United States v. Interstate Commerce Commission

• Decision Date: 02 May 1938
• Docket Number: No. 6952.,6952.
• Citation: 68 App. DC 396,98 F.2d 268
• Parties: UNITED STATES ex rel. KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RY. CO. v. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

68 App. DC 396, 98 F.2d 268 (1938)

UNITED STATES ex rel. KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RY. CO. v. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION et al.^*

No. 6952.

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

Decided May 2, 1938.

Thomas P. Littlepage, of Washington, D. C., and Samuel W. Moore and Frank H. Moore, both of Kansas City, Mo., for appellant.

Daniel W. Knowlton, Edward M. Reidy, and F. W. Clements, all of Washington, D. C., and Samuel W. Sawyer, of Kansas City, Mo., for appellees.

Before GRONER, Chief Justice, and STEPHENS and MILLER, Associate Justices.

MILLER, Associate Justice.

The fact situation out of which this case arises is essentially the same as that described in United States ex rel. Chicago Great Western R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 294 U.S. 50, 55 S.Ct. 326, 79 L.Ed. 752. Appellant, The Kansas City Southern Railway Company, appeared as an intervener in the proceeding before the Interstate Commerce Commission in the earlier case. In the present case it appeared by original complaint before the Commission. In each of the two cases, the objective sought was to escape the burdens imposed upon it by an agreement — into which it had entered voluntarily — and which provided for the financing, maintenance and operation of a union terminal by a number of railroads entering Kansas City.

In each of the two cases, the Interstate Commerce Commission denied that it had power to grant the relief prayed for by appellant and declined to take jurisdiction.¹ In each case appellant applied to the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia for a writ of mandamus directed to the Commission requiring it to hear and determine the issues presented. In United States ex rel. Chicago Great Western R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm., supra, the Supreme Court upheld the action of the Commission in the first case. In the present case the lower court denied appellant's petition. United States ex rel. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm., D. C., 18 F.Supp. 94.

The question most discussed in the briefs and on argument was whether the decision of the Supreme Court in the earlier case is res adjudicata. It is not necessary to decide that question, however, in order to decide the present case. The principles of law stated in United States ex rel. Chicago Great Western R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm., supra, are equally conclusive here.

The point upon which appellant relies to distinguish this case from its predecessor is stated in its brief as follows:

". . . The objective of the intervening petition was the vindication of a purely private right — a reduction in its expenses of operation in the interest of itself and its stockholders. The objective of the complaint was the vindication of a public right — the protection of interstate commerce and interstate shippers from unlawful burdens, discrimination, and preferences made unlawful by Section 3 of the Act 49 U.S.C.A. § 3, and in conflict with the public interest and the established policy of Congress in providing an adequate and efficient transportation system for the people of the United States."

In its petition in the lower court, also, appellant placed emphasis upon this purported vindication of a public right by alleging that:

". . . the charges exacted by the Terminal Company, under the Operating Agreement . . . from complainant and the other smaller users . . . were and are grossly unjust, inequitable and discriminatory, and contrary to the public interest and in conflict with the policy of Congress in the regulation of interstate commerce, . . and constitute an undue prejudice to and burden upon their interstate commerce, and are calculated seriously to impair, if not to destroy, their ability to render adequate and efficient transportation service in interstate commerce at the lowest cost consistent with the furnishing of such service; and that a continuation of said disproportionate burdens, suffered by them, will inevitably lessen their ability properly to serve interstate commerce; and that the charges exacted of the three larger users constitute an undue, unreasonable and unlawful preference, advantage and discrimination in their favor, and to the interstate commerce carried on by them, and each of them."

But this is not sufficient to distinguish the present case from United States ex rel. Chicago Great Western R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm., supra, so far as concerns the rule regulating the issuance of the writ of mandamus. The various considerations urged by appellant in support of its contention that the Interstate Commerce Commission should have power to act under such circumstances may be important and persuasive so far as future legislation is concerned. The only question which we can consider, however, in a proceeding of this nature, is whether the law, as it now stands,² imposes upon the Commission a duty to act, so clearly specified as to be free from doubt and equivalent to a positive command. If there is no duty thus plainly prescribed, but, instead, a situation in which the construction or application of the statute requires the exercise of judgment or discretion, mandamus is not an appropriate remedy. Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Kadrie, 281 U.S. 206, 218, 219, 50 S.Ct. 320, 324, 74 L.Ed. 809.³ Public policy forbids the use of writs of mandamus to hamper the Commission in the performance of its important duties, unless it is clear beyond debate that it has failed or refused to conform to ...