United States v. Hiraldo
| Docket Number | 1:16-cr-177,1:23-cv-171 |
| Decision Date | 07 August 2023 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF, v. JUAN J. HIRALDO, DEFENDANT. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
Before the Court is the motion of pro se defendant Juan J Hiraldo (“Hiraldo”) to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc No. 30 (Motion); Doc. No. 31-1 (Supplement).) Plaintiff United States of America (the “government”) opposes the motion. (Doc. No. 34 (Response).) For the reasons set forth herein, the motion to vacate, as supplemented, is DENIED.
On May 25, 2016, an indictment issued charging Hiraldo with one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), and one count of being a felon in possession of ammunition and a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (Doc. No. 8 (Indictment).)
On September 22, 2016, Hiraldo entered a counseled plea of guilty to the charges in the indictment. (Minutes of Proceedings [non-document], 9/22/2016.) During the guilty plea hearing, the magistrate judge conducted a standard plea colloquy in compliance with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. No. 20 (Transcript of Guilty Plea Hearing); see Doc. No. 18 (Consent to Referral to Magistrate Judge).) At the start of the hearing, the magistrate judge asked Hiraldo if he had been afforded sufficient time to discuss the charges and his response thereto with counsel. Hiraldo answered the question in the affirmative and further indicated that he was completely satisfied with the representation he had received from defense counsel (See Doc. No. 20, at 8-9[1].) The magistrate judge then reviewed the elements and statutory penalties of the crimes to which Hiraldo was pleading guilty, as well as the constitutional rights Hiraldo was forfeiting by changing his plea. (Id. at 9-23.) As to each, Hiraldo indicated that he understood and was prepared to change his plea to guilty. The magistrate judge also requested that the Assistant United States Attorney place on the record the facts the government believed would support a guilty plea in this case. (Id. at 28-31.) Hiraldo stated that he agreed with the government attorney's recitation of the facts, and that he was pleading guilty because he did, in fact, commit the charged offenses. (Id. at 30-31.) At the conclusion of the plea colloquy, the magistrate judge advised that it would be her recommendation that the Court accept Hiraldo's guilty plea to the charges in the indictment as knowing and voluntary. (Id. at 33; see Doc. No. 19 (Report and Recommendation [“R&R”]).) On October 27, 2016, there being no objection to the R&R, and after de novo review of the record, the Court entered an order adopting the R&R, approving the guilty plea, and adjudging Hiraldo guilty of the charges in the indictment. (Doc. No. 21 (Order).)
Prior to sentencing, a final presentence investigation report (“PSR”) was prepared. (Doc. No. 23.) The writer of the PSR concluded that Hiraldo would qualify as both a career offender under the federal sentencing guidelines and an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), the former premised on prior Ohio felony convictions for arson, assault, and domestic violence. (Id. ¶¶ 42-43.) The PSR writer further concluded that Hiraldo would be subject to a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence due to his designation as an armed career criminal. (Id. ¶ 69.)
The sentencing hearing was conducted on January 12, 2017. (Minutes of Proceedings [nondocument], 1/12/2017.) At sentencing, the Court applied a base level offense of 24, and, after applying appropriate adjustments, arrived at an adjusted offense level of 31. (Doc. No. 29 (Transcript of Sentencing Hearing), at 3-5, 23.) The Court also determined that Hiraldo's prior criminal convictions, as set forth in the PSR, produced a criminal history score of 11, to which 2 points were added because the instant offenses were committed while Hiraldo was under a state court sentence. (Doc. No. 29, at 4-5; see Doc. No. 23 ¶¶ 29-38.) With 13 criminal history points, the Court determined that Hiraldo had a criminal history category of VI. (Doc. No. 29, at 5.) Relevant to the present motion to vacate, the Court also determined that Hiraldo was a criminal history category VI for the additional reasons that he qualified as both a career offender and an armed career criminal. (Id.) After applying a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, the Court arrived at an advisory guideline range of 188 to 235 months. (Id. at 22-23.) The Court sentenced Hiraldo to a low-end guideline sentence of 188 months. (Id. at 31; Doc. No. 25 (Judgment).)
Hiraldo did not take a direct appeal. Instead, on June 14, 2022, a one-page document was filed on the docket in which Hiraldo raised the question of whether a change in the law rendered his classification as an armed career criminal improper. (Doc. No. 30.) Citing Borden v. United States, 141 S.Ct. 1817, 210 L.Ed.2d 63 (2021), Hiraldo suggested that his three prior state court felony conviction for arson, assault, and domestic violence no longer qualify as “crimes of violence” for purposes of the ACCA. (Id. at 1.)
On June 16, 2022, the Court issued a non-document order advising Hiraldo that it construed this document as a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 but noting that the document failed to request any relief. (Order [non-document], 6/16/2022.) The Court, therefore, granted Hiraldo leave until July 1, 2022 to “either supplement his motion to specify the relief, if any, he is seeking or notify the Court that he is not seeking relief from his sentence under § 2255.” (Id.)
Hiraldo did not timely respond to the Court's request for supplementation or clarification. Instead, on November 29, 2022, he filed a motion for an extension of time in which to supplement his motion to vacate. (Doc. No. 31.) In his motion, he maintained that he did not have access to FCI Hazelton's legal assistance program for purposes of drafting his supplement. (Id. at 2.) He also complained that, due to what he viewed as FCI Hazelton's “abuse of COVID-19 modified operations/programs[,]” he had been “confined to his housing unit living quarters for days, weeks and months[.]” (Id. at 2-3.) Appended to Hiraldo's motion for an extension of time was a document-prepared on Form AO 243-which the Court construed as Hiraldo's supplement. (Order [non-document], 1/27/2023; see Doc. No. 31-1.)
As supplemented, Hiraldo's motion to vacate raises three grounds for relief. In Ground One, Hiraldo alleges that he was actually innocent of the armed career criminal classification, again citing the Supreme Court's decision in Borden, supra. (Doc. No. 31-1, at 4-6.) As part of this first ground for relief, Hiraldo also maintains that the Court erroneously “allowed [him] to plead guilty to a non-existing possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine . . . as opposed to [a] simple possession” charge. (Id. at 4.) He also brings two new claims sounding in ineffective assistance of counsel. In Ground Two, Hiraldo alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the PSR's advisory guideline calculation, based, in part, on the ACCA enhancement. (Id. at 7-9.) He also suggests that, had his counsel investigated his erratic and bizarre behavior, counsel would have discovered that Hiraldo was addicted to drugs. Armed with this information, Hiraldo believes counsel could have “invoked a valid affirmative lesser included [of]fense of simple possession and [Hiraldo] could have received a lesser sentence or [been] found not guilty of violating” 18 U.S.C. § 841. (Id. at 8-9.) In Ground Three, Hiraldo posits that defense counsel was ineffective for erroneously advising him that he had no meritorious appellate issues and for failing to file a notice of appeal. (Id. at 11-12.)
A federal prisoner may attack the validity of his sentence by filing a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the district court where he was sentenced. Section 2255 sets forth four grounds upon which a federal prisoner may state a claim for relief: “[1] the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or [2] that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or [3] that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or [4] [the sentence] is otherwise subject to collateral attack[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
A criminal defendant may not utilize a § 2255 motion as a substitute for a direct appeal. Regalado v. United States, 334 F.3d 520, 528 (6th Cir. 2003); Capaldi v. Pontesso, 135 F.3d 1122, 1124 (6th Cir. 1998) (“An application under § 2255 . . . should not be considered a substitute for direct appeal.”); see Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993); Watson v. United States, 165 F.3d 486, 488 (6th Cir. 1999). To assert a claim not raised on direct appeal, a petitioner ordinarily must show cause for the default and prejudice. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622, 118 S.Ct. 1064, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 1584, 1603-04, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1998).
A petitioner who entered a guilty plea must show an error of constitutional magnitude that had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the proceedings. Griffin v. United States, 330 F.3d 733, 736 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Abrahamson, 507 U.S. at 637). Therefore, a court may only grant relief under § 2255 if the petitioner demonstra...
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