United States v. Hill, Cr. No. 1258-53.

• Decision Date: 16 September 1953
• Docket Number: Cr. No. 1258-53.
• Citation: 114 F. Supp. 441
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. HILL et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

114 F. Supp. 441

UNITED STATES v. HILL et al.

Cr. No. 1258-53.

United States District Court District of Columbia.

September 16, 1953.

Leo A. Rover, U. S. Atty., Arthur J. McLaughlin, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.

Eugene A. Chase, Washington, D. C., for defendants.

LAWS, Chief Judge.

Defendant Hill has moved to suppress evidence seized by police officers in the search without warrant of an automobile and its occupants within the District of Columbia. The evidence shows that the police received information from a reliable informant at 1:00 P.M. on July 10, 1953, that defendants Hill and Langford were to drive to New York City that day at 5:00 P.M. to receive delivery of contraband narcotics for illegal distribution in the District of Columbia; the automobile was placed under observation by police officers and seen to leave at that time; the officers received a telephone call from an informant in New York the following morning advising them that defendants were returning by automobile to the District of Columbia; later that morning the automobile was observed by the officers travelling at high speed on the Baltimore-Washington highway; and the arrests, searches and seizures were made when the automobile came into the District of Columbia. Defendants argue there was lack of probable cause to support a search and seizure without a warrant.

A valid search of a vehicle moving on a public highway may be had without a warrant only if probable cause for the search exists. Carroll v. United States, 1925, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543. "Probable cause exists where `the facts and circumstances within their (the officers') knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information (are) sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed." Brinegar v. United States, 1949, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1310, 93 L.Ed. 1879. Whether a particular search is reasonable must be determined by the facts and circumstances of each case. United States v. Rabinowitz, 1950, 339 U.S. 56, 70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L.Ed. 653.

Mere information from a third party, however reliable, that a felony is being committed, without an effort to check its accuracy by personal observation, stakeout or surveillance, would of itself be insufficient to authorize either issuance of a warrant or a search without a warrant. Worthington v. United States, 6 Cir., 1948, 166 F.2d 557; United States v. Reynolds, D.C.D.C.1953, 111 F.Supp. 589; United States v. Clark, D.C.Mo.1939, 29 F.Supp. 138; see also Wisniewski v. United States, 6 Cir., 1931, 47 F.2d 825.

But it is not required that probable cause be established solely by facts within the personal knowledge of the arresting officer. The observed facts in themselves may be consistent with the suspect's innocence. United States v. Bianco, 3 Cir., 1951, 189 F.2d 716. A combination of information and personal knowledge, however, may raise the inference beyond opinion, suspicion and conjecture to reasonable probability. The evidence need not be sufficient for conviction. Brinegar v. United States, supra. Thus, in Husty v. United States, 1931, 282 U.S. 694, 51 S.Ct. 240, 75 L.Ed. 629, probable cause was established by reliable information that defendant, a known liquor law violator, possessed liquor in an automobile of particular description and location; discovery of the automobile at the place indicated, with ...