United States v. Ibarra-Hernandez

• Decision Date: 09 June 2020
• Docket Number: Case No.: 20-mj-20300-RNB-H
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARIA DANIELA IBARRA-HERNANDEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARIA DANIELA IBARRA-HERNANDEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.: 20-mj-20300-RNB-H

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

June 9, 2020

ORDER AFFIRMING MAGISTRATE JUDGE CONVICTION AND JUDGMENT

On February 21, 2020, Defendant Maria Daniela Ibarra-Hernandez filed a notice of appeal to the district court. (Doc. No. 13.) The appeal is timely, and the Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3402.

Background

On February 3, 2020, Defendant was arrested approximately half a mile north of the United States/Mexico border and twelve miles east of the Tecate, California Port of Entry. (Doc. No. 1 at 2.) Defendant stated that she is a citizen of Mexico without immigration documents that would allow her to enter or remain in the United states legally. (Id.) Defendant stated that she entered the United States on February 3, 2020. (Id.)

On February 4, 2020, the Government filed a criminal complaint charging Defendant with being "an alien, [who] knowingly and intentionally attempted to enter the United States of America with the purpose, i.e., conscious desire, to enter the United States at a time and place other than as designated by immigration officers, and committed an overt act, to wit, crossing the border from Mexico into the United States, that was a substantial step towards committing the offense, all in violation of Title 8, United States Code, Section 1325, a misdemeanor." (Doc. No. 1 at 1.) On February 4, 2020, Defendant appeared before the Magistrate Judge for an initial appearance. (Doc. No. 3.)

On February 12, 2020, Defendant appeared before the Magistrate Judge and entered an open plea of guilty without a plea agreement to the single count for violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1) in the complaint. (Doc. No. 16 at 2-3, 27; Doc. Nos. 10, 11.) During the hearing, counsel for Defendant objected to the Magistrate Judge's recitation of the elements of the offense, and the Magistrate Judge overruled the objection. (Doc. No. 16 at 9.) At the end of the hearing, the Magistrate Judge accepted Defendant's guilty plea and subsequently sentenced Defendant to time served. (Id. at 28, 30; Doc. Nos. 10, 11.)

The Magistrate Judge entered a final judgment on February 12, 2020. (Doc. No. 11.) On February 21, 2020, Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. (Doc. No. 13.) See Fed. R. Crim. P. 58(g)(2)(B) (setting forth a 14-day deadline for filing an appeal from a magistrate judge's judgment of conviction).

Discussion

"In all cases of conviction by a United States magistrate judge an appeal of right shall lie from the judgment of the magistrate judge to a judge of the district court of the district in which the offense was committed." 18 U.S.C. § 3402. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 58(g)(2)(B) provides: "[a] defendant may appeal a magistrate judge's judgment of conviction or sentence to a district judge within 14 days of its entry." Fed. R. Crim. P. 58(g)(2)(B).

On appeal, Defendant raises four challenges to her conviction for violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1). First, Defendant argues that her guilty plea must be vacated because the Magistrate Judge failed to advise Defendant accurately of the charged offense's elements. (Doc. No. 18 at 1, 3-12.) Second, Defendant argues that § 1325(a) is faciallyunconstitutional under the Supreme Court's decision in Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017). (Id. at 1, 12-16.) Third, Defendant argues that § 1325(a)(1) is unconstitutional because it violates the non-delegation doctrine. (Id. at 1, 16-17.) Fourth, Defendant argues that § 1325(a)(1) is unconstitutional because it is void for vagueness. (Id. at 1, 17.) The Court addresses each of these challenges in turn below.

I. Defendant's Rule 11 Challenge to Her Guilty Plea

Defendant argues that her guilty plea must be vacated because the Magistrate Judge failed to accurately advise her of the charged offense's elements, thereby violating Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. (Doc. No. 20 at 4.) Specifically, Defendant argues that the Magistrate Judge failed to inform her that in order to be convicted of attempted unlawful entry in violation of § 1325(a)(1), the government must prove that the defendant knew she was an "alien." (Id.) In response, the Government argues that knowledge of alienage is not an element of attempted entry in violation of § 1325(a)(1). (Doc. No. 20 at 4-13.)

"A plea of guilty is constitutionally valid only to the extent it is 'voluntary' and 'intelligent.'" Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998) (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). "There are a number of requirements that a plea colloquy must satisfy in order for a guilty plea to be considered voluntary and knowing." Tanner v. McDaniel, 493 F.3d 1135, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007).

"Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 is designed 'to assist the district judge in making the constitutionally required determination that a defendant's guilty plea is truly voluntary.'" United States v. Minore, 292 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969)). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1) requires the court to "address the defendant personally in open court" and "inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands . . . (G) the nature of each charge to which the defendant is pleading." Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1); see also Bousley, 523 U.S. at 618 ("The Supreme Court 'ha[s] long held that a plea does not qualify as intelligent unless a criminal defendant first receives 'real notice of the true nature of thecharge against him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of due process.'" (quoting Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941)). To comply with Rule 11(b)(1)'s requirement that the defendant be informed of "the nature of each charge," "the district court must advise the defendant of the elements of the crime and ensure that the defendant understands them." Minore, 292 F.3d at 1115. The adequacy of a Rule 11 plea colloquy is reviewed de novo. United States v. Villalobos, 333 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2003).

In this case, in order to satisfy the Rule 11(b)(1)'s requirement that Defendant be informed of the nature of her charge, the Magistrate Judge engaged in the following colloquy with Defendant:

THE COURT: Okay. I'm now going to advise the defendants of the elements of the charged offense. If defense counsel has an objection to make, please hold it for now. I'll give you an opportunity.

The elements of the charged offense are:

First, the defendant was at the time of defendant's attempted entry into the United States an alien; that is, a person who is not a natural born or naturalized citizen or a national of the United States.

Second, defendant had the specific intent to enter the United States at a time and place other than as designated by immigration officers.

Third, defendant also had the specific intent to enter the United States free from official restraint, meaning the defendant intended to enter without being detected, apprehended or taken into custody by Government authorities so he or she could roam freely in the United States.

And fourth, defendant did something that was a substantial step toward committing the crime and that strongly corroborated defendant's intent to commit the crime.

Ms. Ibarra, do you understand what the elements are of the charge against you that I just described?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

(Doc. No. 16 at 8-9.)

Defendant argues that this plea colloquy failed to comply with Rule 11 and inform her of the true nature of the charge because the Magistrate Judge failed to advise her of all of the elements of the charged offense. (Doc. No. 18 at 4.) To support this argument,Defendant asserts that knowledge of alienage is a required element for proving attempted unlawful entry in violation of § 1325(a)(1). (Id.) But "knowledge of alienage is not an element of § 1325(a)(1)." United States v. Vazquez-Sanchez, No. 319MJ23193FAGBTM, 2020 WL 2394969, at *4 (S.D. Cal. May 11, 2020); see United States v. Zeferino-De Jesus, No. 319MJ23139AHGDMS, 2020 WL 94373, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2020) ("[T]he Court disagrees that knowledge of alienage is an element of a charge under § 1325.").

Defendant argues that knowledge of alienage is required as an element of § 1325(a)(1) under basic attempt principles. (Doc. No. 18 at 5-7.) Specifically, Defendant argues that in determining whether a defendant has the intent to commit the relevant completed crime, "'a defendant should be treated in accordance with the facts as he supposed them to be,' not as they actually are." (Id. at 5 (quoting United States v. Quijada, 588 F.2d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 1978).) Defendant argues, therefore, that if a defendant genuinely (but incorrectly) believes that he is a U.S. citizen and then attempts to enter the United States, the defendant is not guilty of attempted unlawful entry in violation of § 1325(a)(1). (Id. at 6.)

"Quijada does not stretch as far as Defendant would like." Zeferino-De Jesus, 2020 WL 94373, at *8. In Quijada, the Ninth Circuit explained that "generally a defendant should be treated in accordance with the facts as he supposed them to be" in rejecting an impossibility defense to a conviction for attempt to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. See Quijada, 588 F.2d at 1255. In contrast, here, a defense of impossibility is not at issue as Defendant never raised an impossibility defense in the proceedings below or on appeal. Thus, Defendant's reliance on Quijada is misplaced. Quijada says nothing about how to determine the specific required elements of an attempt crime. See Zeferino-De Jesus, 2020 WL 94373, at *8 (rejecting defendant's reliance on Quijada to prove that knowledge of alienage is a required element of 1325(a)(1)).

In arguing that knowledge of alienage is a required element of § 1325(a)(1), Defendant also relies on the Ninth...