United States v. Huff, 26361.
Decision Date | 02 April 1969 |
Docket Number | No. 26361.,26361. |
Citation | 409 F.2d 1225 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alvin Ray HUFF, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Louis P. Bickel, Dallas, Tex., for appellant.
Melvin M. Diggs, U. S. Atty., B. H. Timmins, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Eldon B. Mahon, U. S. Atty., Dallas, Tex., for appellee.
Before BELL, AINSWORTH and GODBOLD, Circuit Judges.
Pursuant to new Rule 18 of the Rules of this Court, we have concluded on the merits that this case is of such character as not to justify oral argument and have directed the Clerk to place the case on the Summary Calendar and to notify the parties in writing. See Floyd v. Resor, 5 Cir., 1969, 409 F.2d 714, n. 2; Murphy v. Houma Well Service, 5 Cir., 1969, 409 F.2d 804, n. 12.
Appellant was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) for allegedly committing a bank robbery. Subsequent to his arrest and prior to his trial, appellant moved for a judicial determination of his mental competency to stand trial. The trial judge ordered a mental examination of appellant by a qualified psychiatrist and some five weeks later, on April 15, 1968, after the psychiatrist's report had been received, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the question of mental competency, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4244. During the course of the hearing, appellant, through counsel, objected to the hearing being held in the absence of a jury and insisted that he was entitled to a jury trial on the issue of present mental competence. But the court ruled that it was for the trial judge alone to determine whether the defendant was competent to stand trial. Based on the evidence offered at this hearing, the court found that appellant presently was in possession of his mental faculties, that he could rationally comprehend the nature of the charges against him and aid in the conduct of his defense, and that his mental condition was such that he would be able to recall the events in connection with the alleged offense, consult with counsel, and testify at his trial if called upon to do so.
On June 14, 1968, three days before the commencement of his trial, appellant filed a written motion for a two-part or bifurcated jury trial: one on the issue of insanity at the time of the commission of the crime, and the other on the issue of guilt or innocence. Specifically, he moved for the following:
This motion was denied by the trial judge, and the case proceeded to trial. In the course of the trial, appellant did not assert the defense of insanity, contending that to do so would deprive him of a fair trial and violate his privilege against self-incrimination. Indeed, appellant took the stand, out of the presence of the jury, and testified that he was voluntarily waiving his right to urge an insanity defense and relying upon the motion for a bifurcated jury trial. The jury found the appellant guilty, and he was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment. Appellant now appeals his conviction, urging that the conviction be reversed and rendered and that he be acquitted, or, alternatively, that his conviction be reversed and the case remanded for a separate jury trial on the question of mental competency to stand trial, and a separate jury trial to determine his sanity at the time of the commission of the alleged crime.1
Section 4244 was held constitutional by the Supreme Court in Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 76 S.Ct. 410, 100 L.Ed. 412 (1956). While there is widespread criticism of federal and state commitment practices,2 this criticism largely is focused on the procedural and substantive rights of a defendant who, unlike appellant, is found mentally incompetent to stand trial. In any event, federal courts have been unanimous in holding that the question of mental competency at the time of trial is for the trial judge and not for the jury.3 We are obliged to follow the plain meaning of Section 4244 and the overwhelming weight of judicial precedent.
Finally, appellant alleges that the district court also erred in refusing to grant a separate jury trial on his dedense of insanity at the time of the commission of the alleged crime. Holmes v. United States, 1966, 124 U.S. App.D.C. 152, 363 F.2d 281, 282. Appellant argues that inherent in a plea of insanity is an admission that the accused in fact committed the crime charged, and that thus, absent a two-part jury trial, the assertion of the plea is self-incriminating and prevents a fair...
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