United States v. Iron Silver Min

• Citation: 9 S.Ct. 195,128 U.S. 673,32 L.Ed. 571
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. IRON SILVER MIN. Co. et al . 1
• Decision Date: 17 December 1888
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

128 U.S. 673

9 S.Ct. 195

32 L.Ed. 571

UNITED STATES v. IRON SILVER MIN. Co. et al.¹

December 17, 1888.

Sol. Gen. Jenks, for appellant.

L. S. Dixon, for appellees.

FIELD, J.

This is a suit in equity brought by the United States against the Iron Silver Mining Company, a corporation created under the laws of New York, and James A. Sawyer, a citizen of Colorado, to cancel two patents for alleged placer mining claims, known respectively as the 'Fanchon Placer Claim' and the 'Stinson Placer Claim,' situated in the county of Lake, Colorado. Both patents were issued to the defendant Sawyer, and the larger part of the claims was subsequently conveyed by him to the defendant corporation. The Fanchon claim embraces 113 acres and a fraction of an acre. The patent for it bears date November 17, 1881, and was issued upon an entry made April 22, 1880. The Stinson claim embraces 124 acres and a fraction of an acre. The patent for it bears date June 15, 1881, and was issued upon an entry made April 27, 1880. The bill for the cancellation of these patents alleges that they were obtained upon false and fraudulent representations that the land embraced by them was placer mining ground, and contained no veins or lodes of quartz or other rock, bearing gold or silver or other metal, and that the patentee had performed the work upon each tract required by law to entitle him to enter it as a placer claim; whereas, in fact, the land was not placer mining ground, but land containing sundry veins or lodes of quartz or other rock, bearing gold, silver, and lead of great value, which was well known to the patentee on his application for the patents; and that the work required to enter the tracts as placer claims had never been performed. The bill also alleges that the defendant Sawyer had previously made several locations of lode claims on this ground, and that certificates of these locations had been recorded in the office of the recorder of Lake county; that he afterwards entered into a conspiracy with one William H. Stevens and Levi Z. Leiter of Colorado, to defraud the United States of the lode claims and the timber on the land, of which there was a valuable growth, by obtaining patents of the land as placer ground, for the benefit of those parties, and of the defendant the Iron Silver Mining Company, in which they were interested; that by its terms the defendant Sawyer was to abandon the lode claims, and take up the ground as placer claims, and Stevens and Leiter were to advance the necessary funds for that purpose; that, when the patents were obtained, Sawyer was to receive in consideration of his services in the matter a portion of the claims; and that the patents in question were obtained in execution of this conspiracy.

These allegations are specifically denied by the defendants in their answer, and the proofs in the case were directed to establish them on the one hand, and to refute them on the other. If established, the government could justly demand a cancellation of the patents. The statutes providing for the disposition of the mineral lands of the United States are framed in a most liberal spirit, and those lands are open to the acquisition of every citizen upon conditions which can be readily complied with. It is the policy of the government to favor the development of mines of gold and silver and other metals, and every facility is afforded for that purpose; but it exacts a faithful compliance with the conditions required. There must be a discovery of the mineral, and a sufficient exploration of the ground to show this fact beyond question. The form, also, in which the mineral appears, whether in placers or in veins, lodes or ledges, must be disclosed so far as ascertained. Misrepresentation knowingly made as to these matters by the applicant for a patent will afterwards justify the government in proceeding to set it aside. The government has the same right to demand a cancellation of the conveyances of the United States, when obtained by false and fraudulent representations, as a private individual, when a conveyance of his lands is obtained in like manner. In this respect the United States, as a landed proprietor, stand upon the same footing with the private citizen. The burden of proof in such cases is upon the government. The presumption attending the patent, even when directly assailed, that it was issued upon sufficient evidence that the law had been complied with by the officers of the government charged with the alienation of public lands, can only be overcome by clear and convincing proof. In several cases recently before this court, the character and degree of proof required to set aside a patent for land of the United States, issued in due form by their officers, where they have had jurisdiction over the subject, and have observed the various proceedings preliminary to its issue, required by law, have been discussed and determined, and rules laid down which must control in future cases of the kind.

In Maxwell Land Grant Case, 121 U. S. 325, 379, 381, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1015, which was before us at October term, 1886, this question received careful consideration. The court there said, by Mr. Justice MILLER: 'The deliberate action of the tribunals to which the law commits the determination of all preliminary questions, and the control of the processes by which this evidence of title is issued to the grantee, demands that, to annul such an instrument and destroy the title claimed under it, the facts on which this action is asked for must be clearly established by evidence entirely satisfactory to the court. by evidence entirely satisfactory to the court, class of causes for which such an instrument may be avoided.' And again: 'We take the general doctrine to be, that when in a court of equity it is proposed to set aside, to annul, or to correct a written instrument for fraud or mistake in the execution of the instrument itself, the testimony on which this is done must be clear, unequivocal, and convincing, and that it cannot be done upon a bare preponderance of evidence which leaves the issue in doubt. If the proposition, as thus laid down in the cases cited, is sound in regard to the ordinary contracts of private individuals, how much more should it be observed where the attempt is to annul the grants, the patents, and other solemn evidences of title emanating from the government of the United States under its official seal. In this class of cases the respect due to a patent, the presumptions that all the preceding steps required by the law had been observed before its issue, the immense importance and necessity of the stability of titles dependent upon these official instruments, demand that the effort to set them aside, to annul them, or to correct mistakes in them, should only be successful when the allegations on which this is attempted are clearly stated and fully sustained by proof.' In Coal Co. v. U. S., 123 U. S. 307, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 131, before us at October term, 1887, the same subject was considered, and a similar conclusion reached as to the character and degree of proof necessary to invalidate a patent of the United States. There patents for coal lands were alleged to have been obtained on false and fraudulent papers made by the register and receiver of the local land-office, combining with others in a conspiracy for that purpose; but the court, after referring to the doctrine declared in Maxwell Land Grant Case, said, by Mr. Justice MATTHEWS: 'It thus appears that the title of the defendants rests upon the strongest presumptions of fact which, although they may be rebutted, nevertheless can be overthrown only by full proofs to the contrary, clear, convincing, and unambiguous. The burden of producing these proofs, and establishing the conclusion to which they are directed, rests upon the government. Neither is it relieved of this obligation by the negative nature of the proposition it is bound to establish.' Authorities are then cited to show that in some instances the burden of proving a negative rests upon the complaining party; and especially so where the negative allegation involves a charge of fraud against the party whose conduct is complained of, for which it is sought to defeat an estate. In this connection a word should be said of a paragraph in the opinion in Moffat v. U. S., 112 U. S. 24, 30, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 10. That was a suit to set aside a patent issued to fictitious parties, and the court, referring to the presumption which is indulged as a protection against collateral attacks upon a patent by third parties, said: 'It may be admitted, as stated by counsel, that if, upon any state of facts, the patent might have been lawfully issued, the court will presume, as against such collateral attacks, that the facts existed; but that presumption has no place in a suit by the United States directly assailing the patent, and seeking its cancellation for fraud in the conduct of their officers.' It was not intended by this language to hold that presumptions in favor of the regularity and lawfulness of patents issued did not apply in suits by the United States to vacate them for fraud; but that the presumption mentioned—that is, that when a patent is assailed collaterally, if it could be sustained upon any state of facts, the court will presume that such facts existed could not apply in suits by the United States assailing the patent for fraud in the...