United States v. Hooper
| Decision Date | 21 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-4220 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM WELLINGTON HOOPER, JR., Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Mark Diamond, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant.
Jessica D. Aber, United States Attorney, Lisa R. McKeel Assistant United States Attorney, Jacqueline R. Bechara, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, RICHARDSON, Circuit Judge, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
William Wellington Hooper, Jr., was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to produce child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C § 2251(a) and (e); production of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a); and two counts of coercion and enticement to produce child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). He was sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, Hooper challenges his convictions and sentence on multiple grounds. We affirm.
Hooper first challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence derived from two cell phones seized by law enforcement on two different occasions. This court "review[s] the factual findings underlying a motion to suppress for clear error and the district court's legal determinations de novo." United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 233 (4th Cir. 2012). "When a suppression motion has been denied, this [c]ourt reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the government." Id.
The first cell phone was seized when Hooper was arrested while dining in a restaurant with his family. Officers found Hooper seated with his phone on the table within inches of his hand. The officers asked Hooper to go outside, and as he stood up, one officer took his phone from the table. Subsequently, law enforcement obtained a search warrant for the contents of the phone. The district court ruled that the seizure fell easily within the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement.
On appeal, Hooper asserts that the police did not seize his phone until Hooper had already been arrested and removed from the table; accordingly, the phone was not subject to destruction or use of a weapon and, thus, could not be seized incident to arrest. However, the district court explicitly rejected Hooper's wife Robin's testimony that the police returned to the table to seize the phone minutes after escorting Hooper away. Instead, the district court determined that the officer's testimony was more credible and found that the officer seized the phone as Hooper stood up from the table. Special deference is given to the district court's credibility determinations at a suppression hearing, United States v. Bebris, 4 F.4th 551, 560 (7th Cir. 2021), and here, the finding was also supported by the officer's dashcam video. Accordingly, the seizure of the cell phone was appropriate. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 388 (2014) (calling concession that a cell phone may be seized incident to arrest "sensible").
Next, Hooper challenges the seizure of his phone from a table on a platform attached to a pier. The pier was on property belonging to Robin's parents and leased by Robin's company, Williams Wharf Oyster Company. The platform was used to work on the oysters. Hooper had no ownership interest in the Company, and he drew no salary. However, he did help his wife with the Company. Hooper's residence was on adjacent property. When law enforcement entered the Company's property, Hooper put his phone down and walked off the pier towards the officers, where he was arrested.
The district court found that Hooper lacked standing to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge because he had no expectation of privacy in the platform and, even if he did, he lost that expectation when he abandoned his phone. On appeal, Hooper contends that his expectation of privacy arose from the fact that he resided on the property. Further, he asserts that he did not abandon his cell phone, but merely left it on his property.
"[T]he Fourth Amendment protects both homes and the land immediately surrounding and associated with homes, known as curtilage, from unreasonable government intrusions." Covey v. Assessor of Ohio Cty., 777 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). The curtilage-the "area adjacent to the home and to which the activity of home life extends"-"is intimately linked to the home, both physically and psychologically, and is where privacy expectations are most heightened." Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 7 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). This court "presume[s] a warrantless search of curtilage to be unreasonable." Covey, 777 F.3d at 192 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The extent of curtilage is determined by whether "the area harbors the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life." United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the test used to determine the boundaries of a home's curtilage is not "a finely tuned formula that, when mechanically applied, yields a 'correct' answer to all extent-of-curtilage questions." Id. at 301. In determining whether an area qualifies as curtilage, the Dunn Court identified four factors: "[1] the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, [2] whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, [3] the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and [4] the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by." Id. at 301. At the same time, though, the Court cautioned that "these factors are useful analytical tools only to the degree that, in any given case, they bear upon the centrally relevant consideration-whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the home's 'umbrella' of Fourth Amendment protection." Id.; see also Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182 n.12 (1984) ().
Applying the Dunn factors here, we find that the platform attached to the pier is not part of the curtilage of Hooper's residence. First, the evidence showed that the pier was part of Robin's parents' property, where their house was located. Hooper's residence was on an adjacent property, and the parents' house was in between Hooper's residence and the docks. The pier was two to three acres away from Hooper's home. Notably, in the district court, Hooper did not argue that the pier/platform were part of his home but rather that it was his "workstation" or "office."
Moreover, there was no evidence that Hooper used the platform or pier as an extension of his residence to conduct "intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man's home." Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300. There was no evidence that Hooper took steps to exclude others from entering the dock or enclosed a private office; to the contrary, the evidence showed that other employees accessed and worked on the pier and platform. Thus, because the platform was not within the curtilage of Hooper's home, he had no expectation of privacy in it and, thus, no standing to invoke the Fourth Amendment.
Hooper next challenges the admission of testimony regarding unadjudicated prior bad acts. In the instant case, the Government submitted material evidence in the form of text messages and emails between Hooper and Jennifer Hutchens and Hooper and Jennifer Hutchens' minor daughter. Hooper denied sending the messages. The district court permitted the Government to present testimony of prior bad acts, finding that it was admissible to show identity and modus operandi. The court noted that, in the instant case, Hooper claimed that someone else sent the messages at issue, "bringing his identity into issue." (J.A. 249). On appeal, Hooper asserts that his identity was not an issue at trial, in that he argued only that he did not commit the acts of which he was accused, and that the Government did not assert that it sought admission to prove modus operandi. Further, Hooper contends that the district court's limiting instruction was insufficient.
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) is an inclusive rule, allowing evidence of other crimes or acts except that which tends to prove only criminal propensity. United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 994-95 (4th Cir. 1997). Such evidence of other crimes or acts is admissible to prove "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." Id. at 994. Evidence of prior acts is admissible if the evidence is: (1) relevant to an issue other than the general character of the defendant, (2) necessary, (3) reliable, and (4) if the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Id. at 997.
Here the district court clearly stated that Hooper had placed his identity at issue by arguing that he did not send the text and email messages at issue in this case. The challenged testimony described similar communications with Hooper, which was clearly probative of whether Hooper was the author of the messages in this case. Further, the district court accurately found that the prejudicial nature of the evidence did not outweigh its probative value, as the challenged evidence involved substantially the same conduct at that...
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