United States v. Harwood

Decision Date11 April 2022
Docket Number1:14-CR-10042-CBK
PartiesUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. JESSE JAMES HARWOOD, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of South Dakota
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CHARLES B. KORNMANN, United States District Judge

I. BACKGROUND

In the early hours of September 8, 2014, Jesse Howard ("defendant") stabbed his 21-year-old brother Dallas Farmer to death over music. While listening to music and drinking alcohol outside his house in Agency Village South Dakota with his family and girlfriend, an argument broke out concerning what to play on the stereo. Intoxicated, the defendant turned off the stereo twice and proceeded to become aggressive and angry. This led to Harwood throwing knives form the kitchen towards the group as he remained inside the house. Acting as a peacemaker, Harwood's brother Dallas went into the house, seeing if he could diffuse the situation. Minutes later, Harwood came outside bleeding from the head. Upset over the defendant's outburst that evening, Ms. Ojeda ended the relationship then and there. Harwood walked away. But during this back-and-forth, nobody saw or heard from Dallas.

Ms. Ojeda went inside the house, finding Dallas lying on the living room floor saturated with his own blood from a stabbing wound inflicted by the defendant. Dallas was losing consciousness with every minute. Grabbing Aaron Farmer, who was sleeping in a back bedroom, Ojeda tried to revive Dallas as Aaron called 911. Tragically, their efforts were fruitless. But where was Harwood?

The defendant was on a walk while his brother laid dying because of his stabbing attack. He ultimately returned to the house while his (now ex-)girlfriend Ojeda tried to revive his own brother. Instead of rendering first aid or trying to ameliorate the situation, or simply do anything, Mr. Harwood retreated into his bedroom. This is where law enforcement ultimately found him, mere feet from where his brother passed away.

This was not even the first time that this Court has sentenced the defendant for stabbing a family member. In 2011 Harwood stabbed his uncle Stacy Farmer two times in the back with a serrated steak knife. When another individual, Samuel Farmer, tried to break up the fight, defendant bit Samuel's finger, and proceeded to throw two knives at another, David Farmer. Harwood stabbed his brother Dallas to death while on Supervised Release for the 2011 offense.

Mr. Harwood pled guilty to Assault with a Dangerous Weapon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 113(a)(3), 1153. The defendant's guideline range for killing his brother was 57-71 months. After considering all relevant constitutional and statutory factors, including those listed under 18 U.S.C. 3553, this Court upwardly departed and sentenced Mr. Harwood to the statutory maximum of 120 months, followed by three years of supervised release. While acknowledging Harwood has a serious seizure disorder, the Court noted that his condition had no bearing on the killing of his brother, in a nearly identical series of circumstances that led to his first stabbing conviction from which he was still on supervised release. In both instances Harwood was heavily intoxicated when he stabbed his relatives. Tragically, in this offense the stabbing led to the loss of a young father.

On February 23, 2022, Mr. Harwood motioned this Court for compassionate release pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), and to be released to Sisseton, South Dakota. Doc. 44. While checking the requisite boxes for consideration because of (1) a terminal illness; (2) a serious medical condition; and (3) other extraordinary and compelling reasons, this Memorandum and Order explains why only assertions based on a serious medical condition are properly presented before this Court.

Defendant is currently housed in FCI Beaumont, in Texas. Sentenced by this Court in May 2015 to 120 months, Harwood's release date is scheduled for March 13, 2023. This motion would release the defendant almost a year earlier than originally scheduled. Because Harwood's brief assertions for release because of his seizure disorder are unavailing on its own, his motion should be denied.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, Title II, § 212, authorized, inter alia, the district court, upon motion of the Director of the BOP, to reduce a prison term after considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), "if it finds that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." The United States Sentencing Commission was established by the Sentencing Reform Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Effective November 1, 2006, the Sentencing Commission adopted Guideline § IB 1.13, the policy statement on reduction of a term of imprisonment pursuant to § 3582(c)(1)(A). These provisions are known as the compassionate release provisions of the federal criminal code and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.

On December 21, 2018, the First Step Act of 2018 was enacted. Pub. L. 115-391. The First Step Act amended, inter alia, § 3582(c)(1)(A) to increase the use and transparency of the compassionate release process. The Act added district court authority to grant compassionate release upon motion of a defendant after the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Frustratingly, though, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have not been amended since passage of the First Step Act in 2018.[1] This Court proceeds in three steps: (1) assessing whether Campbell has exhausted his administrative remedies; (2) determining whether defendant has demonstrated that there are extraordinary and compelling circumstances warranting early release; and (3) if he has demonstrated such circumstances, whether the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors weigh in favor of early release. United States v. Marcussen, 15 F.4th 855, 858 (8th Cir. 2021) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)).

B. Jurisdiction

Since sentences are final judgments, a court ordinarily "may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). However, an exception exists where a court "may reduce the term of imprisonment" when "extraordinary and compelling reasons" exist under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and that the "reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); United States v. Taylor, - F.- 2022 WL 815289, at *1 (8th Cir. 2022) (per curiam). The defendant carries the burden to show a sentence reduction is warranted under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). United States v. Jones, 836 F.3d 896, 899 (8th Cir. 2016).

C. Exhaustion

This Court can only grant a sentence reduction upon motion of the defendant "after [he] has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier." 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A). See United States v. Houck, 2 F.4th 1082, 1083-84 (8th Cir. 2021). Here, Mr. Harwood requested a Reduction in Sentence ("RIS") from the Warden at FCI Beaumont on April 8, 2021, based on his seizure-related medical issues and assertions of improper care inside the facility. Doc. 46 at 1094. On April 20, 2021 Warden J. Bartlett denied defendant's RIS. Id. at 1093. Accordingly, this matter is now ripe for adjudication.

D. Compassionate Release

Compassionate release offers defendants with "extraordinary and compelling reasons" the opportunity to leave prison prior to the conclusion of their sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). However, § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) does not define what "extraordinary and compelling reasons" may be; rather, that was left to the Commission. And as this Court has noted, the Commission has failed to offer such explanations to date. Prior to the First Step Act, though, the Commission established four categories for district courts to consider when reducing a defendant's term of imprisonment. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § IB 1.13, Application Note 1, these four examples of extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release are:

(A) Medical Condition of the Defendant. -
(i) The defendant is suffering from a terminal illness (i.e a serious and advanced illness with an end of life trajectory). A specific prognosis of life expectancy (i.e., a probability of death within a specific time period) is not required. Examples include metastatic solid-tumor cancer, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), end-stage organ disease, and advanced dementia. (ii) The defendant is-
(I) suffering from a serious physical or medical condition,
(II) suffering from a serious functional or cognitive impairment, or
(III) experiencing deteriorating physical or mental health because of the aging process, that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover.
(B) Age of the Defendant. - The defendant (i) is at least 65 years old; (ii) is experiencing a serious deterioration in physical or mental health because of the aging process; and (iii) has served at least 10 years or 75 percent of his or her term of imprisonment, whichever is less.
(C) Family Circumstances.
(i) The death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the defendant's minor child or minor children.
(ii) The incapacitation of the defendant's spouse or registered partner when the defendant would be the only available caregiver for the spouse or registered partner.
(D) Other Reasons. - As determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons,
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