United States v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 10 March 2020
• Docket Number: No. 19-6288,19-6288
• Citation: 952 F.3d 492
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Ronald Samuel JACKSON, a/k/a Young, Defendant - Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

952 F.3d 492

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.Ronald Samuel JACKSON, a/k/a Young, Defendant - Appellant.

No. 19-6288

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: October 29, 2019

Decided: March 10, 2020

ARGUED: Lisa M. Lorish, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Jennifer R. Bockhorst, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Juval O. Scott, Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. Thomas T. Cullen, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before KING, FLOYD, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Rushing wrote the opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Floyd joined.

RUSHING, Circuit Judge:

When a defendant’s sentence is vacated and the district court resentences the defendant to a term of incarceration less than the time he has already served, the defendant may have the option to "bank" the excess time served and credit that banked time toward a future sentence of incarceration imposed for violating the supervised release term of his sentence. In this case, we are presented not with a vacated sentence, but with a sentence reduction pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (2018). The district court granted Ronald Samuel Jackson’s motion for a reduced sentence under the First Step Act, reducing Jackson’s sentence from 240 months’ imprisonment and ten years of supervised release to time served (approximately 177 months’ imprisonment) and eight years of supervised release. In reducing the sentence, the court rejected Jackson’s request for a sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment, which would have allowed Jackson to bank approximately 57 months toward a future sentence of incarceration if he violated his supervised release. The court reasoned that the need to protect the public and the need for deterrence dictated that Jackson not be given banked time to offset the penalties for future violations of his supervised release, including future crimes. Jackson argues that the district court abused its discretion by considering the possibility of banked time in determining an appropriate reduced sentence. Because we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in considering banked time and imposing a sentence of time served, we affirm.

I.

A.

Ordinarily, a sentence of imprisonment is final and may not be modified once it has been imposed, except in narrow circumstances. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). One such circumstance is when modification is "expressly permitted by statute." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B).

The First Step Act of 2018 expressly permits sentencing modifications. § 404, 132 Stat. at 5222. As relevant here, the First Step Act makes retroactive certain provisions of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010). The Fair Sentencing Act "reduced the statutory penalties for cocaine base offenses" to "alleviate the severe sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine." United States v. Peters , 843 F.3d 572, 575 (4th Cir. 2016). Section 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act modified the drug quantities required to trigger mandatory minimum sentences for cocaine base (often referred to as crack cocaine) trafficking offenses; it increased the amount required to trigger the five-year mandatory minimum from 5 grams to 28 grams and increased the amount required to trigger the ten-year mandatory minimum from 50 grams to 280 grams. See United States v. Wirsing , 943 F.3d 175, 179 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing Fair Sentencing Act, § 2, 124 Stat. at 2372). Section 3 eliminated the five-year mandatory minimum for simple possession of crack. Id. (citing Fair Sentencing Act, § 3, 124 Stat. at 2372).

The relevant provisions of the First Step Act apply to "a covered offense," which means "a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 ..., that was committed before August 3, 2010." § 404(a), 132 Stat. at 5222. The First Step Act provides that "[a] court that imposed a sentence for a covered offense may ... impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 ... were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed." § 404(b), 132 Stat. at 5222. Even if a defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction, however, the decision whether to grant a reduction is entrusted to the district court’s discretion. § 404(c), 132 Stat. at 5222 ("Nothing in this section shall be construed to require a court to reduce any sentence pursuant to this section.").

B.

Jackson was convicted on May 7, 2004 of conspiring to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1). Because of a prior drug conviction, Jackson faced a twenty-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment and a ten-year minimum term of supervised release. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 851. The presentence report calculated Jackson’s Guidelines sentencing range as 188 to 235 months, increased to 240 months because of the mandatory minimum. The district court sentenced Jackson to the mandatory minimum of 240 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by a ten-year term of supervised release. This Court affirmed. See United States v. Jackson , 166 Fed. App. 54 (4th Cir. 2006).

On January 26, 2019, Jackson moved in the district court for relief under Section 404 of the First Step Act. The parties agreed that Jackson was eligible for a sentence reduction, because his offense was committed before August 3, 2010 and the penalties applicable to his statute of conviction were modified by Section 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act. In particular, because Section 2 increased the quantity of cocaine base required to trigger the statutory penalties in Section 841(b)(1)(A) from 50 grams to 280 grams, and Jackson was convicted of conspiring to possess 50 grams or more, Jackson was now subject to the penalties set forth in Section 841(b)(1)(B), which apply to convictions involving 28 grams or more of cocaine base. Under Section 841(b)(1)(B), Jackson’s new statutory sentencing range was ten years to life imprisonment and at least eight years of supervised release.

By the time he moved for a sentence reduction, Jackson had already served approximately 177 months of his 240-month sentence. In his motion, Jackson requested that the district court reduce his sentence to the new statutory mandatory minimum of 120 months’ imprisonment and eight years of supervised release. Jackson’s new Guidelines range was 51–61 months, increased to 120 months because of the mandatory minimum. He argued that the court should reduce his sentence to the mandatory minimum of 120 months because his original sentence had been for the then-applicable mandatory minimum of 240 months. Jackson waived any hearing on his motion in order to expedite his immediate release.

The Government agreed that Jackson was eligible for immediate release but urged the district court to reduce his sentence to time served and eight years of supervised release. The Government objected to any sentence below time served because such a sentence would allow Jackson to " ‘bank’ time to offset any future term of imprisonment that may be imposed upon a supervised release revocation." J.A. 30–31. The Government argued that allowing Jackson to bank time would leave the probation office and the court with no real recourse in the event he violated the terms of his supervision and would undercut the rehabilitative aims of supervised release.

The district court determined that Jackson was eligible for relief under the First Step Act and that a sentence reduction was warranted. The court noted Jackson’s request to be sentenced to 120 months and stated:

Having considered the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court will reduce his sentence to a sentence of time served, to be followed by an eight-year term of supervised release, but will not reduce his sentence below a sentence of time served. In particular, the need to protect the public and the need for deterrence dictate[ ] that a defendant not be allowed to "bank time," which could allow him to commit further crimes without the fear of imprisonment. Cf. Miller v. Cox , 443 F.2d 1019, 1021 (4th Cir. 1971) ("[T]he availability of credits against sentences for future crimes would provide a sense of immunity and an incentive to engage in criminal conduct."). In all likelihood, similar concerns underlie the express prohibition on a court’s reduction of a sentence below time served when reducing based on a sentencing guideline amendment. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1)(C) (directing that a reduction in a term of imprisonment pursuant to a guideline amendment "[i]n no event may ... be less than the term of imprisonment the defendant has already served").

J.A. 39–40. The court also observed that other courts granting sentence reductions under the First Step Act had reduced sentences to time served, "even where a defendant already had served more than the applicable guideline range." J.A. 40. The court reduced Jackson’s sentence to time served and eight years of supervised release. Jackson appealed.

II.

As noted, this case comes to us on appeal from a sentence reduction under the First Step Act. The parties agree that we need not resolve various questions about the proper procedure to be followed in a First Step Act sentence reduction proceeding, either because the parties have not disputed them here or because, even though the parties disagree, resolution of their dispute is not necessary to resolve this appeal. We agree and so leave those questions for another day.

The parties do dispute, however, the extent to which we should review the sentence reduction granted by the district court. The Government, borrowing from decisions reviewing...