United States v. Jenkins
| Decision Date | 11 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-3089 |
| Parties | United States of America, Appellee v. Curtis Jenkins, Appellant |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Argued May 11, 2022
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 1:16-cr-00213-1)
Celia Goetzl, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. With her on the appellant's Memorandum of Law and Fact was A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender.
Kevin Birney, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the appellee's Memorandum of Law and Fact were Chrisellen R. Kolb and Nicholas P. Coleman Assistant U.S. Attorneys.
Before: KATSAS and WALKER, Circuit Judges, and GINSBURG Senior Circuit Judge.
A district court may grant an inmate compassionate release only for "extraordinary and compelling reasons." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Typically, such reasons involve personal considerations such as the inmate's health, age, or family circumstances. Section 1B1.13 of the Sentencing Guidelines, which governs motions for compassionate release filed by the Bureau of Prisons, addresses when these considerations become sufficiently "extraordinary and compelling" to warrant compassionate release.
In United States v. Long, 997 F.3d 342 (D.C. Cir. 2021), we held that section 1B1.13 does not govern motions for compassionate release filed by the inmate himself. This case presents the question whether the district courts, in considering such motions, may nonetheless rely on section 1B1.13 and its commentary as persuasive authority. Following the view of nine sister circuits, we hold that they may.
This case also presents the question whether certain intervening legal changes, occurring after the sentence at issue was imposed, can support compassionate release. One is a statute that only prospectively reduces penalties for the defendant's offense. Another is a judicial decision that retroactively establishes legal error at sentencing. A third is a judicial decision that, if rendered earlier, might have affected the negotiation of a plea bargain by reducing the defendant's exposure. We hold that none of these changes in sentencing law can support the grant of compassionate release.
Under the former regime of indeterminate sentencing, a prisoner typically became eligible for release on parole after serving the earlier of one third of his sentence or 10 years. 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) (). Executive officials had broad discretion to grant or deny parole. Id. § 4206(a). In addition, the Bureau of Prisons could at any time and for any reason move in court to reduce the prisoner's sentence to time served. Id. § 4205(g).
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 abandoned indeterminate sentencing. Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. II, 98 Stat 1987. The SRA abolished parole, including release under section 4205(g). Id. § 218(a)(5), 98 Stat. at 2027. It prohibits modification of a sentence except in three defined circumstances. First, as under the old section 4205(g), the court may reduce a sentence upon motion of the Bureau of Prisons. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). This avenue is widely known as compassionate release. Second, the court may modify a sentence "to the extent otherwise expressly permitted by statute or by Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure." Id. § 3582(c)(1)(B). Third, the court may resentence a defendant if the Sentencing Commission has lowered the applicable guideline range and made the change retroactive. Id. § 3582(c)(2).
The SRA imposed three limits on compassionate release that were not present in the old section 4205(g). First, a district court may grant the Bureau's motion only if it finds that "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warrant early release.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).[1] Second, the reduced sentence must be "consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Finally, the court may grant relief only "after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable." Id.
The First Step Act of 2018 created a new procedural pathway to compassionate release. As before, a defendant seeking compassionate release first must ask the BOP to file a motion on his behalf. Now, if the Bureau refuses, the defendant may file the motion on his own behalf. Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 602(b)(1), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)). The First Step Act did not alter the other statutory restrictions on compassionate release, including the requirement of "extraordinary and compelling reasons."
The Sentencing Commission has issued a policy statement about compassionate release, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, which it last amended before the passage of the First Step Act. The statement provides that a court may grant compassionate release "[u]pon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons" if "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant the reduction" and the inmate poses no danger to the safety of any other person.
Application note 1 of the commentary on section 1B1.13 lists three kinds of reasons that the Commission deems extraordinary and compelling: health, if the inmate suffers from a terminal illness or other serious condition from which he is not expected to recover; age, if the inmate is over 65, has seriously deteriorating health, and has served 10 years or 75% of his sentence; and family circumstances, if the caregiver of the inmate's minor child dies or becomes incapacitated or if the inmate's spouse becomes incapacitated and has no other caregiver. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)-(C). These categories are not exclusive. A reduction may also be warranted if, "[a]s determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, there exists in the defendant's case an extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or in combination with," the listed reasons. Id. cmt. n.1(D).
Section 1B1.13 binds courts in cases where it is "applicable." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). In United States v. Long, 997 F.3d 342 (D.C. Cir. 2021), we held that section 1B1.13 "is not 'applicable' to defendant-filed motions for compassionate release under the First Step Act," because it "applies only to motions _ filed by the Bureau of Prisons." Id. at 355. The Sentencing Commission lacked a quorum from January 2019 until August 2022, so it has been unable to promulgate a policy statement that applies to such motions.
In November 2016, police conducted a traffic stop of Curtis Jenkins' car. They found a stolen handgun, 11 grams of crack cocaine, and roughly $2,500 in cash. A federal grand jury charged Jenkins with one count of possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g); one count of possessing cocaine base with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) &(b)(1)(C); and one count of using a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C § 924(c)(1)(A). While Jenkins was on release pending trial, he fled after police tried to stop his car a second time. When the police eventually apprehended him, they discovered another gun, 3.5 grams of crack cocaine, and about $1,500 in cash. The grand jury once again charged Jenkins with the same three offenses, for a total of six counts.
At the time, Jenkins faced long mandatory minimum sentences on the various firearms charges. A section 924(c) offense carries a mandatory minimum sentence of five years' imprisonment, which must run consecutively with any other sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), (D)(ii) (2018). And section 924(c)'s stacking provision set a mandatory minimum sentence for a second section 924(c) offense at 25 years, even if the defendant had not yet been convicted of the first offense at the time of the second. Id. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i) (2012). Additionally, the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence for violating section 922(g) if the defendant has three prior convictions for a "violent felony" or "serious drug offense." Id. § 924(e)(1) (2018). Jenkins had two prior convictions for attempted distribution of cocaine and one for assault with a dangerous weapon under D.C. law. At the time, all three convictions arguably qualified as predicate offenses to trigger ACCA. Jenkins thus faced the substantial possibility of a 45-year mandatory minimum sentence, with additional prison time for the two drug charges.
Jenkins and the government entered a plea agreement. Jenkins agreed to plead guilty to one section 924(c) charge and one cocaine possession charge in exchange for dismissal of the remaining four charges. Given Jenkins' prior convictions, the parties agreed that the career offender sentencing guideline, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a), applied. That gave Jenkins a guideline range of about 22 to 27 years. Nonetheless, the parties agreed to recommend a prison term of eight to 12 years. The district court sentenced Jenkins to eight years. As part of the plea deal, Jenkins waived any right to challenge the sentence on direct appeal or by motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, except to the extent such a motion was based on newly discovered evidence or a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Three relevant legal developments then took place. First Congress prospectively narrowed section 924(c)'s stacking provision. Now, its enhanced minimum sentence applies only to offenses committed "after a prior conviction" under section 924(c). First Step Act § 403(a), 132 Stat. at 5221-22 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C)) (emphasis added). But the amendment applies only to defendants who had not yet been sentenced at the time of its enactment. Id. § 403(b), 132 Stat. at 5222. Had the change been in place when Jenkins was charged,...
To continue reading
Request your trial