United States v. Innelli

• Decision Date: 26 February 1923
• Docket Number: 167,168.
• Citation: 286 F. 731
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. INNELLI et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

286 F. 731

UNITED STATES v. INNELLI et al.

Nos. 167, 168.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

February 26, 1923

George W. Coles, U.S. Atty., and Robert V. Bolger, Asst. U.S. Atty both of Philadelphia, Pa.

Carr &amp Krauss, of Philadelphia, Pa., for defendants.

Before THOMPSON and DICKINSON, District Judges.

PER CURIAM.

This motion concerns the law of arrests, searches, and seizures. They have been made time out of mind. The power to make them is an absolutely necessary power. Experience, however, has taught us that the power is one open to abuse. The most notable historical instance of it is that of lettres de cachet. Our Constitution was framed during the seethings of the French Revolution. The thought was to make lettres de cachet impossible with us. Protective guards have in consequence been thrown around us, to lessen the harassments and violations of individual rights to which we might otherwise be subjected. Such laws are seldom intentionally violated. What usually happens is that, in the zeal to perform one duty, the other is disregarded or remains unknown. This innocence of motive however, is no justification. The law, and all laws, must be regarded. This is expected of all good citizens. To the judges it is a special command. Let it not be forgotten that there were prohibitions in the Constitution before the Eighteenth Amendment. Among them are the Fourth and Fifth. If they afford protection to the guilty, this is the price to be paid for the general good. One prohibition is that no one shall be compelled to give evidence against himself. If anything in the possession of the accused is taken from him by unlawful force, to be used in evidence against him, it cannot be so used in violation of his rights.

The present motion is based on this proposition. The evidence here was secured by a search warrant. The question, then, is Did this search warrant issue in accordance with law? The rights and privileges saved to individuals by the Constitution cannot be lessened. Congress may accord as much more protection as is thought to be well. It is to be noted that by the Constitution arrests, searches, and seizures are not forbidden. It is only unreasonable ones which are prohibited. Search warrants are not condemned, but the issuance of them is regulated.

It is to be further noted that the power to arrest, search, and seize is left by the Act of June 15, 1917 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, Sec. 10496 1/4a et seq.), as defined in the Constitution. The issuance of search warrants, however, is strictly regulated. The Volstead Act (41 Stat. 305) imposes only two limitations. One is that warrants for a violation of that law shall issue to enter private homes only in exceptional cases. The other is that they shall be issued in accordance with the Act of June 15, 1917.

This takes us to that law. It is general in its terms, but was enacted with special reference to espionage cases. There are (among others) four substantial guards against abuse of process provided. One is that a judge of the court or a commissioner must sanction the issuance of the writ by his finding upon evidence submitted that 'probable cause' exists; the second is that the testimony must be reduced to writing and subscribed by the witness; the third is that the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized must be 'particularly described'; and the fourth is that the writ must be directed to those selected for their approved judgment and discretion, by whom alone the writ may be executed. Some of the criticisms directed against this warrant have been discussed in Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616, 6 Sup.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746; U.S. v. Friedberg (D.C.) 233 F. 314; U.S. v. Crossen (D.C.) 264 F. 459; U.S. v. Maag, unreported.

A further one is directed to the description of the place. It is described by street and number, and the name of the person to whom the premises then or formerly belonged. Had the whole premises included within the description belonged, as was doubtless erroneously taken for granted, to the person whose place was meant to be searched, such a description as that given might meet all practical needs. The fact, however, is that the second floor of the...