v. Sullivan, 2 Cir., 1938, 98 F.2d 79; Cf., Slick v. U. S., 7 Cir., 1924, 1 F.2d 897, (consolidation of two indictments against one defendant for income tax evasion in different years).

With respect to the third ground we are confronted with a substantial question: Is an indictment objectionable which separately charges two defendants with income tax evasion without alleging any connection or participation of the defendants in the offenses?

This Court thinks such indictment is objectionable, but that severance of the defendants rather than dismissal of the indictment as sought here is the proper remedy. Kleven v. U. S., 8 Cir., 1957, 240 F.2d 270.

Dismissal of the indictment for misjoinder of defendants would be improper. United States v. Northeast Texas Chapter, National Electrical Contractors Ass'n, 5 Cir., 1950, 181 F.2d 30; Cf., Finnegan v. U. S., 8 Cir., 1953, 204 F.2d 105 (misjoinder of offenses).

In United States v. Welsh, D.C.D.C., 1953, 15 F.R.D. 189, 190, Judge Holtzoff makes this comment:

"Rule 8(b) in the second sentence permits the joinder in the same indictment if some defendants are charged only in one or more counts but all of the defendants are not charged in each count. But the first sentence of Rule 8(b) limits the joinder of defendants in the same indictment only to situations where they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction, or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses. In other words, different unconnected offenses not arising out of the same series of transactions may not be joined in an indictment in which two or more defendants are charged. There is good reason for that restriction. This is no technical limitation. The purpose is to prevent mass trials." (Italics supplied.)

This Court considers, therefore, that in the instant case Harvick...

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13 cases
  • U.S. v. Franks
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • February 12, 1975
    ...Cir. 1959), modified,273 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1960); United States v. Florio, 315 F.Supp. 795, 797 (E.D.N.Y.1970); United States v. Havrick, 153 F.Supp. 696, 698 (D.N.D. 1957). If Counts 1, 2 and 3 were properly joined in Indictment 72--48, then the charges contained in Indictment 72--49, ste......
  • Gajewski v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • August 26, 1963
    ...no discretion to deny severance where multiple defendants are charged with offenses in no way connected. See also, United States v. Harvick, D.N.D., 153 F.Supp. 696 (1957). Upon reasonable consideration of the indictment in its entirety, we conclude that it satisfies the requirements of Rul......
  • United States v. Moriarty
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin
    • June 10, 1971
    ...enough to authorize consolidation of 70-CR-42 and 70-CR-43. See United States v. Lugo, 269 F.Supp. 757 (E.D.Wis.1967); United States v. Harvick, 153 F.Supp. 696 (N.D.1957); cf. Turner v. United States, 222 F.2d 926, 932 (4th Cir. 1955), cert. denied 350 U.S. 831, 76 S.Ct. 65, 100 L.Ed. 742 ......
  • United States v. Campbell Hardware, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • April 9, 1979
    ...385 U.S. 1013, 87 S.Ct. 723, 17 L.Ed.2d 549 (1967); accord United States v. Lugo, 269 F.Supp. 757 (E.D.Wis.1967); United States v. Harvick, 153 F.Supp. 696 (D.N.D.1957). Accordingly, Dudley's motion to dismiss pursuant to rule 8(b), for misjoinder, is denied. In considering Dudley's motion ......
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