United States v. Hines

• Decision Date: 22 March 2018
• Docket Number: No. 17-5893,17-5893
• Citation: 885 F.3d 919
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William Eugene HINES, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

885 F.3d 919

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.William Eugene HINES, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-5893

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: March 8, 2018

Decided and Filed: March 22, 2018

ARGUED: Amanda B. Harris, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Michael R. Mazzoli, COX & MAZZOLI PLLC, Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Amanda B. Harris, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., Terry M. Cushing, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellant. Michael R. Mazzoli, COX & MAZZOLI PLLC, Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellee.

Before: MOORE, COOK, and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges.

COOK, Circuit Judge.

Not all search warrant affidavits include the same ingredients. It is the mix that courts review to decide whether evidence generated from the search may be used or must be suppressed. Some affidavits describe in fine detail a confidential informant’s reliability, whereas others emphasize the tipster’s basis of knowledge. Some discuss controlled drug buys by police officers looking to corroborate a tip, and others spotlight a suspect’s criminal history. There isn't a singular formula; we consider the affidavit proper if, in its totality, it sufficiently demonstrates probable cause for that search warrant.

Finding the affidavit in this case insufficient to establish probable cause, the district court suppressed evidence recovered during a search. We decide that the totality of the circumstances dictates otherwise, however, and REVERSE.

I.

A.

On December 15, 2015, Louisville Metropolitan Police Department Detective Daniel Evans submitted to Kentucky Circuit Court Judge McKay Chauvin an affidavit for a search warrant of the single-family residence at 668 Eastlawn Avenue in Louisville. The affidavit set forth the following information.

In July 2015, Louisville law enforcement officers learned from a "reliable confidential informant"—referred to as "CS1" throughout the affidavit, without any other identifying information—that William Hines was "selling large amounts of heroin" out of 668 Eastlawn. Surveillance of that house, owned by Hines’s mother, over the ensuing months tracked Hines’s regular comings and goings.

On December 14, 2015, CS1 informed Detective Evans that CS1 "had seen an amount of heroin at" 668 Eastlawn that day. Also on December 14, Detective Evans received further information about Hines "from another reliable confidential source"—referred to as "CS2" in the affidavit. CS2 said Hines had contacted him that day and proposed that they meet at a club called Legends to discuss an incoming heroin shipment. After he met with Hines, CS2 informed Detective Evans that Hines wanted CS2 to meet him at 668 Eastlawn the following day, where Hines would provide CS2 with heroin. According to CS2, he had received heroin from Hines numerous times and was always instructed to meet at 668 Eastlawn.

Owing to the information from CS1 and CS2, and prior to the meeting at Legends, officers set up surveillance around 668 Eastlawn. They saw Hines leave the house, stop briefly at a liquor store, and then drive to the club. When Hines left the liquor store, surveilling officers observed him "drive in a manner consistent with narcotics traffickers"—"he drove opposite of traffic down a one-way street before entering a dark, narrow alley" where officers believed Hines was looking for any tailing law enforcement.

Detective Evans also independently investigated Hines’s history as a drug trafficker and summarized it in the affidavit. Hines had been on the Louisville DEA’s radar since at least 2007, when wire intercepts identified Hines as a kilogram-quantity cocaine trafficker. Additional wiretaps in 2012 helped the Louisville DEA peg Hines as a significant heroin trafficker. That summer, officers seized $33,500 from Javier Rodriguez outside 668 Eastlawn, which they believed to be payment from Hines for a kilogram of cocaine. In a 2015 interview with officers, Rodriguez said that he had previously provided Hines with kilogram-quantities of cocaine and heroin.

B.

The state judge signed a search warrant for 668 Eastlawn early in the afternoon of December 15, which Detective Evans and other officers executed later that day.

They recovered, among other things, 3.72 pounds of cocaine, 2.08 pounds of heroin, $16,085 in cash, and a digital scale with plastic baggies.

Based on the fruits of the search, a federal grand jury charged Hines with possession with intent to distribute at least 100 grams of heroin and at least 500 grams of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B). Hines moved to suppress the evidence recovered at 668 Eastlawn. His arguments supporting suppression shifted but ultimately converged on two: the affidavit did not establish probable cause for the search warrant, and the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply.

The district court granted Hines’s motion to suppress. The court found that "the search warrant affidavit does not establish the reliability of the confidential informants in this case, and as such, it lacks probable cause." It held that the affidavit’s assertion that both CS1 and CS2 were "reliable" was "clearly insufficient" to establish the informants' reliability, noting the conclusory nature of the description and that Detective Evans neither provided the informants' identities to the state judge nor indicated in the affidavit that either informant had previously supplied reliable information. The court also found no independent police corroboration of the confidential informants' statements placing drugs at 668 Eastlawn; "[t]he only information police were able to independently corroborate was that Hines did in fact go to the night club CS2 specified they would meet at," which, according to the court, was the "least significant part of CS2’s story."

Next, the court determined the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule to be inapplicable because "the officer who wrote the search warrant affidavit and applied for and received the warrant was the same officer who executed it." Because, the court explained,

the warrant lacked the necessary indicia that the statements by CS1 or CS2 were reliable ..., it was unreasonable for Detective Evans to have relied on the search warrant affidavit that he himself prepared, as he was aware of its contents and should have known that more information was required to establish the reliability of the confidential informants....

The Government timely appealed. We first address whether the affidavit established probable cause, and then proceed to the good-faith inquiry.

II.

A.

The Fourth Amendment requires warrants to be supported by probable cause. "In order to demonstrate probable cause sufficient to justify a search warrant, the proponent must submit an affidavit that ‘indicate[s] a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be located on the premises of the proposed search.’ " United States v. Dyer , 580 F.3d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Jenkins , 396 F.3d 751, 760 (6th Cir. 2005) ) (alteration in original). "A court must look to the ‘totality of the circumstances,’ including a confidential informant’s ‘veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge,’ in order to answer ‘the commonsense, practical question’ of whether an affidavit is sufficient to support a finding of probable cause." United States v. May , 399 F.3d 817, 822 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 230, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) ). Although the court is "limited to examining the information contained within the four corners of the affidavit," Dyer , 580 F.3d at 390, line-by-line scrutiny of the underlying affidavit is improper when reviewing the issuing judge’s probable cause determination, United States v. Allen , 211 F.3d 970, 973 (6th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

We assess the district court’s decision to suppress evidence by reviewing the court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal determinations—including whether probable cause existed—de novo. United States v. Dunning , 857 F.3d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 2017) ; United States v. Lazar , 604 F.3d 230, 232–33 (6th Cir. 2010). "Given the de novo standard of review, where, as here, the district court reviewed the [issuing judge’s] probable cause determination, we owe the district court’s conclusion no particular deference." United States v. Brown , 732 F.3d 569, 572–73 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Leake , 998 F.2d 1359, 1362–63 (6th Cir. 1993) ). "In reviewing a state magistrate’s determination of probable cause, this court pays great deference to a magistrate’s findings, which should not be set aside unless arbitrarily exercised." United States v. Washington , 380 F.3d 236, 240 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Leake , 998 F.2d at 1363 ).

B.

The Government argues that the district court’s ruling flouts the totality-of-the-circumstances approach to determining the affidavit’s sufficiency. We agree.

Although the affidavit neither named the confidential informants nor offered how they previously provided accurate information, it described both informants' bases of knowledge for their tips about Hines’s trafficking drugs out of 668 Eastlawn. At least as of July 2015, CS1 knew that Hines "was actively selling large amounts of heroin from" 668 Eastlawn and informed law enforcement as much. Then, on December 14, Detective Hines learned from CS1 that CS1 saw heroin at 668 Eastlawn that very day. The basis of CS2’s knowledge is even stronger. CS2 received heroin from Hines "on numerous occasions in the past, and stated that he is always instructed to come to 668 Eastlawn." On December 14, CS2 told Detective Evans that Hines had contacted him earlier in the day "regarding [Hines] receiving a shipment of heroin" and to say "that he would like to speak with CS2 at Legends Nightclub to discuss the shipment." After CS2 met with Hines, CS2 contacted Detective Evans "and informed that [Hines]...