United States v. De Jesus Moran-Rojo, 79 CR 447.
| Decision Date | 25 October 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 79 CR 447.,79 CR 447. |
| Citation | 478 F. Supp. 512 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Manuel DE JESUS MORAN-ROJO and Antonio Rivas |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Daniel W. Gillogly, Asst. U. S. Atty., Chicago, Ill., for the Government.
Nathan Bogolub and M. Robert Bogart, Chicago, Ill., for defendants.
Defendants have moved to dismiss the charges against them because they were indicted 32 days after arrest, in violation of the 30-day time limit imposed by the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq. The question before the court is whether the dismissal sanction provided in this statute, § 3162(a), applies to these defendants.
To allow the courts time to adapt to the Speedy Trial Act time limits, Congress provided that the dismissal sanction would not become effective until July 1, 1979. 18 U.S.C. § 1363(c). Finding the courts still not completely prepared to fully implement the Act, primarily because it has taken some time for new judges to be appointed and confirmed, Congress this year decided to suspend the operation of the dismissal sanction for one more year. The sanction was to be suspended immediately upon the signing of the Speedy Trial Act amendments by the President. See H.R.Rep. No. 96-390 (July 26, 1979), 1979 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News pp. 1758, 1759. These amendments, containing a provision making § 3162 effective for all cases commenced on or after July 1, 1980, were signed into law on August 2, 1979.
Defendants in this case were arrested on July 28, 1979, at which time the dismissal sanction under the unamended statute had already taken effect. The questions, then, are whether Congress, in amending the Act, intended suspension of the dismissal sanction to apply to pending cases, and if it did so intend, whether it had the power to lift that sanction. The House Report cited above makes clear that it was the committee's intent that the sanction be immediately suspended upon the signing of the 1979 amendments. It therefore seems likely that Congress intended to remove the sanction for pending cases. There is no evidence of any contrary intent to mandate dismissal for those defendants charged between July 1 and August 2 but not for those charged thereafter. Even in the absence of clear Congressional intent that the statutory change apply to pending cases, the court's conclusion is supported by the principle of statutory construction that:
"Where a new statute deals only with procedure, prima facie it applies to all actions—to those which have accrued or are pending, and to future actions . . . Absent a clearly expressed legislative purpose to the contrary, pending cases are only affected as to future proceedings from the point reached when the new law becomes operative."
2 Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 41.04 (Sands ed. 1973). See Turner v. United States, 410 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1969). Whether dismissal should be ordered for the government's failure to bring an indictment within the...
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U.S. v. Fielding
...implications of the "one month gap" and independent research has uncovered but one case analyzing its effect. United States v. DeJesus Moran-Rojo, 478 F.Supp. 512 (N.D.Ill.1979); see United States v. Barboza, 612 F.2d 999, 1000 n.1 (5th Cir. 1980). The Moran-Rojo court examined the legislat......
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U.S. v. Fielding
...Criminal Cases. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 50(b); United States v. Noll, 600 F.2d 1123, 1126-27 (5th Cir. 1979).5 Cf. United States v. De Jesus Moran-Rojo, 478 F.Supp. 512 (N.D.Ill.1979) (alleged Speedy Trial Act violation occurred after the effective date of the 1979 amendments; dismissal sanction ......
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U.S. v. Watson
...under the express language of the statute. United States v. West, 607 F.2d 300, 305 n. 5 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. DeJesus Moran-Rojo, 478 F.Supp. 512, 513 (N.D.Ill.1979). Accord, United States v. Hooper, 596 F.2d 219, 224 (7th Cir. 1979) (finding the sanction of dismissal unavailab......
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U.S. v. Vanella, 79-5527
...706 (4th Cir. 1974); 2 Sutherland, Statutes & Statutory Construction § 41.04 (Sands rev. 1973), quoted in United States v. De Jesus Moran-Rojo, 478 F.Supp. 512, 513 (N.D.Ill.1979). That rule applies In United States v. De Jesus Moran-Rojo, supra, the United States District Court for the Nor......