United States v. Jackson, Criminal No. 1:06-cr-161

• Court: United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Virginia)
• Writing for the Court: T.S. Ellis, III United States District Judge
• Citation: 371 F.Supp.3d 257
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Vernon JACKSON, Defendant.
• Docket Number: Criminal No. 1:06-cr-161
• Decision Date: 27 March 2019

371 F.Supp.3d 257

UNITED STATES of America
v.
Vernon JACKSON, Defendant.

Criminal No. 1:06-cr-161

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Alexandria Division.

Signed March 27, 2019

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Mark Lytle, Russell L. Carlberg, William Clayman, United States Attorney's Office, Alexandria, VA, for United States of America.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

T.S. Ellis, III United States District Judge

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At issue in this matter is defendant's post-conviction petition, pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), for a writ of coram nobis to vacate his convictions for bribery and conspiracy to commit bribery.

I.

On May 3, 2006, defendant pled guilty to bribing and conspiring to bribe former United States Congressman William Jennings Jefferson to perform "official acts" for the benefit of defendant's company, iGate, Incorporated ("iGate") in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(A). Defendant was sentenced on September 8, 2006 to serve 60 months of incarceration on the conspiracy count and 87 months of incarceration on the bribery count, to run concurrently, and two years of supervised release on each count, also to run concurrently.

Defendant subsequently provided substantial cooperation in the government's investigation of Jefferson and also testified at trial against Jefferson with respect to seven bribery-related criminal charges.¹ A jury convicted Jefferson on each of these seven bribery-related charges, as well as additional bribery-related, racketeering, and conspiracy charges. Following his conviction, Jefferson was sentenced to serve a total of thirteen years in prison. Jefferson appealed his convictions and sentences to the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court. The Fourth Circuit affirmed Jefferson's convictions and sentences,² and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. United States v. Jefferson , 674 F.3d 332, 369 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied , 568 U.S. 1041, 133 S.Ct. 648, 184 L.Ed.2d 482 (2012).

Based on defendant's cooperation in Jefferson's trial, the government filed a motion to reduce defendant's sentence, and defendant was re-sentenced to serve 40 months of incarceration. Defendant completed his sentence, including his two-year term of supervised release, on January 24, 2012.

Thereafter, in 2016—ten years after defendant pled guilty and nine years after Jefferson's trial—the Supreme Court in McDonnell v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 2355, 195 L.Ed.2d 639 (2016), "altered the legal landscape with respect to the principal element of bribery—the ‘official act.’ " United States v. Jefferson , 289 F.Supp.3d 717, 721 (E.D. Va. 2017). In short, McDonnell held that an "official act" is a "decision or action [by a public official] on a ‘question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy.’ " McDonnell , 136 S.Ct. at 2371. The "question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy" must be "something specific and focused that is ‘pending’ or ‘may by law be brought’ before a public official" and must involve "a formal exercise of governmental power that is similar in nature to a lawsuit before a court, a determination before an agency, or a hearing before a committee." Id. at 2372. And a "decision or action" on

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the "question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy" may include "using his official position to exert pressure on another official to perform an ‘official act,’ or to advise another official, knowing or intending that such advice will form the basis for an ‘official act’ by another official." Id.

In light of McDonnell , Jefferson filed a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his bribery convictions on the ground that the Supreme Court's newly restricted definition of "official acts" meant that the activities for which he was convicted were not criminal. Specifically, Jefferson argued that he never engaged in or agreed to engage in "official acts," as defined by McDonnell . On October 4, 2017, Jefferson's petition was granted with respect to his bribery-related convictions arising from Jefferson's agreements with defendant and iGate because (i) the jury instructions in Jefferson's trial "did not convey ‘meaningful limits’ on the meaning of official act and ‘lacked important qualifications, rendering them significantly overinclusive’ "³ and (ii) the evidence at trial did not establish "that Jefferson took ‘official acts’ in relation to the iGate scheme within the meaning of the bribery statute as clarified by the Supreme Court's opinion in McDonnell . " Id. at 734–35, 740–41.⁴

Currently at issue is defendant's petition for a writ of coram nobis to vacate his bribery and conspiracy convictions, which defendant filed approximately two months after Jefferson's habeas petition was granted in part. In essence, defendant argues that the writ should be granted because the Supreme Court's clarification of the meaning of "official act" in McDonnell reveals that defendant did not plead guilty intelligently during his plea proceeding and that there was not a factual basis for his guilty plea. For the reasons that follow, defendant's petition for a writ of coram nobis must be granted.

II.

The writ of coram nobis⁵ is an ancient common-law remedy that was originally designed "to correct errors of fact" that "affect[ed] the validity and regularity of the judgment." United States v. Morgan , 346 U.S. 502, 507, 74 S.Ct. 247, 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954) (internal quotation marks omitted). In its modern-day form, the writ has a broader application and may "issue

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to redress a fundamental error" infecting "an earlier judgment of conviction." United States v. Denedo , 556 U.S. 904, 911, 917, 129 S.Ct. 2213, 173 L.Ed.2d 1235 (2009).⁶ Yet, to ensure "that finality is not at risk in a great number of cases," the Supreme Court has "limit[ed] the availability of the writ to ‘extraordinary’ cases presenting related circumstances compelling its use ‘to achieve justice.’ " Id. (quoting Morgan , 346 U.S. at 511, 74 S.Ct. 247 ); see also id. at 916, 129 S.Ct. 2213 ("[J]udgment finality is not to be lightly cast aside; and courts must be cautious so that the extraordinary remedy of coram nobis issues only in extreme cases."). Indeed, it is well-settled that coram nobis may only be invoked to correct errors so fundamental that they "render the proceedings themselves irregular and invalid" and "result[ ] in a complete miscarriage of justice." Bereano v. United States , 706 F.3d 568, 577 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Thomas v. U.S. Disciplinary Barracks , 625 F.3d 667, 670 n.3 (10th Cir. 2010) and United States v. Bruno , 903 F.2d 393, 396 (5th Cir. 1990) ).

In particular, the Fourth Circuit has held that a petitioner seeking a writ of coram nobis "must show that (1) a more usual remedy is not available; (2) valid reasons exist for not attacking the conviction earlier; (3) adverse consequences exist from the conviction sufficient to satisfy the case or controversy requirement of Article III; and (4) the error is of the most fundamental character." United States v. Akinsade , 686 F.3d 248, 252 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has made clear that "[i]t is presumed the proceedings were correct and the burden rests on the accused to show otherwise." Morgan , 346 U.S. at 512, 74 S.Ct. 247.

A.

First , it is clear, and the government does not contest, that defendant cannot seek relief through a more usual remedy instead of through a writ of coram nobis. Defendant cannot seek relief under the typical remedies for a direct or collateral attack of a federal judgment and sentence, such as habeas corpus , because he is no longer in custody and has already served his entire sentence of incarceration and supervised release. See Akinsade , 686 F.3d at 252 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1948) ; 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1948) ). Thus, defendant has satisfied the first element necessary to grant a writ of coram nobis.

B.

Second , defendant has provided valid reasons for not challenging his convictions earlier.⁷ Under the well-settled understanding of the law, which had remained unaltered since 1914, defendant had no basis for attacking his convictions for bribing and conspiring to bribe Jefferson.⁸ Indeed, in 2012, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Jefferson's bribery convictions on the ground that the jury was properly

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instructed on the meaning of "official acts" pursuant to United States v. Birdsall , 233 U.S. 223, 34 S.Ct. 512, 58 L.Ed. 930 (1914), and that Jefferson's acts fell within the Birdsall and statutory definition of "official act." United States v. Jefferson , 674 F.3d 332, 355 (4th Cir. 2012). Then, in 2016, a decade after defendant pled guilty to bribery and conspiracy to commit bribery, the Supreme Court's decision in McDonnell changed the legal landscape with respect to the "official act" element of bribery. Defendant then filed his coram nobis petition only seventeen months after McDonnell was decided. Thus, the fact that the basis for defendant's...