United States v. Hymowitz
Decision Date | 05 May 1952 |
Docket Number | No. 193,Docket 22260.,193 |
Citation | 196 F.2d 819 |
Parties | UNITED STATES v. HYMOWITZ. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Myles J. Lane, U. S. Atty. for the Southern District of New York, New York City, (Thomas F. Burchill, Jr., and Norman S. Beier, Asst. U. S. Attys., New York City, of counsel), for United States.
Michael P. Direnzo, New York City, (Mordecai M. Merker, New York City, of counsel), for defendant-appellant.
Before L. HAND, AUGUSTUS N. HAND and CHASE, Circuit Judges.
The appellant was tried by the court, a trial by jury having lawfully been waived, upon an indictment containing nineteen counts. The odd numbered counts, with the exception of number nineteen, each charged a sale of approximately one ounce of morphine sulphate in violation of § 2554(a) of Title 26 U.S.C.A. Each of the even numbered counts and count nineteen charged the appellant with having obtained, in violation of § 2554(g) of Title 26 U.S.C.A., approximately one ounce of morphine sulphate, "by means of a suitable order form prepared by the Secretary of the Treasury of the purpose of obtaining opium and derivatives or preparations thereof, for a purpose other than the use, sale, or distribution thereof in the conduct of a lawful business in said drug or in the legitimate practice of the profession of pharmacy."1 Each odd numbered count charged the sale of an ounce of the drug on the same day the following even numbered count charged it was unlawfully obtained but as to count nineteen there was no such pairing of counts.
The odd numbered counts from one to seventeen inclusive were dismissed for failure to prove sales at the time alleged. The appellant was convicted on all of the even numbered counts and on count nineteen and sentenced to imprisonment on each, the sentences to run concurrently.
The record shows that the appellant was a registered pharmacist who, with a partner, owned and operated a drug store in New York City. It was not disputed that he had obtained morphine sulphate as charged in the even numbered counts and in count nineteen and the only disputed issue of fact as to those counts was whether he so obtained that drug for an illegal purpose. The court, upon ample competent evidence, found that he did obtain it for such a purpose.
Reversal of the judgment is sought upon two grounds: (1) that it was error to convict upon any even numbered count and (2) that the admission of a written statement obtained from the appellant after he was arrested was erroneous.
We find no error in either respect. The argument in support of the first point is, in substance, that § 2554 implements § 2550 of Title 26 U.S.C.A. which levies a tax upon the sale of certain drugs, of which morphine sulphate is one, and that without proving that the morphine sulphate which the appellant obtained was sold by him in violation of § 2554 (a) the government could not show, as a matter of law, that he violated § 2554 (g) when he obtained it by means of the order forms. It is not entirely clear what his legal theory is. He points out that in United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 39 S.Ct. 214, 63 L.Ed. 493, and Nigro v. United States, 276 U.S. 332, 48 S.Ct. 388, 72 L.Ed. 600, where the forerunner of § 2554 was held constitutional, actual sales of narcotics were alleged and proved and, perhaps, his position is that, without such proof, the constitutionality of subdivision (g) would not have been upheld. If so, we cannot accept it as sound. While these cases did concern sales of narcotics subject to the tax, the rationale of the decisions was not so limited. In Nigro v. United States, supra, 276 U.S. at page 351, 48 S.Ct. at page 394, 72 L.Ed. 600, the Court said:
* * *"
In view of this broad basis upon which what is now § 2554 was sustained, and that the proscriptions in subdivision (g) of § 2554 are also reasonably adapted to enforcement of the tax imposed by § 2550, we hold it valid. Its effect is to forestall the acquisition of the drugs by persons who will sell them without the prescribed order forms or their equivalent and thus interfere with the tax inspection scheme which the keeping of such records was designed to facilitate.2 Viewed in this light, any suggestion the appellant has made as to the unconstitutionality of subdivision (g) is without substance.
Also without substance is any suggestion that conviction on the counts based upon subdivision (g) cannot stand without conviction on the counts which were based upon subdivision (a). The charges contained in these two classifications were offenses separate and distinct from each other. Wesson v. United States, 8 Cir., 164 F.2d 50, 53. It was enough, to prove guilt under the (g)...
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