United States v. Hildreth, 11349.

• Decision Date: 04 December 1967
• Docket Number: No. 11349.,11349.
• Citation: 387 F.2d 328
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Blair Nivin HILDRETH, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

387 F.2d 328 (1967)

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Blair Nivin HILDRETH, Appellant.

No. 11349.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued November 6, 1967.

Decided December 4, 1967.

Robert B. Blythe, Charlotte, N. C. (Court-appointed counsel), for appellant.

Wm. Medford, U. S. Atty., for appellee.

Before SOBELOFF, BRYAN and WINTER, Circuit Judges.

SOBELOFF, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Blair Nivin Hildreth was convicted of transporting a 1965 Ford Pick-up truck from Liberty, Texas to Monroe, North Carolina, in contravention of 18 U.S.C. § 2312. About two months after the vehicle was reported stolen, it was discovered behind the home of the defendant's sister and its license plates were found in her house. At trial Hildreth testified, attempting to justify his possession of the stolen truck, but the jury rejected his explanation.

On this appeal, the defendant contends that the District Court erred in refusing his request for a special instruction on circumstantial evidence. A complete answer to this contention, insofar as federal prosecutions are concerned, is provided in Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139, 75 S.Ct. 127, 137, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954), where the Supreme Court stated:

"Petitioners assail the refusal of the trial judge to instruct that where the Government\'s evidence is circumstantial it must be such as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than that of guilt. * * * The better rule is that where the jury is properly instructed on the standards for reasonable doubt, such an additional instruction on circumstantial evidence is confusing and incorrect * * *. If the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, we can require no more."

Since it is conceded that the jury was properly instructed on "reasonable doubt," we cannot ascribe error to the trial judge's refusal to grant the defendant's request.

The defendant also argues that the District Judge committed reversible error by employing different standards in respect to the scope of cross-examination of government and defense witnesses. The record does support Hildreth's charge that the government was permitted to cross-examine him at length on his previous criminal convictions, while a more restrictive standard was applied when his counsel undertook to discredit the testimony of a government witness, the defendant's sister, by inquiring into her criminal record. Defense counsel was attempting to impeach the witness when the trial judge intervened and held...