United States v. Haynes, 30650.

• Decision Date: 01 June 1971
• Docket Number: No. 30650.,30650.
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Joseph M. HAYNES and Allstate Insurance Company, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

445 F.2d 907 (1971)

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Joseph M. HAYNES and Allstate Insurance Company, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 30650.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

June 1, 1971.

Don M. Richard, Asst. U. S. Atty., New Orleans, La., Morton Hollander, Raymond D. Battocchi, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for appellant.

James E. Moore, Baton Rouge, La., for appellees.

Before BROWN, Chief Judge, and COLEMAN and CLARK, Circuit Judges.

CLARK, Circuit Judge:

This action, brought by the United States of America under the provisions of the Medical Care Expense Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2651 et seq., sought to recover for certain medical services which it was statutorily obligated to render. Since we determine that the Louisiana law which grants the cause of action for the recovery of medical expenses exclusively and solely to the community and therefore to the husband as its master, is a procedural device which has nothing to do with whether the circumstances surrounding the injury create a tort liability, we reverse the district court.

The facts are not disputed. On September 21, 1966, in Irwin, Louisiana, Mrs. Vida Haynes was a passenger in a car owned and operated by her serviceman-husband, Joseph Haynes. Mr. Haynes' negligent driving caused an accident which resulted in severe bodily injuries to his wife. Since Mrs. Haynes was a military dependent, the United States was required to,¹ and did, provide medical care and treatment, the reasonable value of which amounted to $1,025.25. At the time the accident occurred, Mr. Haynes was insured by the Allstate Insurance Company, which provided him with liability coverage.

The United States instituted this action under the Medical Care Expense Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2651 et seq. (hereinafter Act) in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, against Mr. Haynes and Allstate,² to recover the value of the medical care given to Mrs. Haynes. The district judge granted the joint motion of Mr. Haynes and Allstate to dismiss on the ground that they were free from liability because, under the peculiarities of Louisiana law, Mrs. Haynes' tort claim for medical care expense (unlike her claim for personal injuries), is a community claim which must be brought by the husband as master of the community, and that a suit by the husband against himself would be barred. In this resulting appeal, we are called on to determine whether the trial court erred in concluding that under Louisiana law a tort-feasor husband and his insurer can defeat the right of the United States to bring an action against them under the Act by raising a personal defense of the husband derived from that State's community property law.

I.

Reduced to fundamentals, the basic purpose of the Medical Care Expense Recovery Act is to allow the federal government to recover from third party wrongdoers the value of medical care which is provided to injured persons. Section 2651(a), which is determinative of the instant case, provides in pertinent part:

In any case in which the United States is authorized by law to furnish hospital, medical, surgical, or dental care * * * to a person who is injured * * * under circumstances creating tort liability upon some third person * * * to pay damages therefor, the United States shall have a right to recover from said third person the reasonable value of the care and treatment so furnished * * * and shall, as to this right be subrogated to any right or claim that the injured * * * person * * * has against such third person.

Our course to a proper application of this Code section has in part been charted by this Circuit's decision in United States v. Fort Benning Rifle and Pistol Club, 387 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1967). In the instant case, as in Fort Benning, the question of whether a certain state's defenses would bar an action brought under the Act depends upon whether the claim urged by the United States is an independent one or is rather derivative or secondary to the claim of the person actually injured. In Fort Benning, this Circuit held that:

The Act creates in the United States an independent right of recovery. This right, however, is "subrogated" to the extent that it is subject to any state substantive defenses which would negate the requirement that the injury arise "under circumstances creating a tort liability upon some third person." The government\'s right to recover cannot be a wholly subrogated right, in the traditional sense, since the only time the Act applies and authorizes recovery is when the United States is required by law to give treatment and care, and hence the injured party, not having himself furnished such care, has no right of recovery to which the United States can be subrogated. Thus, the United States, under this Act, "stands in the role" of a subrogee only to the extent that its independent right to recover depends upon the determination under state law as to when the circumstances create tort liability in some third person. This right is subject only to those substantive state doctrines which create or negate such liability. (footnotes omitted)

The issue thus reduces itself to the following: Is a wife who is injured by her husband, a person injured "under circumstances creating tort liability" upon the husband? This question must be answered in the affirmative.

The cases which have sought to apply the Act demonstrate that those defenses which have nothing to do with whether the circumstances surrounding the injury create a tort, cannot defeat the independent right of the United States to recover. Thus, in Fort Benning, this Circuit rejected the argument that a state's statute of limitations might be used to bar an action by...