United States v. Hill

• Decision Date: 22 April 2016
• Docket Number: Criminal Action No. 3:16-cr-00009-JAG
• Citation: 182 F.Supp.3d 546
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
• Parties: United States of America, v. James William Hill, III, Defendant.

182 F.Supp.3d 546

United States of America,

v.James William Hill, III, Defendant.

Criminal Action No. 3:16-cr-00009-JAG

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia.

Signed April 22, 2016

S. David Schiller, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Richmond, VA, for United States of America.

OPINION

John A. Gibney, Jr., United States District Judge

Does a hate crime committed within one state, at one location, using only fists, affect interstate commerce? Is prosecuting that hate crime in the public interest and necessary to secure substantial justice? The defendant, James William Hill, III, raises these questions in his challenge to an indictment charging him with violating the Matthew Shepard-James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act (the "HCPA" or the "Act").

To the naked eye, it may appear that the federal government can regulate and criminalize anything it wants to. The Constitution, however, grants Congress limited power to legislate. One such grant of power is the Commerce Clause, which entrusts the federal government with the power to regulate interstate commerce. Pursuant to this grant of power, Congress adopted the section of the HCPA criminalizing hate crimes based on sexual orientation. As applied to Hill, the HCPA exceeds Congress's legislative power, and the Court therefore dismisses the indictment against Hill.

I. BACKGROUND¹

Hill and the victim, C.T., both worked at the Amazon Fulfillment Center² in Chester, Virginia. On May 22, 2015, Hill was working as a "re-binner"—moving items from various bins to cubbyholes prior to packaging—and C.T. was working as a "packer"—moving items from cubbyholes to boxes for packaging. About an hour in to their ten-hour work shifts, Hill approached C.T. without provocation and hit him several times in the face with his fists, making no statement during the assault. Afterwards neither Hill nor C.T. returned to the production line, resulting in Amazon losing productivity at both work stations for approximately nine hours.³ Hill later said that he hit C.T. because of C.T.'s sexual orientation.

The Commonwealth of Virginia initially charged Hill with misdemeanor assault and battery in state court. On May 29, 2015, however, the state prosecutor requested the United States to "assume prosecution of this case as a hate crime" based in part on the fact that Virginia's hate crime statute does not cover crimes based on sexual orientation. (Gov't's Resp. Ex. 2.) On July 24, 2015, the United States Attorney General certified that Hill's prosecution under the HCPA "is in the public interest and is necessary to secure substantial justice." The Commonwealth dropped the misdemeanor assault charge in favor of federal prosecution, and a federal grand jury indicted Hill under the HCPA. Hill now moves to dismiss the indictment.

II. DISCUSSION⁴

Congress passed the HCPA, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 249, to punish certain hate crimes. The Act creates two distinct crimes. First, § 249(a)(1) focuses on hate crimes based on " actual or perceived race, color, religion, or national origin." 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1). This offense is not at issue here.⁵ Second, § 249(a)(2) focuses on hate crimes based on "actual or perceived religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability." 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2). Congress passed this subsection based on its power under the Commerce Clause.

To obtain a conviction under § 249(a)(2), the government must prove (1) that the defendant willfully caused bodily injury to another person, or attempted to cause bodily injury though use of a dangerous weapon; (2) that the "but-for cause" of the assault was the actual or perceived religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability of the victim; and (3) that the conducts falls within a "circumstance described in subparagraph (B)."⁶ 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(A) ; see United States v. Miller , 767 F.3d 585, 594 (6th Cir.2014). "[S]ubparagraph (B)"—relevant in this case—states as follows:

[T]he circumstances described in this subparagraph are that—

(i) the conduct ... occurs during the course of, or as the result of, the travel of the defendant or the victim—

(I) across a State line or national border; or

(II) using a channel, facility, or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce;

(ii) the defendant uses a channel, facility, or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce in connection with the conduct ...;

(iii) in connection with the conduct ..., the defendant employs a firearm, dangerous weapon, explosive or incendiary device, or other weapon that has traveled in interstate or foreign commerce; or

(iv) the conduct ...—

(I) interferes with commercial or other economic activity in which the victim is engaged at the time of the conduct; or

(II) otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce.

18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(B).

Finally, to "ensure the federal government will assert its ... hate crimes jurisdiction only in a principled and properly limited fashion," United States v. Jenkins , 909 F.Supp.2d 758, 773 (E.D.Ky.2012) (quoting H.R. 86, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009)), Congress included a certification requirement. Specifically,

No prosecution of any offense described in this subsection may be undertaken by the United States, except under the certification in writing of the Attorney General, or a designee, that—

(A) the State does not have jurisdiction;

(B) the State has requested that the Federal Government assume jurisdiction;

(C) the verdict or sentence obtained pursuant to State charges left demonstratively unvindicated the Federal interest in eradicating bias-motivated violence; or

(D) a prosecution by the United States is in the public interest and necessary to secure substantial justice.

18 U.S.C. § 249(b)(1).

A. Challenge to the Certification Requirement

The Court first addresses Hill's challenge to the certification requirement in this case, because its determination could resolve the case without needing to reach the constitutional issues raised. Hill asks the Court to "review the certification process and find that this prosecution fails to meet the requirement that prosecution is in the public interest and necessary to secure substantial justice." (Def.'s Mot. 1.) The government responds that the certification requirement in § 249 qualifies as an exercise of prosecutorial discretion not subject to judicial review and, even if the Court could review the decision, that this prosecution satisfies the requirement. While the Court finds that it can review the HCPA's certification requirement, it concludes that the government meets that requirement in this case.

The Fourth Circuit has not addressed the reviewability of certification under the HCPA. In a similar case, however, the Fourth Circuit held that courts can review the certification of a juvenile for trial in federal court. United States v. Juvenile Male No. 1 (Juvenile Male ), 86 F.3d 1314, 1319 (4th Cir.1996). The juvenile transfer statute, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 5032, requires the Attorney General to certify the propriety of proceeding against a juvenile in federal court. Juvenile Male , 86 F.3d at 1317. Specifically, the Attorney General must:

certify[y] to the appropriate district court of the United States that (1) the juvenile court or other appropriate court of a State does not have jurisdiction or refuses to assume jurisdiction over said juvenile with respect to such alleged act of juvenile delinquency, (2) the State does not have available programs and services adequate for the needs of juveniles, or (3) the offense charged is a crime of violence that is a felony or [one of a number of specified drug or firearm offenses], and that there is a substantial Federal interest in the case or the offense to warrant the exercise of Federal jurisdiction.

18 U.S.C. § 5032. In Juvenile Male , the Fourth Circuit held that courts "can and must first satisfy [them]selves that [their] jurisdiction has been properly invoked. [Courts] do so by reviewing the stated reasons underlying the government's decision to proceed in federal court." 86 F.3d at 1321. The court found that the "prongs of the certification statute act as limits on the federal courts' jurisdiction to act in this sphere." Id. at 1319.

While § 5032 and § 249 are not identical, the similarities in the statutes matter more than the differences. As an initial matter, the certification requirements in both statutes reflect congressional intent "to limit the types of cases that the executive should bring in federal court." Juvenile Male , 86 F.3d at 1319 ; see Jenkins , 909 F.Supp.2d at 773 ("One of the stated purposes of [the certification] requirement [in the HCPA] was to, ‘ensure the federal government will assert its new hate crimes jurisdiction only in a principled and properly limited fashion.’ " (quoting H.R. 86, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009))). Further, the structures of the statutes mirror each other, listing a handful of specific reasons justifying certification followed by a catch-all.

The language of the catch-all provisions does vary slightly—§ 5032 looks for "a substantial Federal interest," 18 U.S.C. § 5032, while § 249 requires that the prosecution "[be] in the public interest and necessary to secure substantial justice," 18 U.S.C. § 249(b)(1)(D). Nevertheless, Juvenile Male puts the possible reasons justifying certification in § 5032 on the same level, concluding that "[i]n the final analysis, whether there is a ‘substantial Federal interest’ in a given case implicates [the court's] authority over the juvenile to the same extent and for many of the same reasons as whether the juvenile is alleged to have violated a federal law, whether that violation is a ‘crime of violence,’ or whether the appropriate state authorities have refused to act." 86 F.3d at 1320–21. Regardless of the slight differences in the statutes, Juvenile Male opens the door to review the Attorney General's certification under the HCPA.⁷

The scope of review, however, is limited. "In our...