United States v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 26 February 2016
• Docket Number: CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 1:15-CR-244-LMM-CMS
• Citation: 149 F.Supp.3d 1366
• Parties: United States of America, v. Dwayne Antonio Jackson, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

149 F.Supp.3d 1366

United States of America,
v.
Dwayne Antonio Jackson, Defendant.

CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 1:15-CR-244-LMM-CMS

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

Signed February 26, 2016

149 F.Supp.3d 1367

Erin Sanders, U.S. Attorney's Office, Atlanta, GA, for United States of America.

LEIGH MARTIN MAY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) [25] recommending that Defendant Dwayne Antonio Jackson's Motion to Suppress Evidence [18] recovered by law enforcement from a bedroom in his aunt's apartment be granted. The Government has filed timely objections [30] to the R&R. According to the Government, the Magistrate Judge erred in not finding reasonable the investigating officers' belief that Defendant's girlfriend had authority to consent to a search of the bedroom where they had slept the previous night. Defendant has filed a response in opposition to Defendant's objections [32].

Upon review of the record and due consideration, the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge's R&R [25] as the findings of this Court.

I. Standard of Review

Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the Court reviews the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation for clear error if no objections are filed to the report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). If a party files objections, however, the district court must determine de novo any part of the Magistrate Judge's disposition that is the subject of a proper objection. Id. ; Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(3). As the Government filed timely objections to the R&R with respect to its findings regarding and analysis of Defendant's motion to suppress evidence, the Court reviews the Magistrate Judge's findings and recommendations regarding these conclusions on a de novo basis. All other recommendations are reviewed for clear error.

II. Facts

The R&R ably recounts the relevant facts derived from the parties' briefing and from the evidentiary hearing concerning Defendant's motion. See Dkt. No. [25] at 1-5. The Court summarizes the relevant facts as follows for purposes of its discussion.

Defendant and his girlfriend, Ms. Matheny, were detained by local police following a shooting in McDonough, Georgia. While under questioning, Ms. Matheny said that she knew the location of the firearm allegedly used in the shooting: under the mattress in the spare bedroom of an apartment belonging to Defendant's aunt, Ms. Jackson. This is the bedroom where Ms. Matheny and Defendant had slept the previous few nights. Ms. Matheny did not pay rent or receive mail at Ms. Jackson's apartment, lacked a key to the apartment, only entered or stayed at the apartment when in the company of Defendant, and could only enter the apartment if the door was unlocked or if Ms. Jackson let her inside when she and Defendant knocked.¹

Despite these limitations on access, Ms. Matheny volunteered to show the investigating police officers where the gun was located and to retrieve the weapon for them. The officers discussed several methods to retrieve the firearm from the bedroom in Ms. Jackson's home, including obtaining a search warrant. The officers ultimately decided that Sergeant Morris would accompany Ms. Matheny to Ms. Jackson's home in plainclothes, without

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revealing that he was a law enforcement officer, and pose as a relative of Ms. Matheny. When Ms. Matheny knocked on the door to enter, she would tell Ms. Jackson that Sergeant Morris was her cousin, Ms. Jackson would allow them into her home, and Sergeant Morris would covertly retrieve the firearm. That is what happened.

The Government does not contend that the officers had a search warrant or that exigent circumstances justified a warrantless search. Had Ms. Jackson questioned Sergeant Morris's persona, or denied entry to Ms. Matheny, the officers had planned either to obtain a warrant or to ask for consent to search the premises from Ms. Jackson, and if that failed, to secure the apartment and to pursue a search warrant.

III. Analysis

The Government primarily objects to the R&R on the grounds that the Magistrate Judge improperly concluded the officers' reliance on Ms. Matheny's apparent authority to consent to a search of the spare bedroom in Ms. Jackson's apartment was not reasonable. Dkt. No. [30] at 7-12. The Government argues that the Magistrate Court construed the issue of whether the officers' belief in Ms. Matheny's apparent authority was reasonable “on too large a scale.” Id. at 7. The Government relies heavily on the notion espoused in U.S. v. Matlock of “common authority” being applicable not only “to the premises” but to the “effect sought to be inspected.” 415 U.S. 164, 171, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974). Dkt. No. [30] at 7-8. The Government contends that all the officers needed to reasonably believe, then, was that Ms. Matheny has “common authority” over the mattress in the bedroom inside the apartment. The Government asserts that this is a reasonable belief because Ms. Matheny and Defendant had slept in that bedroom for the preceding days, had personal belongings there, and Ms. Matheny claimed both a right to come and go as she pleased and a close relationship with Ms. Jackson. Dkt. No. [30] at 8-9.

The Government's arguments ignore the realities of Ms. Matheny's access to the room in question. It is undisputed that Ms. Matheny could not access the apartment—and thus the bedroom in question—unless Ms. Jackson unlocked the front door. It is also undisputed that Ms. Matheny informed the officers of this fact prior to the search. This is enough to render the officers' belief in Ms. Matheny's authority to consent to a search unreasonable. Despite the Government's argument to the contrary,² the record is clear that the officers were on notice that Ms. Matheny could not come and go from Ms. Jackson's house as she pleased, but depended on others for access.

It is well-settled that an occupant may grant consent, in the absence of another occupant, to search areas of a dwelling over which the consenting occupant exercises common authority, access, or control. Matlock , 415 U.S. at 172 & n. 7, 94 S.Ct. 988. A tenant, for example, could grant consent to search the commonly used kitchen while her co-tenant was out, but could not validly grant consent to search the absent co-tenant's bedroom. Similarly, as in U.S. v. Weeks , 666 F.Supp.2d 1354 (N.D.Ga.2009), aff'd , 442 Fed.Appx. 447 (11th Cir.2011), an occupant would have apparent authority to consent to a search of an apartment where law

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enforcement entered to find the occupant there with her children and was able to direct the officers to a specific bedroom upon request. Weeks at 1377–78. The Court concludes, however, that this line of cases does not extend so far as to allow a co-occupant to grant valid consent to search an area over which she exercises common authority, when she does not exercise authority, access, or control over the entrance and exit to that space.

The case of U.S. v. Green is instructive. No. 4:10–cr–21–RLV–WEJ, 2010 WL 4877872 (N.D.Ga. Oct. 6, 2010) (report and recommendation), adopted by 2010 WL 4876878 (N.D.Ga. Nov. 23, 2010). In Green , the judge considered whether the nephew of the defendant, who lived on the same family compound, had apparent authority to give a sheriff's deputy lawful consent to enter and search the...