United States v. Hicks, 71-2552.
| Decision Date | 07 March 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 71-2552.,71-2552. |
| Citation | 455 F.2d 329 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ulysses Johnny HICKS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Michael D. Nasatir, of Nasatir, Sherman & Hirsch, Beverly Hills, Cal., for defendant-appellant.
Robert L. Meyer, U. S. Atty., Eric A. Nobles, Chief, Crim. Div., Tom G. Kontos, Robert C. Bonner, Asst. U. S. Attys., Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before MERRILL, KOELSCH and HUFSTEDLER, Circuit Judges.
Ulysses Johnny Hicks was convicted of transferring about 24.80 grams of cocaine, a narcotic drug, without obtaining a written order form from the transferee, a violation of 26 U.S.C. § 4705(a) Count I and transporting and concealing about 496.53 grams of cocaine, knowing that the narcotic had been imported into the United States contrary to law, a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 174 Count II.
On this appeal he contends that the judge should have conducted a "pretrial hearing" on the issue of entrapment. As we understand his argument, it is in substance that due process requires that the judge, at the very least, make an in camera preliminary determination that there was no entrapment before submitting that issue to a jury.1 He cites no authority for this proposition, but relies for support upon cases such as Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), which outline an approved procedure to be followed where a question arises concerning the voluntariness of a confession.
We reject his contention.
The two rules rest upon different substantive bases and involve different basic considerations which render them non-analogous to each other. Moreover, we have grave doubts that, procedurally, such a preliminary inquiry into the question of entrapment vel non would be ". . . both practical and desirable . . ." Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. at 397, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908; and, in this regard, we would add that during trial an accused is afforded several opportunities to secure the judge's impartial appraisal of the evidence on the issue.
Hicks also assigns as error the judge's denial of his motion to suppress the cocaine discovered in his automobile; it being his contention that the narcotic was the product of an unreasonable search and seizure. However, we do not reach that question. This evidence was not essential to the crime charged in Count I of the Indictment of which he was also found...
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United States v. Marshall
...run concurrently with those received on Counts Three and Four and we, therefore, choose not to consider the issue. United States v. Hicks, 455 F.2d 329, 330 (9th Cir. 1972). IV. Identity of Marshall contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to compel disclosure of the ide......
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U.S. v. Stevens, 76-2564
...United States v. Marquez (2d Cir. 1974) 506 F.2d 620; United States v. Munoz-Dela Rosa (9th Cir. 1974) 495 F.2d 253; United States v. Hicks (9th Cir. 1972) 455 F.2d 329, 330; United States v. Mason (10th Cir. 1971) 440 F.2d 1293; Kennedy v. Reid (1957) 101 U.S.App.D.C. 400, 249 F.2d 492.The......
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United States v. Chew
...oral pronouncement of the sentence did not include that condition, and the oral pronouncement controls. See United States v. Hicks, 455 F.2d 329, 330 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam). In addition, Standard Conditions 5, 6, and 14 must be stricken because this Court found those conditions uncons......
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United States v. Munoz-Dela Rosa, 73-2930.
...actual oral pronouncement in the presence of the defendant. United States v. Jarratt, 471 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Hicks, 455 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1972); Payne v. Madigan, supra. See also: Borum v. United States, supra; Sobell v. United States, 407 F.2d 180, 184 (2nd Cir. 19......