United States v. Holt
| Decision Date | 11 April 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 15-CV-11891,15-CV-11891 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. JAKEFFE HOLT, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Hon. Amy J. St. Eve
AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge:
On November 30, 2015, petitioner Jakeffe Holt ("Petitioner") filed the present motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. For the following reasons, the Court denies Petitioner's § 2255 motion. The Court, however, certifies an issue for appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
On September 23, 2004, the Special March 2004 Grand Jury returned a one-count indictment (the "Indictment") against Petitioner in United States v. Jakeffe Holt, No. 04-cr-840. Count One charged Petitioner with knowingly possessing a firearm, namely a Smith and Wesson, Model 908, Blue Steel, 9 millimeter caliber, semi-automatic pistol bearing serial number VDK 7317, in and affecting interstate commerce in that the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce before Petitioner's possession of the firearm, having previously been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e).
On March 30, 2005, after a one-day jury trial, the jury found Petitioner guilty of Count One. Later, on October 28, 2005, the district court sentenced Petitioner to two-hundred months' imprisonment and three years' supervised release, in part, pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA") sentencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).
On November 30, 2015, Petitioner sought leave under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) to file the immediate 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. (R. 1.) The government conceded that Petitioner made a prima facie showing that his sentence may violate United States v. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). As a result, on December 30, 2015, the Seventh Circuit granted Petitioner's motion. Importantly, the Seventh Circuit cautioned that its "review [was] necessarily cursory," simply finding that Petitioner's "claim is arguable." (R. 2.)
"Relief under [§ 2255] is available only in extraordinary situations, such as an error of constitutional or jurisdictional magnitude or where a fundamental defect has occurred which results in a complete miscarriage of justice." Blake v. United States, 723 F.3d 870, 878-79 (7th Cir. 2013); see also Almonacid v. United States, 476 F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 2007). Specifically, under § 2255, relief "is available only when the 'sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States,' the court lacked jurisdiction, the sentence was greater than the maximum authorized by law, or it is otherwise subject to collateral attack." Torzala v. United States, 545 F.3d 517, 521 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255). Accordingly, a § 2255 motion is not a substitute for a direct criminal appeal nor is it a means by which a defendant may appeal the same claims a second time. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 140 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1998) ().
Petitioner argues that his sentence was erroneous. Specifically, Petitioner contends that his 1991 Illinois "burglary" violation does not qualify as an ACCA predicate offense. Indeed, he first claims that his Illinois burglary offense cannot fall within the ACCA's residual clause after Johnson v. United States. (See R. 9 at 2, citing Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557, 192 L. Ed. 2d 569 (2015).) "Nor," Petitioner maintains, "does it qualify under ACCA's enumerated crimes clause." (R. 9 at 2, citing Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 186 L. Ed. 2d 438 (2013).) Thus, Petitioner concludes, his predicate burglary "cannot be used as an ACCA predicate," making his imposed sentence enhancement unlawful. (Id. at 10.) The government, however, disagrees. Instead, the government maintains that "Holt's third conviction, a burglary conviction, does qualify as an ACCA predicate under the enumerated offenses portion[.]" (R. 10 at 8, R. 15 at 3 (citing United States v. Dawkins, 809 F.3d 953 (7th Cir. 2016)).) The Court agrees.
The ACCA states the following, in relevant part:
In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title and has three previous convictions by any court referred to in section 922(g)(1) of this title for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another, such person shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than fifteen years, and, notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall not suspend the sentence of, or grant a probationary sentence to, such person with respect to the conviction under section 922(g).
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Further, the ACCA defines a "violent felony" predicate offense as follows:
[A]ny crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or any act of juvenile delinquency involving the use or carrying of a firearm, knife, or destructive device that would be punishable by imprisonment for such term if committed by an adult, that . . . is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another[.]
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B).
The ACCA's "violent felony" predicate offenses have historically fallen into one of two categories: 1) the ACCA's enumerated offenses (i.e. acts of "burglary, arson, or extortion, [or] involv[ing] use of explosives") or 2) the ACCA's residual clause (i.e. acts "otherwise involv[ing] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another"). See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). In Johnson, however, the Supreme Court found the ACCA's residual clause unconstitutional. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557 ( ). As such, violent felonies must now fall within the ACCA's enumerated offenses to qualify as a predicate offense. Thus, the Court's analysis hinges on whether Petitioner's Illinois burglary conviction, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/19-1, qualifies as a "violent felony" within the ACCA's enumerated predicate offenses. It does.
In Taylor v. United States, the Supreme Court established a uniform "burglary" definition for the purposes of sentencing under the ACCA. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 592, 110 S. Ct. 2143, 109 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1990) (); see also Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283 ("We begin with Taylor v. United States, which established the rule for determining when a defendant's prior conviction counts as one ofACCA's enumerated predicate offenses (e.g., burglary).") (citing Taylor, 495 U.S. 575)). "Congress meant by 'burglary,'" the Court held, "the generic sense in which the term is now used in the criminal codes of most States." Id.at 598 (citing Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 45, 100 S. Ct. 311, 62 L. Ed. 2d 199 (1979)). Acknowledging that "the exact formulations vary" across states, the Court concluded that, with regard to the ACCA, "the generic, contemporary meaning of burglary contains at least the following elements: an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime." Id. (citing W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 8.13(a), (c), (e)). Thus, "a person has been convicted of burglary for purposes of a § 924(e) enhancement if he is convicted of any crime, regardless of its exact definition or label, having the basic elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime." Id. at 599.
Further, in Descamps, the Supreme Court elaborated on what constitutes "unlawful entry." See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285-86. The Court concluded that the generic burglary offense established in Taylor "excludes any case in which a person enters premises open to the public, no matter his intent; the generic crime requires breaking and entering or similar unlawful activity." Id. at 2292 (citing 3 W. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 21.1(a) (2d ed. 2003)). Indeed, applying this definition, the Supreme Court ruled that "because California, to get a [burglary] conviction, need not prove that [defendant] broke and entered . . . a [California Penal Code Ann. § 459] violation cannot serve as an ACCA predicate." Id. at 2285-86.
720 ILCS 5/19-1; see also (R. 1 at 12, Exh. 3.)
At the heart of the Court's inquiry is whether the Illinois burglary statute's "without authority" element amounts to "breaking and entering or similar unlawful activity." Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2292. Significantly, however, Petitioner admits that it does. (See R. 9 at 2 () Moreover, he "recognizes that this Court must follow Seventh Circuit precedent." (Id.)
"Residential burglary . . . which is committed when a defendant 'knowingly and...
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