United States v. Hatcher
Decision Date | 26 February 2020 |
Docket Number | No. 19-CR-1036-CJW-MAR,19-CR-1036-CJW-MAR |
Citation | 441 F.Supp.3d 723 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Cameron HATCHER, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
Anthony Morfitt, US Attorney's Office, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Plaintiff.
IV. ANALYSIS...735
A. Consent to Enter the Home...735
B. Exigency as Justification to Enter the Home...738
C. Propriety of the Protective Sweep...740
D. Consent to Seizure of the Firearm as Purging Unconstitutional Conduct...742
E. Good Faith...743
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on a Report and Recommendation ("R&R") (Doc. 33) of the Honorable Mark A. Roberts, United States Magistrate Judge. On December 23, 2019, defendant filed a motion to suppress and request for an evidentiary hearing under Franks v. Delaware , 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). (Doc. 19). On December 24, 2019, the government requested and was granted an extension of time to file a resistance. (Docs. 21 & 22). On January 2, 2020, the government timely filed a resistance. (Doc. 24). On January 8, 2020, Judge Roberts held a hearing on defendant's motion. (Doc. 25). On February 5, 2020, Judge Roberts issued his R&R, recommending that the Court grant defendant's motion to suppress and deny his motion for a Franks hearing. (Doc. 33, at 43). The deadline for filing objections to the R&R was February 19, 2020. On February 19, 2020, the government filed its objections to the R&R. (Doc. 34). Defendant did not file any objections.
For the following reasons, the Court overrules the government's objections (Doc. 34), adopts Judge Roberts' R&R without modification (Doc. 33), grants defendant's motion to suppress, and denies defendant's request for a Franks hearing (Doc. 19).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court reviews Judge Roberts' R&R under the statutory standards found in Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1) :
A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
See also FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b) ( identical requirements). While examining these statutory standards, the United States Supreme Court explained:
Any party that desires plenary consideration by the Article III judge of any issue need only ask. Moreover, while the statute does not require the judge to review an issue de novo if no objections are filed, it does not preclude further review by the district judge, sua sponte or at the request of a party, under a de novo or any other standard.
Thomas v. Arn , 474 U.S. 140, 154, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985). Thus, a district court may review de novo any issue in a magistrate judge's report and recommendation at any time. Id. If a party files an objection to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, however, the district court must "make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In the absence of an objection, the district court is not required "to give any more consideration to the magistrate's report than the court considers appropriate." Thomas , 474 U.S. at 150, 106 S.Ct. 466.
De novo review, of course, is nondeferential and generally allows a reviewing court to make an "independent review" of the entire matter. Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell , 499 U.S. 225, 238, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991) ( ); see Doe v. Chao , 540 U.S. 614, 620–19, 124 S.Ct. 1204, 157 L.Ed.2d 1122 (2004) ( ). The de novo review of a magistrate judge's report and recommendation, however, only means a district court " ‘give[s] fresh consideration to those issues to which specific objection has been made.’ " United States v. Raddatz , 447 U.S. 667, 675, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980) ( ). Thus, although de novo review generally entails review of an entire matter, in the context of Section 636 a district court's required de novo review is limited to "de novo determination[s]" of only "those portions" or "specified proposed findings" to which objections have been made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Consequently, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has indicated de novo review would only be required if objections were "specific enough to trigger de novo review." Branch v. Martin , 886 F.2d 1043, 1046 (8th Cir. 1989). Despite this "specificity" requirement to trigger de novo review, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has "emphasized the necessity ... of retention by the district court of substantial control over the ultimate disposition of matters referred to a magistrate." Belk v. Purkett , 15 F.3d 803, 815 (8th Cir. 1994). As a result, the Eighth Circuit has concluded that general objections require "full de novo review" if the record is concise. Id. (). Even if the reviewing court must construe objections liberally to require de novo review, it is clear to this Court that there is a distinction between making an objection and making no objection at all. See Coop. Fin. Ass'n v. Garst , 917 F. Supp. 1356, 1373 (N.D. Iowa 1996) ().
In the absence of any objection, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has indicated a district court should review a magistrate judge's report and recommendation under a clearly erroneous standard of review. See Grinder v. Gammon , 73 F.3d 793, 795 (8th Cir. 1996) ( ); Taylor v. Farrier , 910 F.2d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1990) ; Branch , 886 F.2d at 1046 ( ).
The court is unaware of any case that has described the clearly erroneous standard of review in the context of a district court's review of a magistrate judge's report and recommendation to which no objection has been filed. In other contexts, however, the Supreme Court has stated the "foremost" principle under this standard of review "is that ‘[a] finding is "clearly erroneous" when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’ "
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City , 470 U.S. 564, 573–74, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co. , 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948) ). Thus, the clearly erroneous standard of review is deferential, see Dixon v. Crete Med. Clinic, P.C. , 498 F.3d 837, 847 (8th Cir. 2007) ( ), but a district court may still reject the magistrate judge's report and recommendation when the district court is "left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed," U.S. Gypsum Co. , 333 U.S. at 395, 68 S.Ct. 525.
Even though some "lesser review" than de novo is not "positively require[d]" by statute, Thomas , 474 U.S. at 150, 106 S.Ct. 466, Eighth Circuit precedent leads this Court to believe that a clearly erroneous standard of review should generally be used as the baseline standard to review all findings in a magistrate judge's report and recommendation that are not objected to or when the parties fail to file any timely objections, see Grinder , 73 F.3d at 795 ; Taylor , 910 F.2d at 520 ; Branch , 886 F.2d at 1046 ; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b) advisory committee's note ("When no timely objection is filed, the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation."). In the context of the review of a magistrate judge's report and recommendation, the Court believes one further caveat is necessary: a district court always remains free to render its own decision under de novo review, regardless of whether it feels a mistake has been committed. See Thomas , 474 U.S. at 153–54, 106 S.Ct. 466. Thus, although a clearly erroneous standard of review is deferential and the minimum standard appropriate in this context, it is not mandatory, and the district court may choose to apply a less deferential standard.
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
After reviewing the record, the Court finds that Judge Roberts accurately and thoroughly summarized the relevant facts in his R&R. (Doc. 33, at 2-10). Further, neither party objects to the R&R's factual findings. Thus, the Court adopts the R&R's factual findings without modification. (Id. ) (footnotes in original).
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