United States v. HP Hood & Sons
| Decision Date | 27 February 1939 |
| Docket Number | 4544,4520-4522,4550.,4530,4529,No. 4519,4540,4543,4536,4519 |
| Citation | 26 F. Supp. 672 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES et al. v. H. P. HOOD & SONS, Inc., et al., and ten other cases. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
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John A. Canavan, U. S. Atty., of Boston, Mass., Robert H. Jackson, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Wendell Berge, Hugh B. Cox, James C. Wilson, and Joseph G. Blandi, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., for plaintiffs.
Charles B. Rugg and Ropes, Gray, Boyden & Perkins, all of Boston, Mass., for defendants H. P. Hood & Sons and another.
Edward F. Merrill, of Skowhegan, Me., for intervening petitioner E. Frank Branon.
John M. Raymond, Lawrence Foster, and Palmer, Dodge, Barstow, Wilkins & Davis, all of Boston, Mass., for defendant Whiting Milk Co.
John W. Redmond, of Newport, Vt., for intervening petitioners Chester D. Noyes, B. A. Gray, and Everett Wiswall.
Charles S. Walkup, Jr., of Boston, Mass., for defendants W. P. Elliott Co., F. W. Laroe, John E. Burr, Whitcomb Farms, Inc., and Mason's Creamery Co.
David Greer, of Boston, Mass., for defendants Green Valley Creamery, A. J. Robinson, W. T. Jones Co., A. J. McNeil & Sons, and Westwood Farm Milk Co.
Thirty actions filed by the plaintiffs were heard together on the question of a temporary mandatory injunction. This Court entered a decree ordering the defendants to comply with Marketing Order No. 4, as amended, during the pendency of this suit. United States of America, et al. v. Whiting Milk Co., D.C., 21 F.Supp. 321.
The cases were then referred to a special master with directions to hear the parties and their evidence, and to make and report his findings of fact to the Court. Hearings were held beginning on January 4, 1938, and were recently concluded. The Master's report was filed on January 27, 1939.
The only question pertaining to the Master's report is raised by the plaintiffs who object to the inclusion of paragraphs 192 to 218 of the report on the grounds that they are immaterial and irrelevant. Since the defendants raise the question of the validity of Order No. 4, and the proper administration of the amended Order No. 4 by the Marketing Administrator, I am of the opinion that the paragraphs referred to should be included in the report. The Court therefore overrules the objection and confirms the Master's report.
After the injunction was issued, and on application of the defendants, a supersedeas pendente lite was issued by the Senior Circuit Judge of this circuit, staying and superseding the operation of the temporary injunction insofar as it compelled payments by the defendants to the Marketing Administrator, and directing that payments should be made to the clerk of this Court instead, or that a bond should be filed to guarantee such payments. Later, the supersedeas was amended to reinstate the injunction which had ordered payments of administration expenses under Article X of the order to the Administrator. The net result of the action of this Court and the supersedeas was to compel payment of administration expenses directly to the Marketing Administrator, and payments of the equalization charges under Article VIII, and the marketing service charges under Article IX, to the clerk of this Court.
On appeal from the injunction, the Circuit Court ordered that the supersedeas ordered issued by the Senior Circuit Judge should be continued pending the final determination of the cases on their merits. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., et al. v. United States, et al., 1 Cir., 97 F.2d 677.
There are now but eleven of the original thirty cases before me for decision. The rest of them are dependent on the decision in these cases, except in one or two instances, where additional testimony is to be taken. This decision will treat the cases as one case, and variations in the facts or law as applicable to any of them will be treated at the end of this opinion.
As a basis for the denial of the relief sought the defendants urge three broad grounds: First, the unconstitutionality of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 7 U.S.C.A. § 601 et seq., hereinafter referred to as the act: second, the invalidity of Order No. 4, both in its original form and as amended: and, third, the improper and illegal administration of Order No. 4, as amended.
The constitutionality of the act was passed upon by this Court in United States of America et al. v. Whiting Milk Co., supra. The reasoning and decision in that case are adopted here. In addition to the grounds urged, the defendants now raise one other question — whether the act is unconstitutional because of the improper delegation of legislative power to the Secretary of Agriculture or to a group of private persons. The defendants contend that this Court is bound by the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for this Circuit in Butler v. United States, 78 F.2d 1, wherein it held that the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, 7 U.S.C.A. § 601 et seq., was unconstitutional because the Congress improperly delegated legislative power to the executive department. They also contend that even if this Court is not bound to follow the decision in the Butler case, under the doctrine of stare decisis, the act shows a delegation of authority without setting up proper standards as a guide for the exercise of that authority. The defendants' first contention is untenable. The decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals in the Butler case, supra, was a decision on the original Agricultural Adjustment Act. After the Supreme Court of the United States had affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court (without passing on the question of the delegation of legislative authority) the act, including the delegation clause, was amended. As the 1937 act now stands, the delegation clause is quite different from the one passed on by the Circuit Court in the Butler case. The doctrine stare decisis has no application here.
The act contains the following declaration of policy:
"(2) To protect the interest of the consumer by (a) approaching the level of prices which it is declared to be the policy of Congress to establish in subsection (1) of this section by gradual correction of the current level at as rapid a rate as the Secretary of Agriculture deems to be in the public interest and feasible in view of the current consumptive demand in domestic and foreign markets, and (b) authorizing no action under this title which has for its purpose the maintenance of prices to farmers above the level which it is declared to be the policy of Congress to establish in subsection (1) of this section." 7 U.S.C.A. § 602.
To effectuate the policy of the act, the Secretary of Agriculture is authorized under section 8c(4), 7 U.S.C.A. § 608c(4), to issue an order. Section 8c(5) specifies in detail the terms and conditions of any orders that may be issued, and provides that no other terms and conditions may be contained in such order. A close reading of 8c(5) leads to the conclusion that the power delegated by Congress to the Secretary has not only a definite standard to follow, but has limitations beyond which the Secretary may not go. The standard or criterion that is to govern the exercise of authority given to the Secretary is the levelling of prices for agricultural commodities between the current period and the base period prescribed in the act. It contains a definite and fixed standard to which the Secretary must adhere, and provides the precision of guidance which were pointed out as lacking in the National Industrial Recovery Act in Schechter Corp. v. U. S., 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837, 79 L.Ed. 1570, 97 A.L.R. 947, and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S.Ct. 241, 79 L.Ed. 446. The exact point urged by these defendants was recently passed upon by the Fifth Circuit in Whittenburg, et al. v. U. S., 100 F.2d 520, wherein it was held that the act was not unconstitutional because of an unwarranted delegation of legislative power. To the same effect are Edwards v. U. S., 9 Cir., 91 F.2d 767; Wallace v. Hudson-Duncan, 9 Cir., 98 F.2d 985; and Currin, et al. v. Wallace, et al., 59 S.Ct. 379, 83 L.Ed. ___, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States January 30, 1939.
The defendants next contend that section 8c(12) of the act amounts to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to a group of producers or to the officers of the cooperative associations having control of the producer vote. This section, and section 8c(19) which permits the Secretary to conduct a referendum for the purpose of determining the sentiment amongst the producers, does not transcend the power of Congress to submit the question of the approval of an order to the producers. Some method or means of ascertaining the sentiment of the producers had to be provided, and the method provided by ...
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Cranston v. Freeman
...the handlers in the District Court. United States v. Whiting Milk Co., 21 F.Supp. 321 (D. Mass.1937); United States v. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 26 F.Supp. 672 (D.Mass. 1939). These cases, after being docketed on appeal in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, went directly to ......
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MASSACHUSETTS FARMERS D. COMMITTEE v. United States
...is set up in the order and act. The price to be paid to the producers is, therefore, but a minimum price. United States of America, et al. v. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 26 F.Supp. 672, decided in this district February 23, 1939. The plaintiffs are not affected by the act or the order, except ......
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Hood Sons v. United States Whiting Milk Co v. Same Branon v. Same
...thereafter, the District Court confirmed the report, sustained both the Act and the Order, and entered a decree for the plaintiffs. 26 F.Supp. 672. The defendants took an appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals and, after the cases were docketed, filed petitions for writs of certiorari. The ......
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Green Valley Creamery v. United States, 3461-3465.
...permanently restraining the numerous defendants from violating any of the terms of Order No. 4 as amended. United States v. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., D.C., 26 F. Supp. 672. Thereafter, two of this group of thirty cases, the Hood and Whiting Milk cases, after being docketed on appeal in the C......