United States v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 24 November 1885
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. JACKSON. SAME v. MOSBY.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee

25 F. 548

UNITED STATES v. JACKSON.

SAME v. MOSBY.

United States Circuit Court, W.D. Tennessee.

November 24, 1885

The indictment was framed under the following section of the Revised Statutes of the United States:

'Sec 5515. Every officer of an election at which any representative or delegate in congress is voted for whether such officer of election be appointed or created by or under any law or authority of the United States, or by or under any state, territorial, district, or municipal law or authority, who neglects or refuses to perform any duty in regard to such election required of him by any law of the United States, or of any state or territory thereof; or who violates any duty so imposed; or who knowingly does any acts thereby unauthorized, with intent to affect any such election, or the result thereof; or who fraudulently makes any false certificate of the result of such election in regard to such representative or delegate; or who withholds, conceals, or destroys any certificate of record so required by law respecting the election of any such representative or delegate; or who neglects or refuses to make and return such certificate as required by law; or who aids, counsels, procures, or advises any voter, person, or officer to do any act by this or any of the preceding sections made a crime, or to omit to do any duty, the omission of which is by this or any of such sections made a crime, or attempts to do so,-- shall be punished as prescribed in sections 5510, 5511.'

H. W. McCorry, Dist. Atty., and J. B. Clough, Asst. U.S. Atty., for the United States.

T. K. Reddick, C. A. Stainback, and F. T. Edmondson, for defendants.

HAMMOND J.

The demurrer challenges the indictment in this case because, (1) while the state statute may impose a duty on the defendant as averred in the indictment, no state law attaches any penalty for the violation of the statute, and therefore it is not such a duty under the law as congress contemplated by the enactment of section 5515 of the Revised Statutes. (2) The specific statutory 'intent to affect the election, or the result thereof,' is not charged by the indictment. Rev. St. Sec. 5515.

It requires only a very cursory reading of the statute to show that the first ground of demurrer is not at all well taken. It is the plain purpose of this statute to declare as an offense against the United States, proprio vigore, the neglect, refusal, or violation of any duty imposed upon an officer holding an election for representative in congress by any law, state or federal. pit is not necessary, as counsel argue, that the state law imposing the duty shall attach a penalty for its violation in order to make it an offense under this statute. The only object for which we look to the state law is to find the measure of the officer's duty, as one charged with the function of holding the election. Once given a duty to perform in that regard, and its performance is an obligation imposed by this federal statute. Its non-performance subjects the officer to the penalties here imposed. It is wholly immaterial how the state laws may look upon or treat a violation of his duty; for when the duty is assumed by him he comes immediately within the jurisdiction of this federal law, and must obey it or take the consequences here by this statute itself imposed for any neglect, refusal, or violation of that duty. He cannot escape by saying that the state does not punish the given conduct as an offense against its peace and dignity. It is the peace and dignity of the United States that he violates by every failure to discharge his duty as an officer of election. The United States does not concern itself with other elections, nor with the violation of the state laws as such in any election; but whenever a member of congress is to be elected, this act of congress steps in to protect the people of the whole United States against the evil effects of fraudulent elections by punishing those who hold the election for every violation of duty in the performance of their functions; or, to put it another way, congress seeks by this statute to guard the election of members of congress against any possible unfairness by compelling, under its pains and penalties, every one concerned in holding the election to a strict and scrupulous observance of every duty devolved upon him while so engaged. This being the object of the statute, its requirements are that every officer of election shall discharge his duties in a manner to accomplish that object. If he does not, he becomes an offender against the laws of the state or not. This is too plain for any further argument, and that ground of demurrer is overruled.

The other objection is of more importance. Section 1025 of the Revised Statutes of the United States protects an indictment against objections for 'any defect or imperfection in matter of form only, which shall not tend to the prejudice of the defendant. ' But it has been properly held that where a statute requires that an act shall be accompanied by a particular intent to make it an offense, the omission to charge that intent is one of substance, and not form only. U.S. v. Jackson, 2 Fed.Rep. 502, 504.

It is a familiar principle that no act done or omitted to be done can be an offense without a wrongful intent, but the application of it to that class of offenses arising out of prohibitions by the law of conduct not in itself of an evil nature, is often misunderstood and confusing. I have not time here to go into the intricacies of the subject, either in its relation to moral philosophy or the somewhat narrower requirements of the criminal law, unless the moral philosophy takes into the consideration the governmental power to prohibit that which may be otherwise either innocent or good. It is sufficient to say that the legislature may, and often does,-- sometimes mistakenly, perhaps,--prohibit the doing of a thing which ought to be done, or out of which no harm could arise, and yet the doing of that thing after the prohibition would be a crime, no matter what the intent. The evil intent consists in disobedience to the law. The legislature has the power to judge and does adjudge that the doing of the thing is not for the public good; and, whether its judgment be wise or unwise, it is always binding on the citizen, and the doing of it is a crime. This is particularly so with reference to that class of statutes imposing duties on public officials in the exercise of their public functions. The command of the legislative will must be obeyed, and disobedience is a crime, and may be punished as such.

Now, it is only where the legislature accompanies its prohibition of particular conduct with a declaration that the inhibited act shall be done with a specified intent, that that intent need be either specifically averred by the indictment or specifically proved on the trial. In other cases the wrongful intent inheres in the act itself, is charged by an averment of the doing of the act, and is proved by evidence showing that the act was done. It consists in a violation of the statute, and proves itself when the violation is shown. This is a sufficient statement of the general principles for the purpose we have in hand. It needs no citation of authority to support it, for every work on criminal law or criminal procedure contains the assertion of them. They were applied,...