United States v. Hasbajrami
Citation | 945 F.3d 641 |
Decision Date | 18 December 2019 |
Docket Number | August Term, 2018,Docket No. 15-2684-L; 17-2669-CON |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Agron HASBAJRAMI, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit) |
Michael K. Bachrach, Law Office of Michael K. Bachrach, New York, NY, Joshua L. Dratel, Joshua L. Dratel, PC., New York, NY, and Steve Zissou, Steve Zissou & Associates, Bayside, NY, for Defendant-Appellant Agron Hasbajrami.
Seth D. DuCharme, David C. James, Saritha Komatireddy, Assistant United States Attorneys, Joseph F. Palmer, Attorney, National Security Division, United States Department of Justice for Richard P. Donoghue, United States District Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY, for the United States of America.
Patrick Toomey and Ashley Gorski, American Civil Liberties Foundation, New York, NY, Mark Rumold and Andrew Crocker, Electronic Frontier Foundation, San Francisco, CA, Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union and Electronic Frontier Foundation.
Before: LYNCH, CARNEY, and DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
This case concerns the Fourth Amendment implications of the government's increasing technological capacity for electronic surveillance in foreign intelligence and terrorism investigations, and the balance our constitutional system requires between national security and individual privacy.
On September 6, 2011, Defendant-Appellant Agron Hasbajrami ("Hasbajrami") was arrested as he attempted to board a flight to Turkey at John F. Kennedy International Airport in Queens, New York. His luggage contained a tent, boots, and cold-weather gear. The government, which had collected Hasbajrami's electronic communications, charged him with attempting to provide material support to a terrorist organization, alleging that he intended to travel to the Federally Administered Tribal Area of Pakistan, where he expected to join a terrorist organization, receive training, and ultimately fight "against U.S. forces and others in Afghanistan and Pakistan." App'x at 44. During the course of the prosecution, the government disclosed that it had collected some of its evidence under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 ("FISA"), Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978), codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. , and that it intended to Introduce FISA-derived evidence at any eventual trial. Faced with the evidence, including his own incriminating communications, Hasbajrami ultimately pleaded guilty to attempting to provide material support to terrorists in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A. He was sentenced to 180 months in prison.
Hasbajrami was already serving his sentence when the government provided him with a supplemental letter disclosing, for the first time, that some of the evidence it had previously disclosed from FISA surveillance was itself the fruit of earlier information obtained without a warrant pursuant to Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act ("Section 702"), Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008), codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1881a.
It is that Section 702-derived evidence — primarily electronic communications between Hasbajrami and individuals without ties to the United States and located abroad — that is at issue in this appeal. Following the disclosure of Section 702 surveillance, the district court (John Gleeson, then-J .) permitted Hasbajrami to withdraw his plea; Hasbajrami subsequently moved to suppress all evidence seized by the government under its Section 702 programs, as well as any fruits of that surveillance, including the evidence obtained pursuant to FISA warrants and inculpatory statements Hasbajrami made upon arrest. The district court denied the motion to suppress, and Hasbajrami again pleaded guilty, reserving his right to appeal the district court's denial of his suppression motion.
The vast majority of Section 702 surveillance at issue here involves information the government collected about Hasbajrami incidental to its surveillance of other individuals without ties to the United States and located abroad. [Redacted]1
In light of that disclosure, and the evidence in the public and classified record, we reach three principal conclusions:
Given these conclusions, further proceedings are necessary to determine (a) what (if any) evidence relevant to Hasbajrami was obtained by the government by querying databases, (b) whether any such querying violated the Fourth Amendment and, if so, (c) whether any such violation tainted other lawfully-collected evidence. We therefore REMAND the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
This appeal concerns the legal status of evidence of Hasbajrami's electronic communications with individuals located abroad, which was collected by the government without a warrant pursuant to the government's authority under Section 702. The background to this appeal may be easily summarized: Hasbajrami sought to suppress evidence the government acquired under Section 702, arguing that the government had violated his Fourth Amendment rights when it seized his communications without a warrant, and that those communications, and any information that the government later collected as the fruit of that initial warrantless surveillance, should therefore be suppressed. The district court declined to suppress the evidence, and Hasbajrami pleaded guilty while preserving his right to appeal the district court's decision.
But our disposition of the case turns in part on the particulars of how Section 702-acquired surveillance was used in Hasbajrami's prosecution; a fuller accounting of the facts of Hasbajrami's case and the nature of Section 702 surveillance is therefore necessary. First, we begin by describing Hasbajrami's arrest and the initial proceedings in which he pleaded guilty, the subsequent disclosure of Section 702 surveillance, Hasbajrami's withdrawal of his guilty plea, and his subsequent motion to suppress. Second, we describe in broad terms the operation of Section 702 surveillance. Third, we turn to the district court's discussion of the use of Section 702 evidence (that it was aware of) in this case, and its denial of the suppression motion. Finally, we describe the proceedings at the district court following its denial of the suppression motion, and the proceedings on appeal.
The conduct underlying Hasbajrami's prosecution occurred primarily between April and August, 2011. During that time, Hasbajrami communicated by e-mail with "Individual #1," a non-American located abroad, who Hasbajrami believed was associated with a terrorist organization. In those e-mails, Hasbajrami discussed his interest in the group's terrorist operations, and Individual #1 instructed Hasbajrami how he could smuggle himself into Pakistan to join the organization. Individual #1 also detailed means by which Hasbajrami could send money to him and how Hasbajrami could contact him once he reached Pakistan. In discussing his plans to join Individual #1 in Pakistan, Hasbajrami also described his arrangements for traveling to Turkey, and his concern that his projected route from there to Pakistan might have been compromised.
Following an investigation by the agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Joint Terrorism Task Force, Hasbajrami was arrested as he was about to board a flight to Istanbul, Turkey. His luggage contained a tent, boots, and cold-weather gear. Upon arrest, Hasbajrami made certain inculpatory statements.
Hasbajrami was indicted on September 8, 2011, and charged with one count of providing material support to terrorist organizations. At the same time, and as required by statute, the government gave notice that it "intend[ed] to offer into evidence, or otherwise use or disclose in any proceedings ... information obtained or derived from electronic surveillance and physical searches conducted pursuant to [FISA]." See Notice of Intent to Use Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Information, United States v. Hasbajrami , 1:11-cr-623 (E.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 13, 2011), ECF No. 9.
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