United States v. Helton
| Decision Date | 03 December 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 18-4663,18-4663 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Anthony Dale HELTON, Defendant - Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
ARGUED: Nicholas Joseph Compton, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. Lara Kay Omps-Botteicher, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Kristen M. Leddy, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. William J. Powell, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Before AGEE, FLOYD, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Quattlebaum wrote the opinion, in which Judge Agee joined. Judge Floyd wrote a dissenting opinion.
We address for the first time whether a conviction under South Carolina’s voyeurism1 statute constitutes a "sex offense" requiring registration under the Sexual Offender Registration Act ("SORNA"). Arguing it does not, Helton moved to dismiss the indictment alleging that he failed to register as a sex offender under SORNA. The district court denied Helton’s motion, holding that a conviction under South Carolina’s voyeurism statute constitutes a sex offense requiring registration under SORNA.
On appeal, our central question is whether a conviction under the statute constitutes "a criminal offense that has an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another." 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A)(i). The answer to that question turns on the definitions of "sexual act" and "sexual contact," which are not provided by SORNA. Helton argues we should use the definitions of those terms found in 18 U.S.C. § 2246, a different federal statute. Under § 2246, "sexual act" and "sexual contact" require physical contact with another. Helton argues that since the South Carolina voyeurism statute does not require such physical contact, it is not a criminal offense involving a "sexual act" or "sexual contact."
But accepting Helton’s argument would require us to rewrite SORNA. Although Congress could have easily drafted SORNA to limit "sexual act" and "sexual contact" to conduct involving physical contact with another, it did not, leaving those terms undefined. Keeping with our previous decisions, we decline to apply the § 2246 definitions of "sexual act" and "sexual contact" outside of their place in Title 18 Chapter 109A, in the absence of statutory language to do so. Instead, we define SORNA’s use of these terms in accordance with their ordinary meaning. In doing so, it becomes clear that a violation of the voyeurism statute—which does not require physical contact, but does require the voyeuristic act to be in furtherance of "arousing or gratifying sexual desire"—is a criminal offense involving a "sexual act" or "sexual contact" that requires registration under SORNA.
For these reasons, and as more fully described below, we affirm the district court and conclude that a conviction under South Carolina’s voyeurism statute constitutes a sex offense requiring registration under SORNA.
Before reviewing the facts of this case, we begin with an overview of SORNA. Congress enacted SORNA "[i]n order to protect the public from sex offenders and offenders against children" by establishing "a comprehensive national system for the registration of those offenders." 34 U.S.C. § 20901. This system requires those designated as a "sex offender" under SORNA to register and keep current their sex offender status in each jurisdiction where they reside, are employees or are enrolled as students. 34 U.S.C. § 20913. A defendant violates 18 U.S.C.§ 2250(a) if he (1) is a sex offender required to register under SORNA, (2) travels in interstate commerce and (3) knowingly fails to register or update his registration as required by SORNA.
SORNA defines a "sex offender" as "an individual who was convicted of a sex offense." 34 U.S.C. § 20911(1). To define "sex offense," SORNA identifies five categories of conduct:
34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A)(i)–(v). Any conduct that falls within one of these five categories, and does not trigger one of the two narrow exceptions in § 20911(5)(B)–(C), constitutes a "sex offense" under SORNA.
Against this backdrop, we turn to the facts of this appeal. In 2012, Helton pled guilty to voyeurism in violation of S.C. Code § 16-17-470(B). He was sentenced to three years of incarceration, with credit for time served and one year of probation. In addition, S.C. Code § 23-3-430 required Helton to register as a sex offender in South Carolina. Following his release from prison, Helton moved to Virginia but later relocated to West Virginia. In both states, Helton registered as a sex offender under the applicable state laws.
However, when the West Virginia State Police later attempted to verify Helton’s address, they discovered that he no longer occupied his last known West Virginia residence and was not registered as a sex offender in any other state. They soon determined that Helton had moved to Rockingham County, Virginia without updating his registration in West Virginia or re-registering in Virginia. Helton was subsequently arrested by the Rockingham County Sheriff’s Department for failing to update his registration in West Virginia.
A federal grand jury in West Virginia indicted Helton for failing to register and update his registration as a sex offender as required by SORNA, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). The indictment alleged that Helton was a sex offender under SORNA because his voyeurism conviction in South Carolina qualified as a sex offense.
Helton moved to dismiss the indictment. He argued that because his South Carolina voyeurism conviction did not feature an element involving a "sexual act" or "sexual contact," his conviction did not fall within SORNA’s definition of "sex offense." 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A). Helton argued the definitions of "sexual act" and "sexual contact" from 18 U.S.C. § 2246, which require physical contact with another, should be used to define those terms under SORNA. He then argued that since South Carolina’s voyeurism statute does not require physical contact with another, violating it does not constitute a sex offense requiring SORNA registration.
The district court rejected this argument. Instead, the court interpreted "sexual act" and "sexual contact" in accordance with their ordinary meaning, and held that the South Carolina statute’s requirement that the voyeuristic act be committed "for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire" was the element of the offense that involved a sexual act. Accordingly, the district court held that a conviction under South Carolina’s voyeurism statute is a sex offense that required Helton to register as a sex offender under SORNA. Based on that conclusion, the court denied Helton’s motion to dismiss the indictment. Helton entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. Helton timely appealed following his sentencing.2
Since Helton pled guilty to violating South Carolina’s voyeurism statute, we must determine whether a violation of that statute is a "sex offense" under SORNA. To answer that question, we first must decide what analytical framework to apply. The Supreme Court has provided three potential frameworks for us to consider: the "categorical approach," the "modified categorical approach" and the "circumstance-specific approach." United States v. Price , 777 F.3d 700, 704 (4th Cir. 2015). The district court held, and the parties agreed at oral argument, that the categorical approach should be applied to determine if Helton’s South Carolina voyeurism conviction meets the SORNA definition of "sex offense." We agree that, under our precedent, applying the categorical approach is appropriate to resolve Helton’s case. See Price , 777 F. 3d at 708 ; United States v. Faulls , 821 F.3d 502, 512 (4th Cir. 2016) ; United States v. Berry , 814 F.3d 192, 195–96 (4th Cir. 2016).
Under the categorical approach, we look to the statutory definition of the state crime to determine whether the criminalized conduct falls within the definition of "sex offense" under SORNA. See United States v. Battle , 927 F.3d 160, 164 (4th Cir. 2019). In doing so, we are "bound by the interpretation of such offense articulated by that state’s courts." United States v. Winston , 850 F.3d 677, 684 (4th Cir. 2017). This analysis "focus[es] on the minimum conduct required to sustain a conviction for the state crime," United States v. Doctor , 842 F.3d 306, 308 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted), but such conduct "must give rise to a ‘realistic probability, not a theoretical probability’ that a state would apply the law and uphold a conviction based on such conduct." Battle , 927 F.3d at 165 (quoting Moncrieffe v. Holder , 569 U.S. 184, 191, 133 S.Ct. 1678, 185 L.Ed.2d 727 (2013) ). We must find that the elements of the statute of conviction are "the same as, or narrower than, those of the generic offense in order to find a categorical match." Price , 777 F.3d at 704.
With our analytical framework determined, we now analyze whether a South Carolina voyeurism conviction is a "sex offense" under SORNA. In...
To continue reading
Request your trial
- United States v. Brinson
-
United States v. Kokinda
...lives, not just in terms of what he would choose to characterize as his home address or place of residence for self-interested reasons. Id. at 38062. More specifically, the explain the meaning of “habitually lives” in the context of transient offenders: Such sex offenders cannot provide the......
-
United States v. Bemis
...to sexual desire orgratification" — the plain meaning definition recently adopted by the Fourth Circuit. See United States v. Helton, 944 F.3d 198, 207 (4th Cir. 2019), as amended (Dec. 4, 2019)("[A]s a matter of ordinary meaning, a 'sexual act' is a something done voluntarily that relates ......