United States v. Hoskins
| Decision Date | 26 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | Criminal No. 3:12cr238 (JBA) |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. LAWRENCE HOSKINS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
Defendant Lawrence Hoskins moves under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c) for a judgment of acquittal on all counts or, in the alternative, under Rule 33 for a new trial. (Def.'s Mot. for Acquittal [Doc. # 589].) The Government opposes. (Gov't Opp. [Doc. # 604].) For the reasons that follow, Defendant's motion is granted in part and denied in part.
The Court assumes the parties' familiarity with the facts of this case. Briefly, Defendant is a British citizen who was employed from 2001 to 2004 by Alstom UK Limited, a British subsidiary of Alstom, but worked primarily for Alstom Resource Management SA, a French subsidiary of Alstom. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. for Acquittal [Doc. # 589-1] at 3-4.) The charges in this case stem from the Tarahan Project in Indonesia, for which an Indonesian subsidiary of Alstom contracted with Marubeni, a Japanese corporation, and "PLN," a utility company owned by the Indonesian government, to build a power plant in Indonesia. (Id. at 3.) Alstom Power Inc. ("API"), based in Windsor, Connecticut, is the American subsidiary of Alstom which headquartered Alstom's international utility boiler business and which was heavily involved in Alstom's bidding on the Tarahan Project. (Id. at 4.) In connection with the Tarahan Project, Alstom hired two consultants: Pirooz Sharafi, through his company Pacific Resources, Inc., and Azmin Aulia, through his company PT Gajendra Adhi Sakti. (Id.) The charges of the indictment relate to an effort by Alstom to use those consultants to bribe Indonesian officials in order to secure the Tarahan contract.
Defendant was indicted on July 30, 2013 and charged with conspiracy to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") (Count One), violations of the FCPA (Counts Two through Seven), conspiracy to commit money laundering (Count Eight), and money laundering (Counts Nine through Twelve). (Second Superseding Indictment [Doc. # 50].)
This matter proceeded to trial on October 28, 2019. After the Government concluded its presentation of evidence, Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on all counts under Rule 29(a). (Oral Mot. for Acquittal [Doc. # 572].) That motion was denied without prejudice to renew following the jury verdict. On November 8, 2019, the jury returned a verdict finding Defendant guilty on Counts One through Ten and Count Twelve, and not guilty on Count Eleven. (Jury Verdict [Doc. # 583].)
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(a) requires courts to "enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction" after the presentation of evidence. In considering a motion for acquittal, courts must "view the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the government, and . . . draw all reasonable inferences in its favor." United States v. Autuori, 212 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 2000). Courts should "consider the evidence in its totality, not in isolation." Id. The Court must "be careful to avoid usurping the role of the jury" and must "not substitute [its] own determinations of credibility or relative weight of the evidence for that of the jury." Id. (internal quotation omitted). Rather, the Court "must determine whether upon the evidence, giving full play to the right of the jury to determine credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable inferences of fact, a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guiltbeyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Mariani, 725 F.2d 862, 865 (2d Cir. 1984) (internal quotation omitted). If "either of the two results, a reasonable doubt or no reasonable doubt, is fairly possible," then the Court "must let the jury decide the matter." United States v. Guadagna, 183 F.3d 122, 129 (2d Cir. 1999). A defendant's motion for acquittal "shoulders a heavy burden in challenging the sufficiency of evidence," and the Court "must uphold the jury's verdict if . . . any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Autuori, 212 F.3d at 114 (internal quotations omitted).
In April 2016, the Government appealed this Court's ruling granting in part Defendant's motion to dismiss and the ruling denying the Government's motion for reconsideration of that decision. (Not. of Appeal [Doc. # 344].) The Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded, inter alia, that "the FCPA clearly dictates that foreign nationals may only violate the statute outside the United States if they are agents, employees, officers, directors, or shareholders of an American issuer or domestic concern." United States v. Hoskins, 902 F.3d 69, 97 (2d Cir. 2018). Thus, because Defendant "did not travel [to the United States] while the bribery scheme was ongoing," id. at 72, Defendant cannot be liable for violations of the FCPA unless he was an agent of a domestic concern.
Defendant argues that he is entitled to an acquittal on Counts One through Seven, the FCPA counts, because the Government failed to prove that he was an agent of API, the relevant domestic concern. According to Defendant, "[t]here is not a shred of evidence that anyone at API had the right to (or actually did) exercise any control over any work that Mr. Hoskins performed, let alone in connection with the retention of consultants on the Tarahan project." (Def.'s Mem. at 6.) "Because the element of control is fundamental to establishing an agency relationship,"Defendant argues, no reasonable jury could have concluded that Defendant was an agent of API in the absence of any evidence of API's control over him.
"Agency is a legal concept that depends on the existence of three elements: (1) the manifestation by the principal that the agent shall act for him; (2) the agent's acceptance of the undertaking; and (3) the understanding of the parties that the principal is to be in control of the undertaking." Cleveland v. Caplaw Enter., 448 F.3d 518, 522 (2d Cir. 2006).1 In other words, an agency relationship arises when "one person (a 'principal') manifests assent to another person (an 'agent') that the agent shall act on the principal's behalf and subject to the principal's control, andthe agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act." Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 (2005) [hereinafter Third Restatement].2
"An essential element of agency is the principal's right to control the agent's actions." Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 713 (2013) (quoting Third Restatement § 1.01, cmt f). "Agency requires more than mere authorization to assert a particular interest." Id. Agency is a "fiduciary relationship." Third Restatement § 1.01; see Hollingsworth, 570 U.S. at 713 (). Thus the agent must "act loyally in the principal's interest as well as on the principal's behalf." Third Restatement § 1.01 cmt. e.
"The right of control by the principal may be exercised by prescribing what the agent shall or shall not do before the agent acts, or at the time when he acts, or at both times." Cleveland, 448 F.3d at 522 (). But control "need not include control at every moment, its exercise may be very attenuated and, as where the principal is physically absent, may be ineffective." Id.
Agency analysis is "highly-factual and often nuanced." Id. at 523. Nonetheless, there are some factors to consider in making the nuanced determination of whether an agency relationshipexisted. If the purported agent "answer[s] to no one," "decides for [himself], with no review, what" to do, owes no fiduciary obligation to the purported principal, and if "[n]o provision provides for [his] removal," then an agent-principal relationship does not exist. Hollingsworth, 570 U.S. at 713. Proof that one party "controlled or supervised" the other "could constitute indicia of agency." O'Connell Mach. Co., Inc. v. M.V. Americana, 797 F.2d 1130, 1137 (2d Cir. 1986).
The "right of interim control" of the agent by the principal "is what distinguishes an agency relationship from a mere contractual one." Johnson v. Priceline.com, Inc., 711 F.3d 271, 278 (2d Cir. 2013) () (distinguishing between the performance of contractual duties and agency relationships).3 Even where a purported principal "exercise[s] control" over several "important" aspects of a transaction, no agency relationship has been established where he lacks interim control over how the purported agent performs the task "beyond the initial specifications." Id. at 278-79. Third Restatement § 1.01 cmt. f(1). "Many positions and relationships give one person the ability to dominate or influence other persons but not the right to control their actions," and a "position of dominance or influence does not in itself mean that a person is a principal in a relationship of agency with the person over whom dominance or influence may be exercised." Id. "The principal's right of control presupposes that the principal retains the capacity throughout therelationship to assess the agent's performance, provide instructions to the agent, and terminate the agency relationship by revoking the agent's authority." Id. "By consenting to act on behalf of the principal, an agent who is an employee consents to do the work that the employer directs and to do it subject to the employer's instructions." Id. § 1.01 cmt. g. For example, in the case of an entity negotiating prices on...
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