United States v. Hurwitz
Decision Date | 21 October 1983 |
Docket Number | Crim. No. 83-20065. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. David N. HURWITZ, Marc Weitzen and Richard M. Firestone, Defendants. |
Samuel Strother, Trial Atty., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., Mary S. Feinberg, Asst. U.S. Atty., Charleston, W.Va., for the U.S.
Thomas H. Dundon, James F. Neal, Neal & Harwell, Nashville, Tenn., Stanley E. Preiser, Preiser & Wilson, L.C., Charleston, W.Va., for defendant David N. Hurwitz.
John P. Cooney, Jr., Robert B. Fiske, Jr., Davis, Polk & Wardwell, New York City, Joseph R. Goodwin, Charleston, W.Va., for defendant Marc Weitzen.
Benjamin Brafman, New York City, for defendant Richard M. Firestone.
On June 30, 1983, a grand jury returned the within fifteen-count indictment, wherein Count One alleges that from approximately the Spring of 1976 until the date of the indictment, that the Defendants, Hurwitz, Weitzen and Firestone, violated 18 U.S.C. § 371 by knowingly conspiring to defraud the United States by impeding, impairing, obstructing and defeating the Internal Revenue Service's ascertainment, computation, assessment, management and collection of income taxes. The indictment further charges Hurwitz1 and Firestone,2 both of whom then resided in the Southern District of New York, with substantive violations of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2).3 Currently pending before the Court is Hurwitz's and Firestone's motion to dismiss the substantive § 7206(2) counts for lack of venue or, alternatively, for a transfer of these counts, along with the § 371 conspiracy count,4 to the Southern District of New York, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3237(b),5 as well as all three of the Defendants' motion for a transfer to the Southern District of New York, pursuant to Rule 21(b), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. For the reasons set out below, the Court hereby grants Hurwitz's and Firestone's motion to dismiss the § 7206(2) counts for lack of venue, and grants the Defendants' motion for a transfer of the remaining § 371 conspiracy count to the Southern District of New York, pursuant to Rule 21(b), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In its response to the Defendants' motions, the Government summarized the factual background of the case as follows:
Government's Memorandum of Law in Response, at pp. 3-5.
Since Congress did not see fit to specify the locus delicti when it enacted 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2), it is incumbent upon the Court to do so by examining U.S. v. Blecker, 657 F.2d 629, 632 (4th Cir.1981) cert. denied 454 U.S. 1150, 102 S.Ct. 1016, 71 L.Ed.2d 304 (1982) (citations omitted). In construing 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2)'s predecessor, the Fourth Circuit stated that: "The key verbs in the statute are `aids,' `assists in,' `procures,' `counsels,' or `advises' the preparation or presentation of a false or fraudulent return, affidavit, claim or document." Newton v. U.S., 162 F.2d 795, 796 (4th Cir.1947) cert. denied 333 U.S. 848, 68 S.Ct. 650, 92 L.Ed. 1130 (1948).
Notwithstanding the fact that Counts Two through Fifteen allege that Hurwitz and Firestone committed violations of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2) "in the Southern District of West Virginia, and elsewhere", the Defendants argue that the Court should pierce this boilerplate language and find that there is not proper venue over Counts Two through Fifteen in the Southern District of West Virginia. In advancing this argument, Hurwitz maintains that he never entered West Virginia in connection with the Sortir and Malade transactions and that he did not have any contacts with the taxpayers while either he or they were in West Virginia.7 Without specifying the nature of his visit, Firestone maintains that he was only in West Virginia once during the period of time covered by the indictment.8 These Defendants further maintain that none of the returns in question were either prepared or filed in West Virginia. On the basis of these facts, Hurwitz and Firestone urge the Court to find that venue is improper in the Southern District of West Virginia, inasmuch as they did not render "aid," "assistance," "procurement," "counsel," or "advice" in this district.
The Government, on the other hand, maintains that Hurwitz and Firestone are accused of a "continuing offense" in Counts Two through Fifteen, and that venue is proper in the Southern District of West Virginia, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a).9 In particular, the Government contends that Hurwitz and Firestone committed the alleged violations of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2) in this district when Pete Neal, who was acting at the direction of the Defendants, delivered Sortir Associates 2's check for $150,000 to Stewart Justice on December 31, 1976, at the airport in Huntington, West Virginia, as consideration for Justice's sublease of certain coal properties located in Mingo County, West Virginia.
The issue before the Court, therefore, is whether Hurwitz and Firestone violated 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2) in this district as a result of the December 31, 1976, transaction between their agent, Neal, and Justice.10
Casting Neal in the role of an aider and abetter, and themselves as principals, Hurwitz and Firestone argue that they may not be properly tried on Counts Two through Fifteen in this district merely because of Neal's "accessorial" actions in this district. In advancing this argument, the Defendants rely on U.S. v. Walden, 464 F.2d 1015 (4th Cir.1972) cert. denied 410 U.S. 969, 93 S.Ct. 1436, 35 L.Ed.2d 705 (1973); U.S. v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206 (2d Cir.1966) (Friendly, J.); U.S. v. Sweig, 316 F.Supp. 1148 (S.D.N. Y.1970), which hold that neither the common law, nor 18 U.S.C. § 2 authorizes the Government to try principals in a district where only their accessory's acts, as opposed to their own acts, were performed. The Government responds that Walden is distinguishable for two reasons. First, the principals in Walden were accused of having committed discrete, substantive crimes, as opposed to continuing ones, as are the Defendants at bar. Second, the Government maintains "that § 7206(2) is itself an `accessory' statute, ... which does not require a culpable principal."
After having carefully considered these arguments, the Court agrees with the Defendants' assessment that venue over the § 7206(2) counts is improper in the Southern District of West Virginia. The fact that the substantive offenses alleged in Counts Two through Fifteen may be characterized as continuing crimes which may be "prosecuted...
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