United States v. Hyams

• Citation: 146 F. 15
• Decision Date: 24 May 1906
• Docket Number: 636.
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. HYAMS.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)

146 F. 15

UNITED STATES v. HYAMS.

No. 636.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

May 24, 1906

William H. Garland, Asst. U.S. Atty. (Asa P. French, U.S. Atty., on the brief).

Wilfred Bolster (Charles W. Bartlett, on the brief), for defendant in error.

Before COLT, PUTNAM, and LOWELL, Circuit Judges.

PUTNAM Circuit Judge.

This case arose under the fourth section of the act of April 12 1902, c. 500, 32 Stat. 97 (U.S. Comp. St. Supp. 1905, p 445), as follows:

'Sec 4. That on all original and unbroken factory packages of smoking and manufactured tobacco and snuff held by manufacturers or dealers on July first, nineteen hundred and two, upon which there has been paid a higher tax than that provided for in the preceding section of this act, there shall be allowed a drawback or rebate equal to the full amount of the difference between such higher tax and the tax imposed by this act, after making the proper allowance for discounts and rebates heretofore authorized, but the same shall not apply in any case where the claim has not been presented within sixty days after July first, nineteen hundred and two; and no claim shall be allowed or drawback paid for a less amount than ten dollars. It shall be the duty of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, to adopt such rules and regulations and to prescribe and furnish such blanks and forms as may be necessary to carry this section into effect.'

In accordance with the closing sentence of the section quoted, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, adopted certain rules and regulations pertaining thereto, one of which required that the proof entitling a petitioner to a drawback or rebate should be satisfactory to the Commissioner, and the other than the claim, after it was signed and sworn to, should be forwarded to the Collector, or Division Deputy Collector, of Internal Revenue for the proper district. Under the interpretation which we place on the statute, though the provision that the proof should be satisfactory to the Commissioner in order to entitle the petitioner to recover may be valid for regulating the personal conduct of his own office, it is invalid for the purposes now claimed by the United States. Of course, under the statute, the claim must be presented to the Commissioner, and the petition alleges that the same was done. The record shows that the claim was filed with the Collector of Internal Revenue for the District of Massachusetts, which undoubtedly, under the regulation which we have cited, can be and must be accepted as in legal effect a presentation of it to the Commissioner.

The proceeding in the Circuit Court was in accordance with what is known as the Tucker act, approved on March 3, 1887, c. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 752). The learned judge of that court filed two papers, one entitled a decree for the petitioner, and the other entitled the opinion of the court, each on the same day. The seventh section of the Tucker act reads as follows:

'Sec. 7. That it shall be the duty of the court to cause a written opinion to be filed in the cause, setting forth the specific findings by the court of the facts therein, and the conclusions of the court upon all questions of law involved in the case, and to render judgment thereon.' 24 Stat. 506 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 544).

The United States apparently claim that certain formalities are required with reference to the specific findings of fact and the conclusions on questions of law called for by the statute; but such a position is not in harmony with the spirit of the law, and in United States v. Swift (C.C.A) 139 F. 225, 226, we held in effect that it is sufficient if the record presents understandingly the questions of law involved. In that case the record consisted largely of an agreed statement of facts, with an opinion of the learned judge of the Circuit Court elaborating and adding thereto. It was in no respect any more formal than the present record. Having in view the explanation we have made in reference to the manner of presenting the claim to the Commissioner, what was filed by the learned judge of the Circuit Court entitled a decree for the petitioner sets out sufficient findings of fact to sustain his conclusions. It appears that, at the hearing in the Circuit Court, the United States presented certain requests for findings and rulings, meaning, of course, by this findings of fact and rulings of law. As to all those the learned judge observed in his opinion, which under the Tucker act may be a part of the record, that it was sufficient to say that the requests should be regarded as refused. This, of course, covered the requests for findings of fact, and was a holding in lump that the proofs sustained none of the propositions of the United States in reference thereto. This was as effectual as though the learned judge had taken each request for a finding of fact, and denied the same seriatim. The result meets all the requirements of the United States v. Swift, and the record clearly and fully presents all the questions of law which could arise. Nothing more can be required.

The requests of the United States for findings of fact were filed, but they were not brought up; neither has any formal suggestion of diminution of the record been made. Neither however, is of any consequence in view of the...