United States v. Jackson

Decision Date18 December 1981
Docket NumberCr. No. M-81-00420.
Citation529 F. Supp. 1047
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, v. Lawrence W. JACKSON, Irvin Tolson, Rebecca Montgomery.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maryland

J. Frederick Motz, U. S. Atty., and Price O. Gielen, Asst. U. S. Atty., Baltimore, Md., for the United States of America.

Fred Warren Bennett, Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, Md., for defendant Jackson.

Alan C. Drew, Upper Marlboro, Md., for defendant Tolson.

William B. Purpura, Baltimore, Md., for defendant Montgomery.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JAMES R. MILLER, Jr., District Judge.

Defendant Jackson has moved to suppress approximately $7,000.00 in cash that was seized from a closed, opaque black paper bag. The bag was located in the locked trunk of a 1977 Cadillac limousine that Jackson had been driving shortly before his arrest on August 31, 1981. The parties have submitted extensive memoranda on this issue,1 and the court held an evidentiary hearing on December 10, 1981. The matters raised by Jackson's motion are, therefore, ready for decision.

I. Overview

At the suppression hearing, the sole source of evidence relating to the seizure of the bag and its contents was the testimony of Sgt. Douglas S. Davis. Sgt. Davis has been a member of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department for 16 years, and has been assigned to a special Drug Enforcement Administration task force for approximately four years. Sgt. Davis was the case agent in charge of the investigation relating to Jackson's alleged narcotics activities.

On February 5, 1981, an individual cooperating with the investigation was directed to attempt to obtain heroin from Jackson. In preparation for this controlled buy, the cooperating individual (CI) was searched completely and equipped with a recording device. The CI was then transported to the 3900 block of Benning Road, N.E., Washington, D. C., where he entered the premises of J & M Auto Brokers. Shortly thereafter, the CI exited the premises in the company of Jackson. Both men entered a 1977 Cadillac limousine. The automobile was driven around the general area by Jackson. While in the automobile, the CI obtained from Jackson a quantity of heroin.

On August 31, 1981, Special Agent George Coleman, acting in an undercover capacity, met Jackson at a liquor store in Northeast Washington, D.C. In exchange for a small quantity of heroin, Coleman gave Jackson approximately one pound of quinine.2 At approximately 8:13 p.m., Coleman observed Jackson enter the 1977 Cadillac limousine with the quinine and drive off. A surveillance team followed Jackson to an apartment building located at 3103 Goodhope Avenue, Hillcrest Heights, Maryland. Jackson parked the vehicle legally, near the side entrance of the apartment building. He then exited the vehicle and entered the building. At approximately 8:30 p.m., Jackson was arrested by Sgt. Davis and other agents while on the inside stairs of the apartment building. At the time of Jackson's arrest, the agents searched his person and found the keys for the 1977 Cadillac limousine, which the agents knew to be owned by Jackson's employer, M & J Limousine Service. The agents then placed a guard on the vehicle and proceeded to execute a search warrant for Apartment 301 of the building in which Jackson was arrested. During the search of the apartment the agents discovered a safe containing, among other things, approximately one pound of quinine. Although they were not then certain, the quinine in the safe appeared to be the same quinine given to Jackson earlier that evening by Special Agent Coleman.

After completing their search of the apartment, the agents proceeded to the vehicle. According to Sgt. Davis, the vehicle was then seized for forfeiture because it had been used to facilitate narcotics transactions. 21 U.S.C. § 881. Sgt. Davis testified at the suppression hearing that both the February 5, 1981 controlled buy of heroin and the discovery of quinine in the apartment were considered by him in determining to seize the vehicle for forfeiture.

According to Sgt. Davis, his sole reason for searching the vehicle was to determine whether it contained any "valuables" that would have to be removed for safekeeping. In other words, Sgt. Davis claims that he conducted an inventory search whose object was to protect the agents from subsequent lost property claims by Jackson or others.

The agents first examined the vehicle's passenger compartment. Finding nothing of value in that portion of the vehicle, they proceeded to the locked trunk. Using the keys found on Jackson's person, Sgt. Davis opened the trunk and viewed its contents. Resting on top of some clothes was an opaque, black paper bag that had been folded or twisted closed at the top. Sgt. Davis removed the bag from the trunk, opened it, and saw that it contained what appeared to be a large amount of cash. Sgt. Davis then returned the bag to the trunk, and the entire vehicle was removed to a basement parking garage at 400 6th Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. At the garage the vehicle was again searched and the bag with the money removed to the police department safe.

Sgt. Davis testified that it was his regular practice to search vehicles seized for forfeiture for valuables, and that the initial search on Goodhope Avenue was conducted to determine the extent of the vehicle's valuable contents. He also testified that the search of the vehicle on Goodhope was terminated after the money was found because of a gathering crowd and poor lighting conditions.

Sgt. Davis testified that the vehicle's locked trunk was opened, and a search for valuables conducted, because the trunks of other vehicles stored at the parking garage used by the agents had been broken into and their contents removed. According to Sgt. Davis, it was he, as the case agent, who determined what items in a seized vehicle would be searched for valuables. He also testified that he knew of no written regulations or other formal procedures governing inventory searches of seized or impounded vehicles. In addition, Sgt. Davis testified that not all of the vehicle's contents were inventoried; only those which he considered to have value. Finally, due to a lack of sufficient storage space, only valuable items found in a vehicle were removed for safekeeping. No effort was made to contact the vehicle's owner prior to searching it for valuables.

Sgt. Davis also testified that he probably would have opened any closed container found in the vehicle, except for a container that itself had value, such as a briefcase. He stated on cross-examination that he opened the paper bag in the vehicle's trunk because it may have contained "trash" and, given the shortage of storage space, he did not want to put nonvaluable containers in the police department safe.

II. Discussion

In opposing Jackson's suppression motion, the Government first contends that no judicially authorized warrant or other process was necessary in this case. According to the Government, the 1977 Cadillac limousine was seized for forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) and (b). The Government next contends that the warrantless search of the vehicle and its contents was a lawful inventory search.3 See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967).

Although the resolution of most search and seizure questions does not involve a bifurcated analysis, separating the search from the seizure, the Government's reliance on 21 U.S.C. § 881 and the inventory exception to the warrant requirement makes it appropriate to conduct one in this case. See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 654, 100 S.Ct. 2395, 2400, 65 L.Ed.2d 410 (1980) (Opinion of Stevens, J.). Accordingly, the court will first determine whether the Government acted lawfully in seizing the vehicle without a warrant. Next, the court will address whether it was constitutionally permissible to conduct a warrantless search of the seized vehicle and, if so, whether the search of the closed paper bag in the vehicle's trunk can be sustained under an inventory rationale.

A. The Seizure

The Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the Fourth Amendment implications of a warrantless seizure of a vehicle pursuant to a forfeiture statute such as section 881 of Title 21.4 See 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 7.3(b) (1978). Cf. G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 349-52, 97 S.Ct. 619, 626-28, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977) (warrantless seizure of automobile from public street in satisfaction of Internal Revenue Service levy). See also Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 676-88, 94 S.Ct. 2080, 2088-94, 40 L.Ed.2d 452 (1974) (rejecting procedural due process and just compensation challenge to state forfeiture statute). In this case, however, it is unnecessary for the court to determine whether the congressional authorization, contained in 21 U.S.C. § 881(b), to effect a warrantless seizure of a vehicle comports with constitutional standards. Jackson has challenged only the Government's purported application of subsection 881(b) and the scope of the subsequent search, not the facial validity of the statute. Compare United States v. Bush, 647 F.2d 357, 368-70 (3d Cir. 1981) with United States v. McCormick, 502 F.2d 281, 285-89 (9th Cir. 1974).

It is apparent that the 1977 Cadillac limousine was subject to forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4), because Government agents had witnessed Jackson use the vehicle on August 31, 1981 to transport the quinine given to him by Special Agent Coleman that same day in exchange for heroin. It is equally plain that the seizure of the vehicle was incident to Jackson's arrest within the meaning of subsection 881(b)(1). Forfeiture of the vehicle occurred on August 31, 1981 when it was used by Jackson to transport the quinine, and the Government exercised...

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