United States v. Jackson

Decision Date02 December 2021
Docket Number1:21-cr-12-RCL
PartiesUNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ZACHARY JACKSON, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.

ZACHARY JACKSON, Defendant.

No. 1:21-cr-12-RCL

United States District Court, District of Columbia

December 2, 2021


MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Royce C. Lamberth United States District Judge

Defendant Zachary Jackson is charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. ECF No. 6. Before the Court are Ihe government's motion in limine to admit evidence pursuant lo Federal Rule of Evidence 609, Gov. Mot., ECF No. 20; and Jackson's response to the government's motion, Def.'s Opp'n, ECF No. 27. The Court held a motion hearing on November 29, 2021. 11/29/2021 Min. Entry. For the reasons stated below, the Court will GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART the government's motion.

The government specifically requests that, if Jackson elects to testify at trial, it be permitted to impeach Jackson's credibility with two of his prior convictions. Gov. Mot. 1. Both are convictions from D.C. Superior Court. Id. at 2. The first is a 2017 conviction for robbery and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Id. at 4. The second is a 2016 conviction for attempted robbery. Id.

Jackson "does not object to the introductions of these convictions should [he] take the stand, provided the government provide a certified copy of the stated conviction." Def.'s Opp'n 2. But he does raise two arguments in response to the government's motion. First, Jackson states that he would object to the introduction of his prior conviction for unlawful possession because

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"introduction of that conviction would be more prejudicial than probative." Def.'s Resp. 2. He argues that "a conviction of virtually the same charge, particularly one that involves a conviction based upon an unchangeable condition precedent (felony conviction), would be unfairly prejudicial." Id. at 3. Second, Jackson argues that because the parties have entered into a stipulation that Jackson has a prior felony conviction "as required by the elements" of his charged offense, the description of his convictions "is not a fact in dispute at trial and [is] therefore only prejudicial." Id.

The government's motion is ripe for review.

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Rule 609 permits the "admission of a defendant's prior convictions for purposes of impeachment, so long as the 'crime ... was punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than one year' (that is, it was a felony), and 'the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.'" United States v. Ford, No. 15-cr-25 (PLF), 2016 WL 259640, at *7 (D.D.C. Jan. 21, 2016) (quoting United States v. Moore, 75 F.Supp.3d 444, 453 (D.D.C. 2014)). It is the government's burden to "show that the probative value of a prior conviction outweighs the prejudice to the defendant." United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (en banc). Courts in this district consider the following nonexhaustive factors in their balancing analysis: "(1) the kind of crime involved; (2) when the conviction occurred; (3) the importance of the witnesses] testimony to the case; (4) the importance of the credibility of the defendant; and (5) generally, the impeachment value of the prior crime." United States v. Pettiford, 238 F.R.D. 33, 41 (D.D.C. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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Jackson's first objection focuses on the risk of unfair prejudice from introducing his prior firearm conviction.[1] As Jackson identifies, both this case and his 2017 conviction involve unlawful firearm possession. It is widely recognized that the balance tilts further toward exclusion when proffered impeachment evidence is similar to the crime for which the defendant is being tried. See, e.g., 28 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6134 (2d ed.) ("[T]he danger of unfair-prejudice is enhanced if the witness is the accused and the crime was similar to the crime now charged, since this increases the risk that the jury will draw an impermissible inference under Rule 404(a)."). As the Fourth Circuit has explained, "[t]he [j]ury, despite limiting instructions, can hardly avoid drawing the inference that the past conviction suggests some probability that defendant committed the similar offense for which he is currently charged." United States v. Sanders, 964 F.2d 295, 297-98 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v....

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