United States v. Jaimes-Moreno, 16-CV-07776
| Decision Date | 11 December 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 13 CR 694,No. 16-CV-07776,16-CV-07776,13 CR 694 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. NICACIO JAIMES-MORENO, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On September 25, 2013, Defendant Nicacio Jaimes-Moreno was indicted on a charge that he knowingly transported a minor in interstate commerce with the intent that the minor engage in criminal sexual activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). Shortly before the trial on that charge was scheduled to begin, Defendant Jaimes-Moreno pled guilty to a lesser charge of knowingly transporting an individual (not necessarily a minor) for the purpose of engaging in criminal sexual activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2421(a). As a result of the plea deal, Jaimes-Moreno's potential sentence was capped at ten years, rather than at life, and he was sentenced on March 30, 2015 to a ten-year term. He now moves under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate the judgment against him, alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. For the reasons outlined below, the defendant's claims fail to satisfy the test for ineffective assistance set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984), and its progeny. The defendant cannot show that his counsel's performance was deficient, and even if he could, he was not prejudiced by the representation he received. Accordingly, the motion is denied.
In approximately 2006, the defendant lived in Mexico with his girlfriend, and Victim A, the daughter of his girlfriend. PSR at ¶ 11; GV at 1-2.1 While living there, the defendant began to rape Victim A, who was a minor. PSR at ¶¶ 10-11; GV at 2. In 2007, the defendant moved to the United States illegally and arranged for Victim A to join him in Tulsa, Oklahoma. PSR at ¶ 12; GV at 2-3. In about May 2010, the defendant, Victim A, and Victim A's mother together moved from Oklahoma to Indiana. PSR at ¶ 13; GV at 4. Next, the defendant moved Victim A and her mother with him to Illinois in August or September 2010, when Victim A was 15 years old. R. 90 at 2; PSR at ¶ 13. Throughout their time in Oklahoma, Indiana, and Illinois, the defendant continued to rape Victim A. R. 90 at 2; PSR at ¶ 13; GV at 4-5.
On August 28, 2013, the defendant was named in a criminal complaint charging him with knowingly transporting Victim A, a minor, in interstate commerce from Indiana to Illinois, with the intent that Victim A engage in sexual activity for which the defendant could be charged with a criminal offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). Cmplt., ECF No. 1. On September 19, 2013, the grand jury returned a one-count indictment charging the defendant with the samecrime. Indictment, ECF No. 8. This charge carried a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of ten years and a maximum term of imprisonment for life. Trial was set for October 27, 2014. ECF No. 47. As discussed further below, the defendant ultimately waived his right to a jury trial and requested a bench trial. ECF No. 59.
After the defendant's original counsel withdrew on November 14, 2013,2 then, on or about December 11, 2013, the Court appointed the defendant's counsel, Ralph Schindler, who is the subject of the defendant's pending motion. See ECF Nos. 25-27, 41. Three months later, on March 12, 2014, the defendant filed a pro se motion seeking substitution of counsel on the basis that "an irreconcilable conflict" had arisen between the defendant and his counsel. ECF No. 31. During a March 26, 2014 hearing (ECF No. 42), the Court denied the defendant's motion after learning that the defendant's primary concern was that he wanted more communication with his counsel. 3/26/2014 Tr. (ECF No. 120) at 5-6. During the hearing, the defendant acknowledged that he had an opportunity to talk about issues with counsel, that counsel explained what counsel was doing, and that counsel's explanations answered the defendant's questions and concerns, but nevertheless maintained that he wanted to switch counsel. Id. at 4. The Court noted that counsel had "invested a substantial period of time on [the defendant's case] already" and that the general nature of the problem did not then warrant the appointment of new counsel. Id. at 6. Accordingly, the court denied the defendant's motion and directed both the defendant and his counsel "to work harder at working together productively," which the defendant agreed to do. Id. at 6-7. The court specifically advised the defendant that it would reconsider the need to appointdifferent counsel if "Mr. Schindler and you continue to go down the road and you continue to have problems working together." Id. at 6.
Less than three months before trial, on August 4, 2014, the defendant again filed a pro se motion for substitute counsel. ECF No. 52. Among other things, the defendant's motion stated that "his attorney verbally promised the [the defendant] [a] 3-4 years sentence" based on counsel's apparent plea discussions with the government, but that the defendant "did not agree with the time." Id. at 2. The defendant also cited his concern about potentially facing new federal charges involving guns, as well as the defendant's concern about accepting a plea offer that could result in a 10-year sentence. Id. The Court held a hearing on the defendant's motion on August 21, 2014. ECF No. 59. During this dialog, the defendant complained that Mr. Schindler had told him that there was "nothing he could do" to help the defendant, but when the Court pressed the defendant to explain further, it became clear that the defendant's principal problem as to Mr. Schindler was not what he had done or failed to do to prepare for trial but rather his (Schindler's) inability to negotiate a better deal with the government. Id. at 7-9. With respect to the defendant's concerns, the Court confirmed that the government was entitled to its view of the case and that Mr. Schindler's duty as the defendant's counsel was to "assist you in defending against whatever charges the government brings at a trial if the government is unwilling to offer you a deal that is acceptable to you short of a trial. And from all that I can see in this case, . . . Mr. Schindler is doing exactly that. The court then cataloged for the defendant the types of actions that Mr. Schindler was making on his behalf:
You're entitled to competent counsel, and everything I can see of Mr. Schindler's representation in that matter suggests that he is performing his duties competently, and that's an understatement because the record in this case reflects that he is very actively doing things necessary to defend against the charges that have been brought against you. He has secured the services of investigators, he has secured or is seeking to secure the services of expert witnesses, he has interviewed andsecured or has a motion pending that we'll address today to ensure that a number of witnesses for your defense are brought in from other locations at the government's expense. He has filed numerous motions to preserve your rights as guaranteed by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In short, Mr. Schindler's efforts in this case have been substantial, they have been appropriate in the view of the Court in terms of the kinds of activity that would be necessary to defend this case, and they are substantially in excess of the kinds of efforts that the court normally sees made in defending criminal cases.
8/21/2014 Tr. (ECF No. 117) at 6-7. The court denied the motion in the absence of any indication that the communication problems between the defendant and Mr. Schindler were preventing Mr. Schindler from preparing for trial or getting necessary information from the defendant. Id. at 10.
During the same hearing, the defendant confirmed that, as indicated by the motion filed by his attorney (ECF No. 56), he was seeking a bench trial. 8/21/2014 Tr. (ECF No. 117) at 14-15. In the ensuing colloquy to ensure that the defendant's waiver of his right to a jury trial was knowing and voluntary, the defendant noted that he was taking "three different psychiatric medications" at the time, which were being prescribed for him at the MCC. Id. at 17-18. In response to the court's questions, the defendant confirmed that the medications helped him to relax and to think more clearly and that there was no reason he could not go forward with an important decision like waiving his right to a jury trial. Id. at 19. After a full colloquy, the court accepted the defendant's jury trial waiver and entered an order setting the case for a bench trial. ECF No. 59.
A pretrial conference was scheduled on October 22, 2014. At the very outset of the conference, the defendant personally requested an opportunity to engage in further plea discussions with the government. 10/22/14 Tr. (ECF No. 114) at 2. Mr. Schindler explained that the mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years carried by the indictment had been the stickingpoint in negotiations and the government indicated that it had offered to issue a superseding information charging a crime that carried a 10-year maximum sentence and eliminated the mandatory minimum. The court accommodated the defendant's request and delayed the start of the conference to give the parties an opportunity to confer further. Within about half an hour, the parties advised the Court that the discussion had been fruitful and that it was likely that the defendant would enter a plea of guilty to a superseding information charging a less serious crime than the indictment.
The following day, October 23, 2014, the defendant pled guilty pursuant to a written plea declaration to a one-count superseding information, which charged him with knowingly transporting Victim A in interstate commerce from Indiana to Illinois, with the intent that Victim A engage in sexual activity...
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