United States v. John Kelso Co.
| Decision Date | 11 April 1898 |
| Docket Number | 3,461. |
| Citation | 86 F. 304 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES v. JOHN KELSO CO. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
Samuel Knight, Asst. U.S. Atty.
R Percy Wright and Edwin L. Forster, for defendant.
On October 9, 1897, there was filed in this court by the United States district attorney for this district, an information charging the defendant, a corporation, with the violation of 'An act relating to the limitation of the hours of daily service of laborers and mechanics employed upon the public works of the United States and of the District of Columbia,' approved August 1, 1892 (2 Supp.Rev.St.p. 62). Upon the filing of this information, the court, upon motion of the district attorney, directed that a summons in the general form prescribed by section 1390 of the Penal Code of this state, be served upon said corporation, and accordingly on said date a summons was issued, directing the defendant to appear before the judge of said court in the court room of the United States district court for this district on the 21st day of October, 1897, to answer the charge contained in the information. The summons stated generally the nature of the charge, and for a more complete statement of such offense referred to the information on file. On the day named in said summons for its appearance, the defendant corporation appeared specially by its attorney, and moved to quash the summons, and to set aside the service thereof, upon grounds hereinafter stated. Upon the argument of this motion, it was claimed in behalf of the defendant: First, that the act of congress above referred to does not apply to corporations because the intention is a necessary element of the crime therein defined, and a corporation as such is incapable of entertaining a criminal intention; second, that, conceding that a corporation may be guilty of a violation of said act congress has provided no mode for obtaining jurisdiction of a corporation in a criminal proceeding, and for that reason the summons issued by the court was unauthorized by law, and its service a nullity. It will be seen that the first objection goes directly to the sufficiency of the information, and presents precisely the same question as would a general demurrer, attacking the information on the ground of an alleged failure to charge the defendant with the commission of a public offense. This objection is one which would not ordinarily be considered upon a motion like that now before the court, when the party making the objection refuses to acknowledge the jurisdiction of the court, or to make any other than a special appearance for the purpose of attacking its jurisdiction; but, in view of the conclusion which I have reached upon the second point urged by the defendant, it becomes necessary for me to determine whether the act of congress above referred to is applicable to a corporation and whether a corporation can be guilty of the crime of violating the provisions of said act. Section 1 of that act makes it unlawful for a contractor or subcontractor upon any of the public works of the United States, whose duty it shall be to employ, direct, or control the services of laborers or mechanics upon such public works, 'to require or permit any such laborer or mechanic to work more than eight hours in any calendar day except in case of extraordinary emergency ' And section 2 of the act provides 'that * * * any contractor whose duty it shall be to employ, direct, or control any laborer or mechanic employed upon any public works of the United States * * * who shall intentionally violate any provision of this act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and for each and every offense shall upon conviction be punished by a fine not to exceed one thousand dollars or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court having jurisdiction thereof. ' It will be observed that by the express language of this statute there must be an intentional violation of its provisions, in order to constitute the offense which the statute defines. In view of this express declaration, it is claimed in behalf of defendant that the act is not applicable to corporations, because it is not possible for a corporation to commit the crime described in the statute. The argument advanced to sustain this position is, in substance, this: That a corporation is only an artificial creation, without animate body or mind, and therefore, from its very nature, incapable of entertaining the specific intention which, by the statute, is made an essential element of the crime therein defined. The case of State v. Great Works M. & M. Co., 20 Me. 41, supports the proposition that a corporation is not amenable to prosecution for a positive act of misfeasance, involving a specific intention to do an unlawful act, and it must be conceded there are to be found dicta in many other cases to the same effect. In a general sense, it may be said that no crime can be committed without a joint operation of act and intention. In many crimes, however, the only intention required is an intention to do the prohibited act,-- that is to say, the crime is complete when the prohibited act has been intentionally done; and the more recent and better considered cases hold that a corporation may be charged with an offense which only involves this kind of intention, and may be properly convicted when, in its corporate capacity, and by direction of those controlling its corporate action, it does the prohibited act. In such a case the intention of its directors that the prohibited act should be done is imputed to the corporation itself. State v. Morris E.R. Co., 23 N.J.Law, 360; Reg. v. Great North of England Ry. Co., 58 E.C.L. 315; Com. v. Proprietors of New Bedford Bridge, 2 Gray, 339. See, also, State v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 15 W.Va. 380. That a corporation may be liable civilly for that class of torts in which a specific malicious intention is an essential element is not disputed at this day. Thus an action for malicious prosecution will lie against a banking corporation. Reed v. Bank, 130 Mass. 434; Goodspeed...
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...held in 1898 that there are certain crimes, including murder, of which a corporation cannot be guilty. Id. (citing United States v. John Kelso Co. , 86 F. 304 (N.D. Cal. 1898) ). Mongol Nation argues that because it is legally incapable of committing any of the specific intent "racketeering......
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Albrecht v. United States, 9
...5, supra. 8 The leading case on the use of summons in criminal prosecutions against corporations in the federal courts is United States v. Kelso (D. C.) 86 F. 304, followed in United States v. Standard Oil Co. (D. C.) 154 F. 728; United States v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. (C. C.) 163 F......
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