United States v. Jackson
| Docket Number | CRIMINAL ACTION 13-290 (SDW) |
| Decision Date | 07 August 2023 |
| Parties | Re United States v. Carolyn Jackson, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Rubin Sinins
Javerbaum Wurgaft Hicks Kahn Wikstrom & Sinins
Counsel for Defendant Carolyn Jackson
Carol Dominguez
Office of the Federal Public Defender
Counsel for Defendant John E. Jackson
Desiree L. Grace
Office of the United States Attorney
Counsel for the United States of America
LETTER OPINION FILED WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT
Before this Court is Defendants Carolyn Jackson (“Carolyn”) and John E. Jackson's (“John,” together with Carolyn, “Defendants”) motion to bar the imposition of further sentences (D.E. 493, 495 (“Motion”)). This Court having considered the parties' submissions, and for the reasons discussed below, denies Defendants' Motion.
The facts of this case have been extensively covered-in a 39-day trial, in multiple sentencing proceedings, and in three separate opinions by the Third Circuit. Accordingly, this Court's recitation of the facts includes only those pertinent to resolving the instant Motion.
John, a former major in the United States Army, and Carolyn, his wife, “inflicted devastating abuse on their three young foster children-Joshua, J, and C-over the course of five years, causing serious and lasting harm.” (D.E. 487-1 at 3.) The abuse occurred, at least in part, on Picatinny Arsenal Installation in Morris County, New Jersey.[1]
Defendants were first indicted in federal court on April 29, 2013. (D.E. 1.) Trial began in October 2014. (D.E. 116 at 2). On November 14, 2014-the fifteenth day of the first trial-the presiding judge, the Hon. Katharine S. Hayden, U.S.D.J., granted Defendants' motion for a mistrial. (See generally D.E. 151, 157.) On January 15, 2015, in a 15-count superseding indictment, the Government again charged Defendants. (D.E. 175.)
On July 8, 2015, following a 39-day jury trial, Defendants were found guilty of the following: conspiring from August 2005 to April 2010 to engage in acts that endangered their three foster children (Count 1); physically assaulting all three children with various objects and their hands (Counts 3, 6, and 12); withholding adequate water from J and C and prohibiting these children from drinking water (Counts 4 and 8); forcing J to ingest hot sauce, red pepper flakes, and raw onion, and forcing C to ingest hot sauce and red pepper flakes (Counts 5 and 9); and withholding prompt and proper medical care for C's dehydration and elevated sodium levels (Count 11). (See generally D.E. 353, 354.) In addition, the jury found Carolyn-but not John- guilty of withholding sufficient nourishment and food from Joshua (Count 2), and “[c]ausing [C] to ingest excessive sodium and a sodium-laden substance while restricting [C's] fluid intake, causing [C] to suffer hypernatremia and dehydration, a life[-]threatening condition,” (Count 10). (D.E. 487-1 at 4; see also D.E. 353 at 1, 3.)
Since the jury pronounced its verdict, Defendants have been thrice sentenced, and each time, the Third Circuit has vacated those erroneous sentences. Defendants' first sentencing occurred on December 15, 2015. (D.E. 407, 408.) Prior to that sentencing, the Probation Office calculated the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines (“Guidelines”) range of 210 to 262 months for each Defendant. (D.E. 487-1 at 4.) The Government similarly calculated a Guidelines range of 292 to 365 months but only sought sentences of 235 months for Carolyn and 188 months for John. (D.E. 420-1 at 6.) Following a 10 1/2-hour hearing, Carolyn was sentenced to a term of 24 months' imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release, and John received a three-year term of probation accompanied by 400 hours of community service and a $15,000 fine. (D.E. 407-11.) On January 21, 2016, the Government appealed. (D.E. 413, 414.)
On July 6, 2017, the Third Circuit vacated Defendants' sentences. (See generally D.E. 419, 420-1). In a lengthy opinion, Circuit Judge Cowen thoroughly analyzed “a number of rather unusual sentencing issues” implicated in this case, (D.E. 420-1 at 8), and ultimately held that the Sentencing Court (i) committed reversible error and (ii) imposed substantively unreasonable sentences, (see generally id.). The Third Circuit then remanded the case for resentencing. (See generally id.)
Defendants' first resentencing occurred over the course of two days-April 11 to April 12, 2018. (D.E. 437, 438.) At the conclusion of that hearing, Carolyn was sentenced to a term of 40 months' imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release, and John received a three-year term of probation accompanied by 400 hours of community service. (See generally D.E. 439, 440.) On May 21, 2018, the Government again appealed,[2] (D.E. 443, 444), and on June 26, 2020, the Third Circuit again vacated Defendants' sentences and remanded the case for resentencing, (see generally D.E. 451, 452-2).
The second resentencing was held on October 6, 2021. (D.E. 476, 477.) At that time, the Government calculated a Guidelines range of 108 to 135 months for each Defendant, Defendants calculated their Guidelines range as 57 to 71 months, and the Sentencing Court calculated a Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months for each Defendant. (See generally D.E. 482.) The Sentencing Court “varied significantly downward from those ranges,” however: Carolyn was sentenced to a term of 40 months' imprisonment (which the Sentencing Court deemed time-served) plus one additional year of supervised release, and John was sentenced to an 18-month term of home confinement. (D.E. 487-1 at 5-6; see also D.E. 482 at 151-55.) On November 15, 2021, the Government once again appealed. (D.E. 478, 479.)
In October 2022-while the Government's most-recent appeals were still pending before the Third Circuit-Carolyn completed her term of supervised release.[3] (See id. at 6.) Just two months later, in December 2022, the parties participated in oral argument before the Third Circuit. (D.E. 487 at 2; D.E. 494 at 3.)
On April 3, 2023, the Third Circuit again vacated Defendants' sentences. (See generally D.E. 487.) In remanding the case, the Third Circuit instructed that this case be assigned to a different judge, (D.E. 487-1 at 11-12), and on April 19, 2023, Chief Judge Renee M. Bumb assigned it to this Court, (D.E. 485). Resentencing has been set for October 11, 2023. (D.E. 490.)
Carolyn filed the instant Motion on May 18, 2023.[4] (D.E. 493.) The Government filed its opposition on May 24, 2023. (D.E. 494.) One week later, Carolyn filed a reply, (D.E. 497), which John joined and supplemented on June 23, 2023, (D.E. 498). At bottom, Defendants argue that the imposition of any further sentence would violate their rights under both the Double Jeopardy and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution.
Defendants' arguments contradict precedent and practical application, and therefore the Motion must be denied.
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. This constitutional guarantee “affords three protections to the criminal defendant.” Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 380-81 (1989). “The first two[] . . . protect against a second prosecution for the same offense, and against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction.” Id. at 381 (citing Ohio v Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498 (1984)). The third such protection safeguards criminal defendants “against ‘multiple punishments for the same offense' imposed in a single proceeding.” Id. (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)).
The Supreme Court has identified “two vitally important interests” embodied by the Double Jeopardy Clause:
The first is the “deeply ingrained” principle that “the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.” The second interest is the preservation of “the finality of judgments.”
Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 117-18 (2009) (internal citations omitted). Because of these vital interests, “[a]n acquittal is accorded special weight” under the Double Jeopardy Clause. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129 (1980). Indeed, “‘[t]he constitutional protection against double jeopardy unequivocally prohibits a second trial following an acquittal,' for the ‘public interest in the finality of criminal judgments is so strong that an acquitted defendant may not be retried even though “the acquittal was based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation.”'” Id. (quoting Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962)).
The foregoing interests do not apply with equal force in the context of an appealed noncapital sentence.[5] Id. at 730. As the Supreme Court explained in United States v. DiFrancesco:
The double jeopardy considerations that bar reprosecution after an acquittal do not prohibit review of a sentence. We have noted . . . the basic design of the double jeopardy provision, that is, as a bar against repeated attempts to convict, with consequent subjection of the defendant to embarrassment, expense, anxiety, and insecurity, and the possibility that he may be found guilty even though innocent. These considerations, however, have no significant application to the prosecution's statutorily...
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