United States v. John Doe

• Decision Date: 17 June 2020
• Docket Number: No. 19-6152,19-6152
• Citation: 962 F.3d 139
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. John DOE, Defendant - Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

962 F.3d 139

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.John DOE, Defendant - Appellant.

No. 19-6152

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 27, 2020

Decided: June 17, 2020

G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before MOTZ, WYNN, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.

Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Wynn wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge Motz joined. Judge Richardson wrote a dissenting opinion.

WYNN, Circuit Judge:

Defendant appeals the district court's order denying his motion to seal.¹ Defendant, a federal inmate, argues that the district court unnecessarily exposed him to harm by issuing an order that referred to his cooperation with the government. Fearful that other inmates would use online legal research services to discover the district court's order and, consequently, his cooperation, Defendant moved to seal the order.

Defendant's request implicates the public's interest in accessing judicial records, the government's interest in protecting cooperating defendants in federal custody, and Defendant's interest in his own safety. But the district court summarily denied Defendant's motion. The court ignored facts showing that Defendant faces a heightened risk of harm in prison and failed to consider the increased risks that all government cooperators now face due to the advent of electronic filing and the use of the internet to identify cooperators. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with an order to seal the order in question.

I.

In 2012, Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute 28 grams or more of cocaine base and 500 grams or more of cocaine. At sentencing, the government moved for a downward departure under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 5K1.1 in light of Defendant's substantial assistance. The government explained that Defendant had willingly provided information to state authorities even before he was federally indicted. Defendant described multistate drug-trafficking networks and provided information about in-state drug dealers and multiple home invasion robberies. The information proved credible and was used in another individual's sentencing, as well as in several investigations.

After balancing the sentencing factors, the district court sentenced Defendant to 252 months’ imprisonment—a significant downward departure from his Guidelines range of 292 to 365 months. Defendant did not appeal his sentence.

In 2016, Defendant moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and Guidelines Amendment 782, which lowered base offense levels for federal drug crimes. According to Defendant, under the Amendment, his new Guidelines range was 235 to 293 months. The district court denied the § 3582 motion in July 2018.

In explaining Defendant's original 252-month sentence, the district court's order denying Defendant's § 3582 motion referred to the government's § 5K1.1 motion. Defendant became concerned about that reference, and in November 2018, he moved to seal the district court's order and to remove its contents from online legal research services. Defendant contended that the district court's reference to his cooperation threatened his safety because the order was available to other inmates through the prison law library.

The district court denied Defendant's motion to seal in a text order issued in late December 2018. Citing Doe v. Public Citizen , 749 F.3d 246, 272–73 (4th Cir. 2014), the court noted that the underlying order "ha[d] been public since July 30, 2018." J.A. 14.² Defendant timely appealed in January 2019.³

In February 2019, the district court issued a one-paragraph written order that again denied Defendant's motion to seal. That order contained little more analysis than the text order, stating only that "[t]he court has carefully weighed the interests discussed in [Defendant]’s motion to seal and those interests favoring public access to judicial documents and records" and that the court would deny the motion. J.A. 26 (citing Doe , 749 F.3d at 265–69 ).

II.

Before reaching the merits, we must consider whether this Court has jurisdiction over Defendant's appeal. Federal courts have an independent duty to confirm their own jurisdiction even when, as here, it is unquestioned by the parties. See Va. Dep't of Corr. v. Jordan , 921 F.3d 180, 187 (4th Cir. 2019). Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 1292, we have jurisdiction only over final orders and certain interlocutory and collateral orders. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. , 337 U.S. 541, 545–46, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949).

This Court has not explicitly decided whether an order denying a motion to seal judicial documents is an appealable final judgment. It has, however, held that "an order unsealing district court documents is an appealable collateral order under Cohen ." Va. Dep't of State Police v. Wash. Post , 386 F.3d 567, 574 n.4 (4th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added); see also Under Seal v. Under Seal , 326 F.3d 479, 481, 485 (4th Cir. 2003). Additionally, other courts of appeals have concluded that both sealing and unsealing orders are appealable collateral orders. See, e.g. , Vantage Health Plan, Inc. v. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr. , 913 F.3d 443, 449–50 & n.1 (5th Cir. 2019) (collecting cases).

Moreover, the district court's order here was not, in fact, collateral to an ongoing proceeding. Rather, it was a final, post-judgment order, which significant persuasive authority suggests is appealable. See United States v. Ray , 375 F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir. 2004) ("[T]his court has found post-judgment orders to be ‘final’ for purposes of § 1291 in a variety of criminal and civil contexts."); Sportmart, Inc. v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc. , 601 F.2d 313, 316 (7th Cir. 1979) ("[M]ost post-judgment orders are final decisions within the ambit of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as long as the district court has completely disposed of the matter."); 15B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3916 (2d ed. 1992 & Supp. 2020) ("[O]nce the original trial proceedings have been completed, final judgment appeal should be available upon conclusion of most post-judgment proceedings."); see also In re Am. Preferred Prescription, Inc. , 255 F.3d 87, 92–93 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[O]rders entered post-judgment in ordinary civil litigation ... are generally appealable, unless they are ministerial or administrative, such as post-judgment discovery orders." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Palmer v. Wyeth , No. 97-20291, 1998 WL 857388, at *2 n.9 (5th Cir. Nov. 9, 1998) (unpublished) (per curiam); Ohntrup v. Firearms Ctr., Inc. , 802 F.2d 676, 678 (3d Cir. 1986) (per curiam); 19 Daniel R. Coquillette et al., Moore's Federal Practice – Civil § 202.13 (3d ed. 2020) (noting that post-judgment proceedings are appealable "to the extent that similar orders in prejudgment proceedings are appealable").

In line with this authority, we have previously explicitly exercised § 1291 jurisdiction over a post-judgment order. E.g. , United States v. $79,650.00 Seized from Bank of Am. Account Ending in 8247 , 650 F.3d 381, 386 (4th Cir.), as corrected (June 2, 2011); cf. In re Mbakpuo , No. 93-1662, 1995 WL 224050, at *2 (4th Cir. Apr. 17, 1995) (unpublished) (per curiam). And we have often implicitly done so for post-judgment motions related to sealing documents. E.g. , United States v. Morgan , No. 91-7192, 1992 WL 102573 (4th Cir. May 15, 1992) (unpublished).⁴ So have our sister circuits. E.g. , United States v. Bacon , 950 F.3d 1286, 1289–90 (10th Cir. 2020) ; Fair Lab. Practices Assocs. v. Riedel , 666 F. App'x 209, 211 (3d Cir. 2016).

Admittedly, this Court has stated that an appeal related to a sealing order "would be treated as a petition for mandamus if the party seeking review has standing and has substantially complied with the requirements of [Fed. R. App. P.] 21(a)." In re Wash. Post Co. , 807 F.2d 383, 388 (4th Cir. 1986). In fact, this Court has at times referred to mandamus as the "preferred vehicle" for seeking review of sealing-related orders. Under Seal , 326 F.3d at 485 n.5.

But our preference for mandamus in sealing cases is usually limited to appeals filed by third parties, such as members of the press. See, e.g. , Balt. Sun Co. v. Goetz , 886 F.2d 60, 63 (4th Cir. 1989) ("Mandamus, not appeal, ‘is the preferred method of review for orders restricting press activity related to criminal proceedings.’ " (emphasis added) (quoting In re Wash. Post , 807 F.2d at 388 )); Cent. S.C. Chapter, Soc'y of Prof'l Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi v. Martin , 556 F.2d 706, 707 (4th Cir. 1977) (noting that mandamus was "the proper remedy" in a case involving press requests for access). But see Va. Dep't of State Police , 386 F.3d at 574 n.4 (in a case involving the press, calling mandamus the "preferred vehicle" but nevertheless noting that "an order unsealing district court documents is an appealable collateral order" and therefore not employing mandamus review). And although this Court has occasionally expressed a preference for mandamus without explicitly limiting that preference to cases involving the press, such statements were dicta and do not bind us here. See, e.g. , In re Application of the U.S. for an Order , 707 F.3d 283, 289 n.3 (4th Cir. 2013) (employing mandamus but noting that the Court would reach the same result if it were to "treat this request for relief as an appealable collateral order"); Under Seal , 326 F.3d at 485 & n.5 (referring to mandamus as the "preferred vehicle" but holding that an unsealing order was an appealable collateral order).

Because Defendant is a party to this criminal proceeding, ...