United States v. Inaba

• Decision Date: 21 July 1923
• Docket Number: 1085.
• Citation: 291 F. 416
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Washington
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. INABA et al.

291 F. 416

UNITED STATES v. INABA et al.

No. 1085.

United States District Court, E.D. Washington, Southern Division.

July 21, 1923

Frank R. Jeffrey, U.S. Atty., and H. Sylvester Garvin, Asst. U.S Atty., both of Spokane, Wash.

McAulay & Meigs, of Yakima, Wash., for defendants.

WEBSTER District Judge (after stating the facts as above).

The contention that this court is without jurisdiction to grant the injunctive relief asked is predicated upon section 265 of the Judicial Code (Comp. St. Sec. 1242), which reads:

'The writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in any court of a state except in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy.'

No case has been cited by counsel, and I have not been able to find any, in which section 265 has been considered in connection with a case wherein the United States, as such, as a proper plaintiff was suing in its own courts to protect its own property, or in order faithfully to perform its duties as trustee of property held by it in trust for others. In the many authorities cited by counsel for defendants, the only case wherein the United States was the moving party is the case of United States v. Parkhurst-Davis Mercantile Co., 176 U.S. 317, 20 Sup.Ct. 423, 44 L.Ed. 485. In that case, however, the Indians, for the protection of whom the government was suing, were Indians concerning whom it was provided by law that:

'Each and every member of the respective bands or tribes of Indians to whom allotments have been made shall have the benefit of and be subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the state or territory in which they may reside. ' 24 Stat. 390, Sec. 6.

The Indians involved in that case had each received patents in fee to their respective allotments under the provisions of the statute quoted. They had also been lawfully authorized by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, prior to the commencement of the action by the government, to trade and do business as licensed traders of the United States. The action brought by the government was for the purpose of enjoining the defendants from enforcing in the courts of the state of Kansas certain claims against the property of these Indian allottees. In that case section 720 of the Revised Statutes (being section 265 of the Judicial Code) was held to apply. It was not a case, however, wherein the United States was suing as trustee for the benefit and protection of Indians under the guardianship of the government, the title to the land in question being held by the government in trust.

The Indians in the Parkhurst Case were sui juris, and able under the law to sue for their own protection; title to their lands being vested in them in fee. For these reasons, we do not consider that case as controlling here. In this case the title to the lands upon which the crops in controversy were grown is vested in the United States, and it is asserting its right to sue in the courts of its own sovereignty for the protection of that property. All the cases to which my attention has been drawn in which section 265 of the Code has been held to apply are cases wherein the jurisdiction of the state and federal courts involved was concurrent.

It is elementary law that the United States cannot be sued without its consent, clearly manifested by an act of Congress. In Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U.S. 508, 13 Sup.Ct. 418, 37 L.Ed. 259, Mr. Chief Justice Fuller speaking for the court, it is said:

'They (the United States) cannot be subjected to legal proceedings at law or in equity without their consent, and whoever institutes such proceedings must bring his case within the authority of some act of Congress. Such is the language of this court in United States v. Clarke, 8 Pet. 436, 444. The same exemption from judicial process extends to the property of the United States, and for the same reasons. As justly observed by the learned judge who tried this case, there is no distinction between suits against the government directly and suits against its property.'

Again, in Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U.S. 255, 16 Sup.Ct. 754, 40 L.Ed. 960, the Supreme Court says:

' * * * They (the United States) have never consented to be sued in the courts of a state in any case.'

Judge Rose, in his recent work on Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, published in 1922, asserts that up to that time no such consent had even been given by the government. Since the prior suit in the state court had impounded property in which the United States has an interest or upon which it asserts a lien, must the government subject itself to the jurisdiction of a state court in order to protect its rights? Despite the sweeping language of section 265, we think not. To compel the United States to go into the state courts for the protection of its property clearly would subject it to the jurisdiction of the state tribunals, precisely like any other litigant, and the consequence would be to force the government into a state court by indirection when this could not be accomplished by direction. What process could the superior court of Yakima county employ to bring the United States before it in the case pending in that court? It is suggested by counsel for the defendants that the government might voluntarily intervene in that action. But what officer of the United States is clothed with the legal authority to subject the general government to the jurisdiction of a state court, either by intervention or otherwise? In the case of Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U.S. 255, 16 Sup.Ct. 754, 40 L.Ed. 960, supra, the United States district attorney, acting under the direction of the Attorney General, attempted to appear in a state court of Texas on behalf of the United States. In considering this matter the Supreme Court in that case said:

'The answer actually filed by the district attorney, if treated as undertaking to make the United States a party defendant in the cause, and liable to have judgment rendered against them, was in excess of the instructions of the Attorney General, and of any power vested by law in him or in the district attorney, and could not constitute a voluntary submission by the United States to the jurisdiction of the court.'

It seems plain, therefore, that the government could not, in the absence of congressional authorization, intervene as a party to the action in the state court; no officer of the government being clothed with authority to subject it to the jurisdiction of a state tribunal....