United States v. Hunter, Crim. No. 2008-68

• Decision Date: 31 July 1975
• Docket Number: 800-71,Crim. No. 2008-68,904-72 and 981-73.
• Citation: 394 F. Supp. 997
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Raymond HUNTER, Defendant. UNITED STATES of America v. Albert RAYMOND, Defendant. UNITED STATES of America v. William DeLOACH, Sr., Defendant. UNITED STATES of America v. Linda F. EWING, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

394 F. Supp. 997

UNITED STATES of America v. Raymond HUNTER, Defendant.

UNITED STATES of America v. Albert RAYMOND, Defendant.

UNITED STATES of America v. William DeLOACH, Sr., Defendant.

UNITED STATES of America v. Linda F. EWING, Defendant.

Crim. Nos. 2008-68, 800-71, 904-72 and 981-73.

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

July 31, 1975.

On Applications for Excess Compensation Pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)

BAZELON, Chief Judge:

When these applications for excess compensation pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d), were first before me, I concluded that each attorney had rendered "extended or complex" representation and that each of the applications were sufficiently detailed to permit a finding that the services provided to the indigent defendants in these felony cases were "reasonably expended" in the course of counsel's representation of the indigent defendant. United States v. Hunter, 385 F.Supp. 358 (D.D.C.1974). In each of these cases, the trial judge approved vouchers submitted by appointed counsel in amounts exceeding the statutory ceiling of $1,000 for a felony case, and in each case the trial judge concluded that payment at the maximum statutory rates of $30 per hour for in-court time and $20 per hour for out-of-court time was necessary to provide "fair compensation." 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d). Since I had previously held that excess compensation is not ordinarily to be computed at maximum rates absent a showing of "exceptional circumstances,"¹ I was troubled by these vouchers, particularly so since there appeared to be no ascertainable standard to guide the trial judge's initial determination nor my approval function under the statute. I therefore held the applications in abeyance and requested memoranda on this point from counsel involved in the cases before me, and I also invited the various bar organizations in the District of Columbia and the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts to aid in the resolution of this important and difficult problem by submitting memoranda as amicus curiae. Memoranda have been submitted by several of the attorney-applicants and by various bar organizations as amici curiae. I am particularly grateful for the helpful memoranda submitted by the Bar Association of the District of Columbia, the District of Columbia Bar, and the National Legal Aid and Defender Association. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts elected not to respond to my invitation to participate in these cases as amicus curiae.²

The attorney-applicants and amici curiae ask me to hold that, when appropriately certified by the trial judge, "fair compensation" for "extended or complex" representation under the amended act may be computed on the basis of maximum hourly rates without regard to a separate showing of "exceptional circumstances." This construction, it is contended, accords with the intention of Congress which led to the 1970 amendments to the Criminal Justice Act and furthers the statutory goal of providing indigent defendants in the federal courts with adequate and effective representation by counsel. Initially, I adopted a contrary construction under the original statute. United States v. Hanrahan, 260 F.Supp. 728 (D.D.C.1966). I adhered to that construction in United States v. Thompson, 361 F.Supp. 879, 886-887 (D.D.C.1973), the only case which I have decided under the amended act. As the attorney-applicants and amici see it, Thompson is at odds with the legislative purposes of the 1970 amendments and results in substantial delay in the processing of excess compensation applications which is incompatible with the statutory scheme. Finally, it is argued that the "exceptional circumstances" standard results in at least the appearance of, if not the fact of, arbitrary reductions in the compensation found by the trial judge to have been necessary to afford "fair compensation" in a particular case.

These are powerful arguments involving a statute which is at the heart of our goal of providing competent counsel for indigents. I have accordingly pondered the memoranda before me with care and, for reasons which follow, I have concluded to approve each of the applications in the full amount as certified by the respective trial judges.

I begin with the wording of the statute. As amended, the act provides that counsel appointed to represent an indigent defendant in a felony case shall be compensated at rates not to exceed $30 per hour for in-court time and $20 per hour for out-of-court time subject to a ceiling of $1,000. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(1), (2). Payment in excess of the statutory limit may be authorized "for extended or complex representation" when the trial judge certifies that "the amount of the excess payment is necessary to provide fair compensation" and the chief circuit judge "approves" the payment. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(3). The 1970 amendments expressly removed the previously required showing of "extraordinary circumstances" as a pre-condition to excess compensation. There is substantial support in the legislative materials to support the conclusion that Congress intended to increase the compensation available to appointed counsel pursuant to the statute, and to ease the eligibility requirements for excess compensation. S.Rep. No. 91-790, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at 7, 14-15 (1970); H.R. Rep. No. 91-1546, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at 10-11 (1970), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 1970, p. 3982. I recognized as much in United States v. Thompson, supra, 361 F.Supp. at 882-887, but nevertheless concluded that the "exceptional circumstances" standard should be retained for excess compensation payments which were calculated at maximum hourly rates. 361 F.Supp. at 886-887. While that standard may have been appropriate under the original act with its "extraordinary circumstances" provision, further reflection has persuaded me that it has no place in administration of the excess compensation provision of the amended statute.

Several reasons lead me to this conclusion. First, the "extraordinary circumstances" test is not compelled by the language of the amended statute, and there is nothing in the act itself or the legislative history which requires a holding that "fair compensation" in a given case may not be fixed at maximum hourly rates.³ Continued adherence to the "extraordinary circumstances" requirement, at least in the absence of promulgated criteria by those charged with administration and implementation of the Criminal Justice Act,⁴ cannot therefore be justified by ordinary canons of statutory construction.

Second, this circuit's experience with the "extraordinary circumstances" standard is now sufficient to enable me to conclude that, as the attorney-applicants and amici argue, continued adherence to that test may actually hinder administration of the act and inadvertently thwart the overriding legislative goal of providing competent legal services to eligible criminal defendants in the federal courts. It is fair to say that neither counsel, the trial bench nor I have a focused notion of what kind of a showing will satisfy the "extraordinary circumstances" standard. Without enunciated criteria, appointed counsel face lengthy delays as trial judges and I grapple with excess compensation applications in an effort fairly to administer the statute. I am now persuaded that a chief cause of such delay is the difficulty encountered in the effort to apply an essentially standardless standard. An attorney faced with such a delay may understandably conclude that, despite the promise of "fair compensation" in an "extended or complex" case, the Criminal Justice Act instead imposes an unfair and prejudicial economic burden. Equally important, reduction of a fee award found by a trial judge to be necessary to afford an appointed attorney "fair compensation" which is unaccompanied by appropriate explanation necessarily smacks of standardless and perhaps arbitrary judicial action.

Finally, it is argued that retention of the "extraordinary circumstances" standard actually impedes the legislative goal or furnishing each indigent defendant with a competent attorney. This is so, the attorney-applicants and amici suggest, because appointed counsel, aware of the "extraordinary circumstances" test, will be reluctant to expend the time really necessary to provide full defense services if they know that they may not be compensated.⁵ Of course, the modest compensation provided under the statute is not the guiding star for many dedicated attorneys who will always represent their appointed clients zealously regardless of the demand upon their time or the availability of publicly-funded compensation. It would, however, be naive to assume that such compensation is not a factor for some attorneys, particularly those who practice alone or in small firms and are therefore least able to absorb the financial impact of an extended or complex case.⁶ The statute must be construed and administered in a way which will encourage competent and dedicated attorneys to become involved in the federal criminal courts for, if caseloads and statistics are any guide, our need for such lawyers will continue in future years. There is now evidence that, among other factors, insistence on the "extraordinary circumstances" requirement actually deters competent counsel from accepting appointments in extended or complex criminal cases, lowers the quality of the defense services provided to individual defendants,⁷ and runs a risk of driving the experienced practitioner from the criminal courts while discouraging young attorneys from pursuing a career in criminal litigation.⁸ A judge-made standard that reaps such consequences is not faithful to the spirit and purpose of the Criminal Justice Act.

For these reasons, I now hold that when appropriately certified by the trial judge on an adequately detailed application, "fair...