United States v. Hill
Decision Date | 12 January 1933 |
Docket Number | No. 9543.,9543. |
Parties | UNITED STATES v. HILL. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
W. N. Ivie, U. S. Atty., G. T. Sullins and Virgil P. Wallace, Asst. U. S. Attys., all of Ft. Smith, Ark., and Cleveland Cabler, Atty., Veterans Administration, of Little Rock, Ark., for the United States.
Vernon Bankston, of Fountain Hill, Ark., and Cazort & Cronkrite, of Little Rock, Ark., for appellee.
Before KENYON, GARDNER, and SANBORN, Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal from a judgment entered upon the verdict of a jury in an action brought by the appellee upon a contract of war risk insurance. The parties will be designated as in the court below.
The defendant makes two contentions:
(1) That the court was without jurisdiction because no disagreement existed within the meaning of section 445, title 38, U. S. Code (38 USCA § 445).
(2) That if the court had jurisdiction, it should have directed a verdict for the defendant on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a verdict for the plaintiff.
1. This action was commenced before July 3, 1930, the date of the enactment of the amendment to section 445, title 38, U. S. Code (38 USCA § 445) 46 Stat. 992, which defined a "disagreement."
The plaintiff's claim was denied by the regional manager of the United States Veterans' Bureau at Little Rock, Ark., by letter of July 11, 1929, which advised him that the evidence of record was insufficient to warrant a total and permanent disability rating at any time subsequent to discharge, and which concluded: "This letter is accordingly evidence of a disagreement under Section 19 of the World War Veterans' Act, 1924, as amended." In view of section 426, title 38, U. S. Code (38 USCA § 426), requiring officers and employees of the bureau to perform such duties as are assigned to them by the Director, and of General Order No. 387 of June 6, 1929, authorizing regional managers to effect final denial of claims under war risk contracts, it seems clear that a disagreement existed, at the time this action was commenced, which required the court to assume jurisdiction. See Norton v. United States (D. C.) 57 F.(2d) 869; United States v. Burleyson (C. C. A. 9) 44 F.(2d) 502.
2. The plaintiff enlisted July 25, 1918, and was discharged May 24, 1919. He paid no premiums after discharge. His policy lapsed July 1, 1919. His discharge papers show that at the time of discharge he claimed some disability from rupture and rheumatism; the rupture having been incurred in October, 1918, and the rheumatism May 1, 1919. He was married on July 13, 1919. He first applied for compensation in 1921, and subsequently made other applications. He was not granted compensation, the bureau having determined his disability to be less than 10 per cent. He brought this action in July, 1929, more than ten years after his discharge from the service. His claim is that he is now totally and permanently disabled as the result of chronic arthritis, and was so disabled when his contract of insurance was in force.
The defendant's claim is that the plaintiff is not now and never has been so disabled, but that he has had some disability due to a congenital defect of his feet which causes callouses or bunions.
The plaintiff's testimony is:
At Camp Pike, Ark., shortly after his enlistment, he had sore feet, which he attributed to ill-fitting shoes. He fell out on the march from Camp Merritt to the boat on account of his feet and his heart. He rested on the boat, and "held out" until October 17, 1918. He then took a hike, and his back and heart gave out. He was "crippled along" until November 7, 1918, and had to give up, and was held for an operation for hernia. At his own request, he was not operated on. He came home on May 24, 1919, and was not able to do anything at all; He was not able to gather the crop his brother had planted for him. In 1920, 1921, 1922, and 1923, he attempted to farm, with the help of his wife, a boy, his neighbors, and his brother. He was never free from pain. He was never able to do a day's work, but has worked some. He has not attempted to work since 1924. His condition has grown worse since 1924. When he was discharged, he was examined by a surgeon. "I only told them about this hernia, I didn't tell them about the rheumatism, I figured that to be usual and customary, and the hernia wasn't." In July, 1919, he thought his disease was serious, but that he would get over it, and he continued to think so until 1924. He had crops in the years 1920 to 1924. He ran for county treasurer in 1922. His wife taught school in 1924, but not before. In 1924 and 1925, he and his wife had a small store and filling station, and he waited on customers. His rheumatism developed prior to 1922. He had it while in the army, but it has gotten worse. On March 17, 1923, he made an affidavit which he states is true to the best of his knowledge at that time. It reads in part as follows:
In 1921, when he made application for vocational training, he stated in his application that his disability was rupture and had feet incurred in France; that he was working for himself making a bare living; that he was not physically fit to do farm work; and that he did not know of any work he could do except teaching school.
The record contains the testimony of lay witnesses, usual in such cases, as to the plaintiff's being in a more or less disabled condition after his return from the army; much of it relating, however, to the period after 1922.
Three physicians testified for the plaintiff:
Dr. W. N. Chavis, on direct examination, stated that he examined the plaintiff just after he returned from the army, but did not examine him closely; that the plaintiff was suffering with rheumatism and with his feet; that he prescribed for the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff came back two or three times that year. The doctor said:
On cross-examination, the doctor identified his own affidavit made April 20, 1923, containing this statement with reference to the plaintiff:
The doctor virtually admitted the truth of the statements contained in the affidavit.
Dr. E. L. Miller testified that he examined the plaintiff in 1921 or 1922; he is not sure which. His examination revealed trouble with the feet, a rapid heart, and blood pressure of about 160. Based upon his examination and the history the plaintiff gave him, he was of the opinion that the plaintiff was at that time totally and permanently disabled. He expressed no opinion as to the degree of the plaintiff's disability at the time of discharge.
Dr. A. G. Cazort testified that he examined the plaintiff on November 15, 1929, and found arthritis of the sacroiliac joint, "a process by which the two parts of bone that come together were being dissolved," and "myocarditis or inflammation of the heart muscle, causing a rapidly beating heart and an enlargement of the heart." He stated that it was his opinion that in May, 1919, the plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled. On cross-examination, he testified as follows:
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State of Washington v. United States
...evidence is only as good as the facts upon which it is based. Opinion evidence in conflict with the physical facts, United States v. Hill, 8 Cir., 1933, 62 F.2d 1022, 1025; United States v. Thornburgh, 8 Cir., 1940, 111 F.2d 278, 280, is not substantial evidence, and may be "As against the ......
-
McCurry v. Thompson
... ... Instruction G -- it does not assume a controverted fact ... Hill v. St. L. Pub. Serv. Co., 64 S.W.2d 633; ... Dodson v. Gate City Oil Co., 338 Mo. 183, 88 ... (11) The court did not err in giving ... defendant's Instruction H -- it correctly states the law ... and does not make contributory negligence a complete defense ... There was no duty ... Co. v. Baker, 10 F.2d 277; ... May Dept. Stores v. Bell, 61 F.2d 830; United ... States v. Hill, 62 F.2d 1022; Ocean Acc. & G. Corp ... v. Moore, 85 F.2d 369; Jones v ... ...
-
Trombley v. State
...v. Hiles, 67 Wis. 361, 367, 30 N.W. 511; Bucher v. Wisconsin Central Railway, 139 Wis. 597, 606, 607, 120 N.W. 518; United States v. Hill, 8 Cir., 62 F.2d 1022, 1025, 1026; United States v. Owen, 5 Cir., 71 F.2d 360. In Dreher v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 173 Wis. 173......
-
Feil v. FTC
...the conflict, if sustained by substantial evidence. So the teaching of the cases relied on by the petitioners, such as: United States v. Hill, 8 Cir., 1933, 62 F.2d 1022; Differential Steel Car Co. v. Macdonald, 6 Cir., 1950, 180 F.2d 260, 269; State of Washington v. United States, 9 Cir., ......