United States v. Hudson
| Decision Date | 24 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 5:11cr3/MW/EMT,Case No.: 5:14cv193/MW/EMT |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. YAMURA D. HUDSON |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
This matter is before the court upon Defendant's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (ECF No. 119). The Government filed a response (ECF No. 124), and Defendant filed a reply (ECF No. 126). The case was referred to the undersigned for the issuance of all preliminary orders and any recommendations to the district court regarding dispositive matters. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). After a careful review of the record and the arguments presented, it is the opinion of the undersigned that Defendant has not raised any issue requiring an evidentiary hearing and that the § 2255 motion should be denied. See Rules 8(a) and (b), Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases.
On January 18, 2011, Defendant was charged in a five-count indictment with drug and weapons offenses. The specific charges were: possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine and twenty-eight grams or more of crack cocaine on a date certain in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) and 841(b)(1)(B)(ii)(II) ("Count One"); possession of firearms in furtherance of the drug trafficking crime charged in Count One in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) ("Count Two"); possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a) ("Count Three"); and two counts of possession with intent to distribute an indeterminate amount of a substance containing cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C) ("Count Four" and "Count Five") (ECF No. 1). The Government filed a notice of enhancement information indicating its intent to seek enhanced penalties pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§ 851 and 841(b)(1)(A) due to Defendant's two prior felony drug convictions (ECF No. 28).
Defendant was represented by Federal Public Defender Randolph Murrell. Mr. Murrell filed a motion to suppress evidence that was allegedly seized in violationof the Fourth Amendment (ECF No. 22). The motion acknowledged that officers had valid arrest warrants to enter the mobile home where Defendant was arrested and arrest him. Defendant maintained, however, that an additional warrant authorizing them to search for property was lacking in the constitutionally required particularity. Defendant argued that the officers did not have the authority to search throughout Defendant's mobile home for incriminating evidence at the time of his arrest and use the items that were discovered during this search as the basis for a later search warrant. Defendant further argued that during law enforcement's execution of the later search warrant, their seizures exceeded the scope of the warrant to such a degree that all items seized during that search should be suppressed (ECF No. 22). The Government responded in opposition and, in pertinent part, emphasized that no items had been seized at the time of Defendant's arrest; it also argued that Defendant lacked standing to challenge the warrants (ECF No. 35).
Defendant filed a supplemental motion to suppress in which he asked the court to suppress photographs taken from his cell phone and argued that the photos could not be used to justify the seizure of jewelry at the time of his arrest (ECF No. 41). The Government filed another response in opposition (ECF No. 42). Then- DistrictJudge Richard Smoak denied both motions on March 17, 2011, after a hearing (ECF Nos. 44, 45).
Defendant entered a blind plea of guilty after jury selection concluded (ECF No. 65 at 2). The Government recited the elements of the offenses and the potential penalties for the record (id. at 3-4, 11-12). Defendant indicated that he was entering the plea while reserving the right to appeal the court's denial of his motions to suppress (ECF No. 60; ECF No. 65 at 10). In light of the eleventh-hour plea, there was no written statement of facts. Instead, the Government stated for the record the facts it was prepared to prove if the case proceeded to trial, and Defendant agreed that those facts, if believed by a jury, would support a guilty verdict (ECF No. 65 at 13-19). Defendant disagreed with the Government's assertion that he was wearing a gun when he sold cocaine to the confidential informant ("CI"), but otherwise he agreed with the Government's proffer (ECF No. 65 at 24). Defendant indicated his understanding that the Government intended to seek enhanced sentences based upon two prior convictions, which convictions he affirmed (ECF No. 65 at 19-21). The specific sentence was not mentioned. Defendant acknowledged that his attorney did not know how the court would apply theguidelines and statutes in his case and that if the sentence he received was different than what his attorney had predicted, this could not be a basis for withdrawing his guilty plea (ECF No. 65 at 22-23). Defendant seemed equivocal about whether his questions had been answered and whether he had enough time to talk to counsel but indicated that he just wanted to "go on with it" (ECF No. 65 at 24-25). Counsel were asked to indicate to the court that there were no promises, assurances, or understandings about the disposition of Defendant's case that were different than what the court had discussed with him, and they both did so (ECF No. 65 at 26).
Nine days after he entered his guilty plea, Defendant filed a pro se letter which was construed as a motion to have Mr. Murrell removed as counsel of record due to ineffectiveness (ECF No. 61). Mr. Murrell filed a motion in which, on Defendant's behalf, he requested a hearing for the court to consider Defendant's motion (ECF No. 62). At a hearing held on April 12, 2011, Defendant indicated that he no longer wished to withdraw his plea and wanted to proceed to sentencing with Mr. Murrell as his lawyer (ECF No. 66).
Defendant's Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") assessed a base offense level of 26 (ECF No. 73, PSR ¶ 22-24). There were no adjustments, andhis total offense level would have been 26 but for the application of a Chapter Four enhancement, which increased Defendant's total offense level to 37 (ECF No. 73, PSR ¶¶ 32-37). Defendant had seven criminal history points, but because he was a career offender his criminal history category became VI (ECF No. 73, PSR ¶ 48). The applicable guidelines range was 360 months to life as to Counts One, Four, and Five. Defendant's sentence on Count Three was limited to 120 months due to the statutory maximum penalty, and Count Two carried a mandatory consecutive term of 60 months (ECF No. 73, PSR ¶¶ 71-75).
At sentencing, defense counsel objected to the lack of credit for acceptance of responsibility, noting that his client had indicated his interest in pleading guilty before jury selection (ECF No. 92 at 3-6). After some discussion, the court awarded Defendant a two-point adjustment for acceptance of responsibility due to his guilty plea, which reduced the advisory guidelines range to 292 to 365 months imprisonment (ECF No. 92 at 7-9, 17). Mr. Murrell argued that the court should consider a sentence of 15 years, noting that the offenses that supported the career offender enhancement were minor offenses that occurred 17 and 18 years ago, respectively, when Defendant was a teenager (ECF No. 92 at 10-12). The courtrejected this argument and sentenced Defendant to a total term of 420-months imprisonment, which was comprised of a 360-month sentence on Counts One, Four and Five; a concurrent term of 120 months on Count Three; and a 60-month term of imprisonment on Count Two to run consecutive to the sentence imposed on Counts One, Four, and Five (ECF No. 78; ECF No. 92 at 15).
Defendant appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed his conviction in an unpublished opinion (ECF No. 112).1 It rejected his contention that the district court had improperly engaged in plea negotiations, and, noting inadequate record development, declined to reach his claim that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective because of his concession that a general arrest warrant authorized police officers to enter a mobile home to effectuate Defendant's arrest (id. at 5-6).
Defendant, through counsel, timely filed the present motion to vacate in August of 2014 (ECF No. 119), in which he raises five grounds for relief. He contends that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective because he (1) failed toproperly challenge a search warrant, (2) failed to file an interlocutory appeal of the denial of the motions to suppress, and (3) failed to properly oppose the Career Offender enhancement. Fourth, Defendant asserts that his plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. And fifth, he claims that appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective because he did not raise two specific claims on appeal. The Government opposes the motion in its entirety.
Collateral review is not a substitute for direct appeal, and therefore the grounds for collateral attack on final judgments pursuant to § 2255 are extremely limited. A prisoner is entitled to relief under section 2255 if the court imposed a sentence that (1) violated the Constitution or laws of the United States, (2) exceeded its jurisdiction, (3) exceeded the maximum authorized by law, or (4) is otherwise subject to collateral attack. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1194 n.8 (11th Cir. 2011). "Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 'is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for that narrow compass of other injury that could not have been raised in direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in acomplete miscarriage of justice.'" Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). The "fundamental miscarriage of...
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