United States v. Haskell

• Decision Date: 27 January 1964
• Docket Number: Docket 28027.,No. 75,75
• Citation: 327 F.2d 281
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Jerome J. HASKELL, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

327 F.2d 281 (1964)

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Jerome J. HASKELL, Appellant.

No. 75, Docket 28027.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued November 1, 1963.

Decided January 27, 1964.

Irving I. Erdheim, New York City (Jacob W. Friedman, New York City, of counsel), for appellant.

Robert C. Zampano, U. S. Atty., District of Connecticut, New Haven, Conn., for appellee.

Before SWAN, CLARK¹ and MARSHALL, Circuit Judges.

MARSHALL, Circuit Judge.

The questions presented on this appeal are the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain appellant's conviction of a violation of the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371;² and alleged errors in the rulings on evidence at the trial and in the charge to the jury.

The one-count indictment charged appellant Haskell, a former key employee of Esquire Motors, Inc.,³ an automobile dealership in Bridgeport, Connecticut, and Vincent Anthony, president of Esquire with conspiring with each other and unknown persons during the period June 1, 1954 to June 1, 1957 to wilfully attempt to evade and defeat a large part of the income taxes owing to the United States Government by Esquire, Anthony and Haskell, for the fiscal years ending September 30, 1955 and September 30, 1956. The means alleged were that the defendants would make continuing efforts to avoid detection and prosecution of tax frauds, that they perpetrated a scheme to take fraudulent deductions on Esquire's returns of $21,000 in 1955 and $25,000 in 1956, that checks were entered on the corporate records payable to Haskell for purported travel and entertainment expenses and bonuses, and that these checks were not cashed. The overt acts alleged were the issuance of checks to Haskell of $21,000 (dated September 30, 1955) and of $19,000 (dated September 29, 1956), which were not cashed. Anthony was convicted on his plea of nolo contendere, entered shortly before trial, and the trial proceeded with Haskell as the only defendant.

Three principal witnesses testified for the government. They were Ralph Piccolo, Jr., Esquire's accountant who prepared its returns during the relevant years; Stephen J. Catandella, Esquire's bookkeeper and Anthony's son-in-law, and Anthony himself. Although there were some variations in their testimony, particularly with regard to dates, they agreed on most essential points. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the jury might find the following facts from their testimony.

Haskell joined Esquire in late 1954, under an oral agreement with Anthony that he would receive fifty per cent of the profits less his salary, which was originally fixed at $250 per week and later increased to $300. He immediately took charge of the business, did virtually all of the buying of cars from other dealers and a large part of the selling. Thanks largely to his efforts, Esquire's gross sales jumped from about $2,000,000 in fiscal 1954 to over $10,000,000 in fiscal 1955. Shortly before the close of fiscal 1955, Piccolo prepared a tentative profit and loss statement showing a certain amount of income tax due. He showed this to Haskell, Anthony and Catandella. After looking it over, Haskell threw the statement down, told Piccolo that he was an idiot, that there was too much tax and that they weren't going to pay so much tax. A second meeting between the men, together with an accountant named Henry Clauson was held after the close of the fiscal year,⁴ at which Haskell submitted to Piccolo a revised statement that showed additional expenses of $40,800 in the travel and entertainment category. Piccolo protested that "you can't just take travel and entertainment expenses without some substantiation," but ultimately agreed to fill out a return using the revised figures. When Anthony asked whether this might cause trouble with the income tax people, Haskell answered "well, the worst could happen, Uncle Sam would ask you for the refund and you would have to pay a penalty plus interest on it." On the night of the meeting, Catandella made out three checks, predated to September 30, 1955, one to Haskell for $21,000; one to Anthony for $16,000, and one to himself for $3,800. Haskell designated these amounts. The checks to Anthony and Catandella cleared the bank, but not the one to Haskell, which apparently disappeared. With regard to the 1956 return, the government's evidence was less conclusive. According to Catandella, about two or three weeks after the close of the fiscal year some unidentified person told him to make out the check to Haskell, he drew it, placed it on Haskell's desk, in his presence, and did not see it again. Piccolo testified that, after the income tax return was filed, he noticed while preparing a bank reconciliation that the check had not cleared. He suggested to Anthony and Haskell that an amended return be filed, restoring the amount to income. Haskell never responded but Anthony may have said that the check had not been cashed because there was "no money in the bank." Catandella also testified that Haskell frequently told him to draw checks, but that Anthony had to sign them all.

The foregoing recital establishes that a jury might find that a conspiracy to evade Esquire's taxes existed among Haskell, Anthony, Piccolo and Catandella, with respect to the 1955 return. Haskell not only participated in the conspiracy but indeed actually directed it. All the participants were aware that the claimed deductions for travel and entertainment were not substantiated, and that it was wrong to take them without proof. The evidence regarding the preparation of the 1956 return is weaker but we need not consider whether, standing alone, it would have warranted submission to the jury. A single conspiracy was charged, and it was more than adequately proved. Cf. United States v. Postma, 242 F.2d 488, 496 (2 Cir. 1957); Neely v. United States, 145 F.2d 828 (5 Cir. 1945); Moss v. United States, 132 F.2d 875 (6 Cir. 1943).

The most important of the trial errors assigned as grounds for reversal of the judgment concerns a series of questions which defendant was asked on cross-examination. The matter was broached for the first time on Haskell's direct examination, when his counsel asked whether he was ever convicted of petit larceny, and elicited the answer that he was convicted in 1934 or 1935, and also that he was convicted of speeding. On the next day, the prosecutor first got Haskell to repeat his admission of a petit larceny conviction and then asked, "weren't you convicted of grand larceny and not petit larceny," to which Haskell replied in the negative. The prosecutor then showed Haskell Government Exhibit K for identification, and FBI "rap sheet" which showed that Haskell was arrested on August 26, 1942 for grand larceny in New York, and was sentenced to one year (suspended) "on CL of GL and PL.," and asked him again whether he was convicted of grand larceny. Again a negative answer was received. The government offered the paper in evidence; defense counsel objected and was sustained. Before trial resumed on the afternoon of that day, the prosecutor informed the judge that the FBI sheet, on which he relied for his questions with regard to a grand larceny conviction, was erroneous. In fact, Haskell in 1942 had been charged with grand larceny but pleaded guilty to petit larceny. The court instructed the jury to completely disregard any reference to a grand larceny conviction, because Haskell was never in fact convicted of that crime. He further stated that the reference to the traffic conviction should not be construed as having any bearing on the witness' credibility. Finally, he told the jury that the government had been instructed to provide proof of any criminal record in the form of certified copies of any judgments of conviction and that their minds should be kept completely open until the proof arrived. The judge later charged that the sole item in Haskell's record was a petit larceny conviction in 1942, to which counsel had stipulated.

As a general rule, of course, it is grossly improper for a cross-examiner to suggest that a witness has been convicted of crimes, especially felonies, when he has no support for the question. 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 780 (Supp. 1962). Here, however, it appears that the prosecutor's examination was based on an honest reliance on the FBI report, that he informed defense counsel prior to trial of his intention to bring up the grand larceny matter, and that he promptly moved to correct the erroneous impression which the jury might have acquired despite Haskell's denial that such a conviction was on his record....