United States v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 16 April 2014
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 13–2077O–CR–ZLOCH
• Citation: 155 F.Supp.3d 1320
• Parties: United States of America, Plaintiff, v. Randy Sam Jackson, and Braden Anthony Jones, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

155 F.Supp.3d 1320

United States of America, Plaintiff,

v.Randy Sam Jackson, and Braden Anthony Jones, Defendants.

CASE NO. 13–2077O–CR–ZLOCH

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

Signed April 16, 2014

Brooke C. Watson, Gera R. Peoples, United States Attorney's Office, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff.

Anita Margot Moss, David Oscar Markus, Markus/Moss PLLC, Miami, FL, Timothy Cone, Federal Public Defender's Office, Fort Pierce, FL, for Defendant.

ORDER

WILLIAM J. ZLOCH

, United States District Judge

THIS MATTER is before the Court upon Defendant Randy Sam Jackson's Motion To Suppress And Request For Evidentiary Hearing (DE 43) and Defendant Braden Jones's Motion To Suppress (DE 45). The Court has carefully reviewed said Motions, the entire court file and is otherwise fully advised in the premises.

Defendants Jackson and Jones are both charged in all Counts of the nine-Count Indictment (DE 3). Specifically, Count 1 charges Defendants with conspiracy to possess, with the intent to defraud, fifteen (15) or more unauthorized access devices, namely, social security numbers issued to other persons, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3)

. In furtherance of the conspiracy, the Indictment charges that on or about April 30, 2013, Defendants possessed a notebook containing over 635 names, social security numbers, and dates of birth, and used a laptop computer to begin a federal income tax return application and refund for another individual, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(b)(2). Count 2 charges Defendants with knowing and willful possession with intent to defraud fifteen (15) or more unauthorized access devices, namely, social security numbers, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1029(a)(2) and (3). Defendants are also charged in Counts 3 through and including 9 with knowing transfer, possession, and use of identification of another person, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028A(a)(1) and (2).

By the instant Motions To Suppress (DE Nos. 43 & 45), Defendants assert that all evidence seized from the efficiency apartment located at 1071 N.W. 199th Street, Miami Gardens, Florida, on or about April 30, 2013, must be suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Defendants claim that law enforcement illegally entered the property and, ultimately, the efficiency unit. Thereafter, according to Defendants, law enforcement conducted an allegedly illegal search of the unit and seizure of the evidence in the above-styled cause. The Government opposes Defendants' Motions. See DE 47. The Court held an Evidentiary Hearing on the instant Motions (DE Nos. 43 & 45) on January 21–22, 2014.

I. Background

The Parties presented the following testimony and evidence at the Evidentiary Hearing. Detectives Jose Rosado and Chris Shuman testified on behalf of the Government. Defendant Jackson did not present any witnesses, but did introduce evidence, and Defendant Jones presented the testimony of Randy Weinstein, staff investigator for the Federal Public Defender's Office.

On or about April 29, 2013, Detectives Jose Rosado, Chris Shuman, and James Harris—all of the Miami Gardens Police Department—responded to a residence located at 1071 N.W. 199th Street, Miami Gardens, Florida. DE 65, 30:24–32:25; 36:11–15. The Detectives were investigating an anonymous tip reporting “illegal activity and/or narcotics activity” at the rear efficiency unit, specifically. Id., 31:8–10; 36:11–25. After parking their unmarked police vehicle two houses away, they proceeded to the efficiency unit in order to knock on the rear efficiency door to investigate the tip. Id., 33:3; 36:3–15. Detective Rosado testified, “Once I was passing in front of an A/C unit that was next to [the efficiency unit] door, I smelled a strong odor of marijuana coming from the exhaust of that A/C unit.” Id., 38:9–12. Detective Rosado testified, “At that point I knocked and announced, ‘Miami Gardens Police Department’.... Very quickly, a couple of seconds later the door opened and Mr. Jackson was at the front door.” Id., 40:20–24.

Once the door was opened, Detective Rosado observed Defendant Jones sitting at a table in the efficiency, smoking a marijuana cigarette. He also observed smoke, and a strong smell of burned marijuana emanated from the unit. Id., 41:22–42:6; 45:17–21. Further, Detective Rosado observed an open notebook next to a laptop computer on the table. Id., 62:11– 12. Detective Shuman also detected a strong odor of marijuana at the time Defendant Jackson opened the door and observed Defendant Jones at the table “smoking or rolling like a marijuana roach [or] blunt.” DE 66, 39:12–40:6. The Detectives asked Defendant Jackson to come outside, and he was compliant. DE 65, 45:1–4. Detective Shuman then detained Defendant Jackson either at or outside the doorway of the efficiency unit, and Detective Rosado asked Defendant Jones to step outside. Id., 45:3–4, 45:12–18, 84:21–85:20; DE 66, 40:2–3, 40:7. Defendant Jones then reached across the table to put a marijuana cigarette in the ashtray. Id., 46:17–19. Because Jones hesitated to comply with Detective Rosado's request, the Detective stepped inside the apartment to detain him and bring him outside “to prevent any other evidence related to the narcotics odor from being destroyed,” at which time Defendant Jones cooperated. DE 66, 40:7–10; DE 65, 46:21–47:1. Detective Shuman was able to observe what appeared to be “little baggies of marijuana” on the table, while Detective Rosado detained Defendant Jones. DE 66, 42:24–43:2. Defendant Jackson then made a statement to Detectives Rosado and Shuman to the effect that he does not sell marijuana, he was just smoking it.¹ DE 65, 45:6–10; DE 66, 41:7–15.

While the Detectives were in the process of detaining Defendants outside the apartment, both Detectives Rosado and Shuman observed areas of the efficiency unit in which they were unable to tell if additional people were in the apartment. DE 65, 47:5–11;DE 66, 41:23–42:4. While Detective Harris secured both Defendants outside the efficiency, Detectives Rosado and Shuman conducted a protective sweep for the safety of the officers to determine if other people remained in the areas of the apartment not visible to the Detectives. DE 65, 47:18–19; DE 66, 43:6–7, 43:21–44:4. During the sweep, the Detectives proceeded into the efficiency, checked the obstructed rear area, including the bathroom, and looked under the bed. DE 65, 48:22–49:3; DE 66, 44:2–4. According to the testimony of both Detectives, the sweep lasted approximately one minute. DE 65, 113:8–10; DE 66, 97:19–21.

Detective Shuman testified that, during the sweep, he observed that the screen of the laptop computer on the table displayed “taxtype information.” DE 66, 45:23–24; 80:21–24. He also saw at least one Florida Access card on the table, as well as the open notebook with a ledger of names and social security numbers. Id., 45:7–24; 80:10–82:10; 100:14–24. Based on Detective Shuman's training and experience, these items indicated to him that a fraud was taking place. Id., 46:1–6; 100:19–101:6.

Detective Rosado testified that he observed a partially open backpack on the floor of the apartment as he conducted the protective sweep. DE 65, 59:8–14. When he saw the backpack on the floor during the protective sweep, he saw multiple Florida Access cards in the open pouch of the backpack. DE 65, 58:20–25; 61:1–62:2; Government's Exhs. 25 & 26. Based on his training and experience, Detective Rosado's observations indicated to him that “some sort of fraud was occurring.” DE 65, 59:1–7. Upon the conclusion of the protective sweep, the backpack and the items contained therein, as well as the items on the table, including the baggies of marijuana, the notebook, the Florida Access card, and the laptop computer, were seized. DE 66, 20:18–23. Both Detectives have training and experience in narcotics and fraud. DE 65, 29:9–30:23; DE 66, 30:16–32:10.

II. Analysis

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

U.S. Const. Amend. IV

. “Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted.” Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969). “Two requirements must be met before a person may successfully prevail on a [F]ourth [A]mendment claim.” United States v. Bachner, 706 F.2d 1121, 1125 (11th Cir.1983) (emphasis added). First, the claimant's legitimate expectation of privacy must be invaded by the search and seizure. Id. (citing

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) ). Second, the search and seizure must be “unreasonable.” Bachner, 706 F.2d at 1125.

A. Defendants' Legitimate Expectations of Privacy

As to the first requirement, the Court notes that what was often referred to as the question of standing to raise a Fourth Amendment claim now falls within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law, rather than that of procedural standing. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139–40, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978)

(holding only defendants whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated shall benefit from the exclusionary rule's protection); see also

United States v. Hawkins, 681 F.2d 1343 (11th Cir.1982) (noting the correct Fourth Amendment analysis is not focused on standing, but rather the defendant's legitimate expectation of privacy). Only those individuals who have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded property have standing to challenge the validity of a government search. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139–40, 99 S.Ct. 421. Thus, the mere fact that a defendant was the subject of a search or that he was legitimately on the premises fails to...