United States v. Henry
| Decision Date | 18 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 19-2445,19-2445 |
| Citation | 983 F.3d 214 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael Jerome HENRY, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
This is Defendant Michael Jerome Henry's third time before the court. On this occasion, Henry appeals the district court's order finding that First Step Act § 403 did not apply to his resentencing. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we REVERSE the district court's order holding the First Step Act is not applicable to Henry and REMAND for resentencing in accordance with First Step Act § 403.
In October 2013, a jury convicted Henry of three counts of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and three counts of using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). R. 56 (2013 Jury Verdict Form) (Page ID #183–84). The three § 924(c) counts each related to conduct involved in the associated bank robbery count. See id. Before the First Step Act, a defendant's first § 924(c) conviction carried a mandatory-minimum sentence of five years’ incarceration, and each additional § 924(c) conviction carried a sentence of twenty-five years’ incarceration, even if the defendant's § 924(c) convictions were part of the same indictment. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2015).
At Henry's sentencing hearing in July 2014, the district court sentenced him to 730 months’ incarceration. R. 71 (2014 Judgment) (Page ID #250–52). For the three counts of bank robbery, the district court sentenced Henry to seventy months’ incarceration for each count, to be served concurrently. R. 86 (2014 Sent'g Hr'g Tr. at 12) (Page ID #1082). The district court sentenced Henry to 60 months’ incarceration for the first § 924(c) count, 300 months’ incarceration for the second count, and 300 months’ incarceration for the third count, with each to be served consecutive to all other counts. Id. at 15 (Page ID #1085).
On appeal, we reversed his second and third § 924(c) convictions because the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Rosemond v. United States , 572 U.S. 65, 134 S.Ct. 1240, 188 L.Ed.2d 248 (2014), clarified the intent required for aiding and abetting the use or carrying of a firearm. United States v. Henry , 797 F.3d 371 (6th Cir. 2015) ( Henry I ). On remand, a jury again convicted Henry of the six counts. R. 110 (Jury Verdict Form) (Page ID #1250). At his subsequent resentencing hearing, the district court sentenced Henry to 738 months’ incarceration—seventy-eight months’ incarceration for each bank robbery count, concurrent to each other, along with the mandatory-minimum sentences for the three counts of using or carrying a weapon during a crime of violence. R. 132 (2016 Sent'g Hr'g Tr. at 12–13) (Page ID #1832–33).
Henry again appealed to our court, arguing that (1) the government's evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions; (2) § 924(c) ’s residual clause was unconstitutionally vague; and (3) there were other issues with his sentence unrelated to the present case. United States v. Henry , 722 F. App'x 496, 497–98 (6th Cir.), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 70, 202 L.Ed.2d 47 (2018) ( Henry II ). We rejected these arguments but remanded his case to the district court for resentencing in response to the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Dean v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1170, 197 L.Ed.2d 490 (2017), which permitted district courts to consider mandatory-minimum sentences imposed under § 924(c) when determining the sentence for other counts. Henry II , 722 F. App'x at 501. At the time of Henry's 2016 resentencing, the Sixth Circuit's decision in United States v. Franklin , 499 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2007), prohibited the district court from considering the lengthy mandatory-minimum sentences for his § 924(c) convictions when sentencing him for the bank robbery convictions. Henry II , 722 F. App'x at 501. As a result, we "remand[ed] the case for the limited purpose of resentencing him and allowing the district court to consider the mandatory minimum sentences applicable to him." Id.
Between our remand and Henry's 2019 resentencing, Congress passed the First Step Act. Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (Dec. 21, 2018). Prior to its enactment, individuals convicted of two § 924(c) charges faced a mandatory-minimum sentence of thirty years’ incarceration regardless of their prior criminal history (five years for the first and twenty-five years for the second § 924(c) conviction) and twenty-five years’ incarceration for each additional § 924(c) conviction. Under the First Step Act's new framework, only a defendant who has a prior final § 924(c) conviction is subject to the escalating mandatory-minimum sentences for a subsequent § 924(c) conviction. First Step Act, § 403(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(C) ). In a section entitled "applicability to pending cases," Congress extended this amendment "to any offense that was committed before the date of enactment of this Act, if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of such date of enactment." First Step Act, § 403(b) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 924 notes).
The district court ordered supplemental briefing on Henry's eligibility under the First Step Act. R. 149 (Order for Additional Briefing & Setting Briefing Deadlines) (Page ID #2058). Henry argued that our court's 2018 remand for resentencing meant that the district court had not imposed a sentence as of the date of enactment of the First Step Act, and, therefore, he could benefit from the First Step Act's amendment to § 924(c). R. 151 (Henry's Supp. Br. on the Applicability of the First Step Act) (Page ID #2076).
This question has significant implications for Henry. If we were to hold that First Step Act § 403 does not apply to Henry, then the district court correctly found that § 924(c) requires that he serve at least five years for his first count, and twenty-five years for each additional count—which entailed that Henry would serve at least fifty-five years of incarceration in addition to the sentence imposed for his bank robbery charges. However, if we were to conclude that First Step Act § 403 does apply to Henry, the mandatory minimum for each of Henry's § 924(c) counts is five years, for a total mandatory-minimum sentence of fifteen years of incarceration.
The district court held that Henry could raise the issue of whether he was eligible for resentencing under First Step Act § 403 but concluded that the provision did not apply to his resentencing. R. 155 (Op. & Order Determining Inapplicability of "First Step Act" & Denying Def.’s Mot. for Variance) (Page ID #2112). The district court sentenced Henry to sixty months’ incarceration for each bank robbery conviction, concurrent to each other, along with the mandatory-minimum sentence of fifty-five years’ incarceration for Henry's three convictions for using or carrying a weapon during a crime of violence. R. 163 (2019 Sent'g Hr'g Tr. at 18–19) (Page ID #2164–65); R. 159 (Am. J.) (Page ID #2130). Henry appeals this sentence.
This case presents an issue of first impression in this circuit: whether First Step Act § 403 applies to a defendant at resentencing following a limited remand. We conclude that the text of the statute makes clear that § 403 applies to defendants whose cases have been remanded for resentencing prior to the First Step Act's enactment, but who were not yet resentenced. This includes Henry, as our limited remand permitted the district court to consider the sentences for his § 924(c) convictions. Furthermore, our interpretation of § 403 is consistent with Congress's intent to end the practice of stacking lengthy mandatory-minimum sentences for § 924(c) upon enactment of the First Step Act.
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. United States v. Wagner , 382 F.3d 598, 606 (6th Cir. 2004). "When interpreting a statute, we begin with the plain meaning of the statutory language." King v. Zamiara , 788 F.3d 207, 212 (6th Cir. 2015). This requires that we "look at the specific statutory language as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole." United States v. Meyers , 952 F.2d 914, 918 (6th Cir. 1992). "If the statutory language is not clear, we may examine the relevant legislative history." United States v. Parrett , 530 F.3d 422, 429 (6th Cir. 2008). Finally, "[i]f the statute remains ambiguous after consideration of its plain meaning, structure, and legislative history, we apply the rule of lenity in favor of criminal defendants." United States v. Choice , 201 F.3d 837, 840 (6th Cir. 2000).
The First Step Act represents Congress's response to long-standing problems within the federal criminal justice system. The Act is the product of a remarkable bipartisan effort to remedy past overzealous use of mandatory-minimum sentences and harsh sentences for drug-offenders, as well as to facilitate access to rehabilitation programs and compassionate release. Groups ranging from law enforcement groups to civil rights groups supported the First Step Act. Senator Chuck Grassley Website, "Floor Statement by Senator Chuck Grassley of Iowa: Passage of the First Step Act of 2018," Dec. 18, 2018.
As part of this reform, Congress sought to ensure that stacking applied only to defendants who were truly recidivists. Stakeholders of the criminal justice system had criticized the practice of stacking of mandatory minimum penalties for multiple § 924(c) convictions.1 Congress's remedy, § 403, reads:
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