United States v. Jackson
| Decision Date | 04 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | Criminal No. 18-cr-132-JL |
| Citation | 578 F.Supp.3d 240 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Laveneur JACKSON |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Hampshire |
Anna Z. Krasinski, Seth R. Aframe, US Attorney's Office, Concord, NH, for United States of America.
Simon R. Brown, Preti Flaherty Beliveau Pachios LLP, Concord, NH, for Laveneur Jackson.
Defendant Laveneur Jackson's motion for judgment of acquittal hinges on whether there was sufficient evidence to establish several essential elements of the charged crimes, including whether Jackson was identified as the perpetrator. Jackson was indicted on two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). After a two-day trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts. Jackson orally moved for judgment of acquittal at the end of the prosecution's case-in-chief, arguing that the prosecution had not met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) he was the perpetrator of the charged crimes; (2) the firearms he allegedly possessed traveled in interstate commerce; and (3) he knew he had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year. The court took his oral motion under advisement and, following the jury's verdicts, Jackson submitted a written motion expanding on his arguments.1
After considering the parties’ arguments at trial and written submissions, the court denies the motions.2 The prosecution introduced evidence from which "a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that" Jackson was in fact the person who committed the charged offenses, the Ruger and two SCCY firearms traveled in interstate commerce at some time, and Jackson knew that he had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by more than a year in prison. Specifically, the witnesses and visual evidence sufficiently connected the person on trial to the perpetrator of the crimes, the government's qualified interstate nexus specialist provided adequately supported opinion testimony that the firearms in question crossed state lines, and the jury could infer from Jackson's Massachusetts court-generated plea documents and two-year sentence that he knew of his convicted felon status at the time of the charged crimes. This constituted proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
"No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment's due process clause "prohibits the criminal conviction of any person except upon proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 309, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Accordingly, "[a]fter the prosecution closes its evidence or after the close of all the evidence, the court on the defendant's motion must enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction." Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a). Considering only the evidence presented in the government's case-in-chief, which, here, was all the evidence, the court assesses "whether ‘a rational factfinder could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the prosecution successfully proved the essential elements of the crime.’ " United States v. Ortiz, 447 F.3d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Moran, 312 F.3d 480, 487 (1st Cir. 2002) ). If the "verdict ‘finds support in a plausible rendition of the record,’ " the conviction must stand. United States v. Oliver, 19 F.4th 512, 516 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Echeverri, 982 F.2d 675, 677 (1st Cir. 1993) ).
In doing so, the court "take[s] all inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict ... give[s] equal weight to both direct and circumstantial evidence, and ... neither weigh[s] witness credibility nor require[s] the prosecution to ‘eliminat[e] every possible theory consistent with the defendant's innocence[.]" Id. (quoting United States v. Rivera-Ruiz, 244 F.3d 263, 266 (1st Cir. 2001) ). It "evaluate[s] the sum of all the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom, and determine[s] whether that sum is enough for any reasonable jury to find all the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt, even if the individual pieces of evidence are not enough when viewed in isolation." United States v. Santos-Soto, 799 F.3d 49, 57 (1st Cir. 2015). In conducting a sufficiency review, however, "some degree of intellectual rigor is required" and the court must "reject those evidentiary interpretations and illations that are unreasonable, insupportable, or overly speculative." United States v. Rodríguez-Martinez, 778 F.3d 367, 371 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Spinney, 65 F.3d 231, 234 (1st Cir. 1995) ).
Consistent with this standard, the following background draws on the evidence presented during the prosecution's case at trial.
By criminal complaint dated July 25, 2011, Jackson was charged in Lowell District Court with five counts of violating various sections of the Massachusetts Criminal Code.3 In 2013, he pled guilty to, and was convicted of, two felony counts: (1) possession with intent to distribute a Class A substance; and (2) possession with intent to distribute a Class B substance.4 Each offense carried a maximum sentence of ten years in state prison.5 Jackson was sentenced to two years of imprisonment at a house of correction and served 64 days.6 As part of his plea, Jackson signed a tender of plea and waiver of rights form in which he acknowledged that he was "aware of the nature and range of the possible sentence(s)" for the charges to which he was entering a guilty plea.7 In the same form, the presiding District Court judge certified that he "addressed [Jackson] directly in open court" and, after a colloquy with Jackson, the judge found that Jackson "knowingly, intelligently[,] and voluntarily waived all of the rights as explained during these proceedings and as set forth in this form." The judge further certified that he "made appropriate inquiry into the education and background of the defendant" and was satisfied that Jackson "fully under[stood] all of [his] rights as set forth in" the waiver form.8
Similarly, in February 2011, Jackson was charged in Lawrence District Court with eight counts of violating various sections of the Massachusetts Criminal Code.9 In August 2014, he pled guilty to, and was convicted of, four felony counts: two counts of assault and battery on a police officer, one count of possession with intent to distribute a Class A substance, and one f possession with intent to distribute a Class B substance.10 The assault and battery on a police officer offense carried a maximum sentence of two and one-half years imprisonment in a house of correction.11 Jackson was sentenced to concurrent one-year house of corrections sentences for these offenses.12 As part of his 2014 plea, Jackson signed the same tender of plea and waiver of rights form and made the same acknowledgments as he did for his 2013 guilty plea.13 The District Court judge similarly certified that he had addressed Jackson directly in open court and, after a colloquy, found that Jackson fully understood his rights and knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived them.14
The government's investigation of this case began on January 2, 2017, when ATF Special Agent John Cook and Task Force Officer Matthew Barter traveled to Riley's Sport Shop, a gun store in Hooksett, New Hampshire (at the time) in response to a call from Riley's staff.15 When he arrived at Riley's, Agent Cook saw Jackson and a woman named Angelina Keenan. Agent Cook met first with Keenan and then spoke with Jackson. He asked Jackson if he had a felony conviction and Jackson answered that he was a convicted felon.16 Jackson then admitted that he had handled guns in Riley's, but that he did not know it was illegal for a convicted felon to handle guns in a gun shop. Agent Cook next asked Jackson about the possibility of obtaining back the guns that Jackson previously purchased with Keenan's help. Jackson responded that it would take some time, that he would have to give some people their money back, and that the guns were in Massachusetts.17
Following this encounter, Agent Cook began investigating whether Keenan purchased firearms for Jackson prior to January 2, 2017.18 As part of this process, Agent Cook spoke with local gun stores and had them look for ATF Form 4473s completed by Keenan. Purchasers of firearms from federally licensed firearms dealers must fill out Form 4473s to complete the purchase.19 The forms contain biographical information about the purchaser, a series of questions to determine whether the purchaser is someone prohibited from possessing a firearm, information about the firearms dealer, and information about the firearm itself, including the make, model, caliber and serial number.20 Agent Cook discovered through this inquiry that Keenan had recently completed two Form 4473s at two different New Hampshire firearms dealers.
Keenan is a recovering heroin addict. At some point in the past, in the midst of her addiction and during a period where she would experience "sickness" or withdrawals when she was not using drugs, Keenan met a man she knew as "Lance" through a friend.21 Keenan eventually learned that Lance was looking for people to buy guns for him in exchange for money and, needing money to support her drug addiction, Keenan spoke to Lance about purchasing guns for him. Lance asked Keenan if she had a valid ID and wanted to make money or obtain drugs by buying firearms for him, and Keenan agreed. Keenan eventually purchased firearms on two occasions for Lance.
The first purchase was on December 23, 2016 at Affordable Firearms in Pelham, New Hampshire. Keenan and her boyfriend Benjamin Soule-Jensen picked Lance up and drove to Affordable...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
United States v. Jackson
...order on November 18, 2021, and later issued a published order explaining its reasoning on January 4, 2022. See United States v. Jackson, 578 F. Supp. 3d 240 (D.N.H. 2022). A few weeks later, on January 26, 2022, the District Court sentenced Jackson to 66 months of imprisonment, followed by......
-
Hughes v. Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev.
...578 F.Supp.3d 234Kevin HUGHESv.SECRETARY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENTCivil No. 20-cv-025-LMUnited States District ... ...