United States v. INTERNATIONAL UNION, ETC.

• Decision Date: 12 April 1951
• Docket Number: No. 10558.,10558.
• Citation: 88 US App. DC 341,190 F.2d 865
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

88 US App. DC 341, 190 F.2d 865 (1951)

UNITED STATES v.INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA.

No. 10558.

United States Court of Appeals. District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued April 26, 1950.

Decided April 12, 1951.

H. G. Morison, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom George Morris Fay, U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., Joseph M. Friedman, Special Asst. to the Atty. Gen., Jess H. Rosenberg, Atty., Department of Justice, and Samuel K. Abrams, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellant.

Welly K. Hopkins, Washington, D. C., with whom Harrison Combs, Willard P. Owens, Washington, D. C., and M. E. Boiarsky, Charleston, W. Va., were on the brief, for appellee.

Before STEPHENS, Chief Judge, and PRETTYMAN and FAHY, Circuit Judges.

STEPHENS, Chief Judge.

This is an appeal by the United States (hereafter referred to as the Government) from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia entered March 4, 1950.The judgment dismissed a petition for a rule to show cause against the appellee, International Union, United Mine Workers of America (hereafter referred to as the Union), dismissed a rule to show cause issued pursuant to the petition, and adjudged that the Union was not guilty of civil contempt for failure, as charged in the petition, to comply with a temporary restraining order issued by the District Court.

The National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1948(hereafter referred to as the Agreement of 1948), entered into between the Union and numerous Coal Operators and Associations (hereafter referred to as Operators) expired by its own terms on June 30, 1949.A dispute arose as to the terms and conditions of a successor agreement and no successor agreement was entered into until March 4, 1950.In late December, 1949, sporadic work stoppages commenced in the bituminous coal mines in the United States.These increased so that by the early part of 1950 there was a substantial diminution in bituminous coal production.On February 11, 1950, the Attorney General, at the direction of the President acting pursuant to Section 208 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 178(hereafter referred to as the Act), instituted, by filing a complaint, the proceeding out of which this appeal has arisen.¹The complaint named the Government as plaintiff and the Union and John L. Lewis, its president, and some one hundred and one Operators, as defendants.The complaint alleged the existence of an unresolved labor dispute between the Union and the Operators and the existence of a strike affecting a substantial part of an industry engaged in trade and commerce among the several states and with foreign nations and in the production of goods for commerce; that if permitted to continue, the strike would imperil the national health and safety; that the strike was a concerted work stoppage on the part of the Union which had continued since on or about February 6, 1950, and was preceded by, or was a continuation of, a number of successive concerted total or partial stoppages of work on the part of the Union commenced in the early summer of 1949, of varying periods of duration, and affecting coal mining operations in various areas in the United States; that the strike and its predecessor work stoppages had resulted from unresolved labor disputes affecting wages, hours, terms and conditions of employment attending the failure of the Union and the Operators, or a great majority of them, signatory to the Agreement of 1948, to agree to a continuance thereof beyond June 30, 1949, or to execute a successor agreement or agreements; that unless the strike was enjoined, the Government would suffer irreparable injury for which it had no adequate remedy at law.²The complaint prayed that the District Court: (1) enjoin the Union from continuing the strike; (2) order the Union to instruct, and take all appropriate action necessary to insure that the instructions were carried out, all members of the Union to cease the strike and to return to work in the mines under the terms and conditions of employment of the 1948 Agreement; (3) enjoin both the Union and the Operators from encouraging, causing or engaging in a lockout or strike at any bituminous coal mine covered by the 1948 Agreement; (4) order the Union and the Operators to engage in free and collective bargaining for the purpose of resolving their disputes, as contemplated by the Act; (5) issue, pending the final determination of the case, a preliminary injunction enjoining the Union and the Operators in the manner and form aforesaid; (6) issue, pending the issuance of the preliminary injunction, a temporary restraining order restraining and enjoining the Union and the Operators in the manner and form aforesaid; (7) grant such other and further relief to the Government as might be just and proper.

Upon the filing of the complaint, and upon the same date, February 11, 1950, the District Court, acting ex parte and upon the basis of the allegations of the complaint and of the statements in the supporting affidavits and in the Report of the Board of Inquiry, issued against the Union and John L. Lewis and the Operators, the temporary restraining order prayed for.The order reflected the first four paragraphs of the prayer.Its text is set forth in the margin.³The order, stating its terms briefly: (1) restrained the Union from continuing the strike; (2) directed the Union to instruct, and to take all appropriate action necessary to insure that the instructions were carried out, all members of the Union employed in the mines to cease the strike and to return to their employment; (3) restrained both the Union and the Operators from causing or engaging in a lockout or strike or work stoppage; (4) directed the Union and the Operators to engage in collective bargaining for the purpose of resolving their disputes.The order was served upon the Union and John L. Lewis, president, on the date of its issuance.The order as issued expired at 11:20 A.M., February 21, 1950.On February 20, 1950, the District Court extended it to 11:20 A.M., March 3, 1950.

Notwithstanding the issuance and service of the restraining order, the work stoppage in the bituminous coal mines continued, and on February 20, 1950, the Government filed a petition for a rule requiring the Union to show cause why it should not be punished for civil and criminal contempt of the District Court.The petition recited the filing of the complaint and the issuance and service of the temporary restraining order and charged violation of the first three paragraphs thereof.In brief, the petition charged that at no time after the service of the order had the Union brought the strike to an end or taken appropriate action to insure that the Union miners discontinue the strike and return to their employment; that, on the contrary, the Union had continued to cause and engage in a strike at the mines and had engaged in a course of action interfering with the jurisdiction of the court and obstructing the determination of the case; and that the strike had continued uninterruptedly to the date of the filing of the petition.Following the filing of the petition for the rule on February 20, 1950, the District Court, on the same day, issued a rule against the Union requiring it to show cause on February 27, 1950, why it should not be punished for civil and criminal contempt.The rule directed that if upon the return by the Union it should be found that the alleged contempt had not been sufficiently purged, a trial should be had.

On February 24, 1950, the Union filed its answer to the rule and to the petition for the rule.The answer attacked the jurisdiction of the District Court to issue the temporary restraining order and the rule, attacked the constitutionality of the Act and of the restraining order, and asserted that the order violated the rights of the members of the Union as miners not to work, particularly in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement.The answer averred that the Executive Board of the Union had not issued a strike call or requested a referendum for the approval of a strike call, or done any act to cause, permit or encourage the alleged strike or its continuance.⁴The answer then described steps assertedly taken by the Union, through its officers, to obtain obedience to the instructions of the District Court in the restraining order and to end the work stoppages — in particular the sending of telegraphic messages to the Union's district presidents, officers and agents, copies of the same to each of the local unions, publication of the same in the United Mine Workers Journal, and the sending of a report to all local union officers and members instructing immediate obedience to the directions of the District Court in the restraining order and termination of the work stoppages and return of the miners to work.The answer averred further that despite such messages, instructions and endeavors on the part of the Union to persuade its members to return to work, they, not being under obligation to work by virtue of any existing contract, and having a legal right to sell or not to sell their labor and to sell it upon such terms and conditions as they chose, refused to return to work and determined to continue the work stoppages which, according to the assertions of the answer, they had of their individual volition decided upon prior to the issuance of the restraining order.The answer asserted that the means employed by the Union to cause its members to return to work were those which it had on prior occasions successfully employed and that only powers of recommendation were available to the Union and its officers under the Union's Constitution.The answer alleged finally that the refusal of the miners to return to work was without suggestion, direction or authorization of the Union and was contrary to the directions given by the Union as above described.⁵

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